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Ribot,   Th, 

The  Diseases  of  Personality.  1387 


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^DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 

^  By  TH.  RIBOT. 

Translated  from  the  French  by  J.  FITZGERALD,  M.A. 
(Copyright,  1887,  by  J.  Fitzgerald.) 


CHAPTER    I. 

INTRODUCTION.— PERSONALITY. — INDI- 
VIDUALITY.— CONSCIOUSNESS. 

In  the  language  of  psychology  the  gen- 
eral meaning  of  the  term  "  person  "  is,  an 
individual  being  that  has  a  clear  conscious- 
ness of  itself  and  that  acts  consequently : 
it  is  the  highest  form  of  individuality. 
Metaphysical  psychology,  to  explain  this 
character  (which  it  reserves  for  man  ex- 
clusively) merely  assumes  a  Me  [ego],  ab- 
solutely one,  simple,  and  identical.  Un- 
fortunately, the  explanation  is  illusive,  the 
solution  only  apparent.  Unless  we  assign 
a  supernatural  origin  to  this  Me,  we  must 
needs  explain  how  it  comes  to  be,  and 
from  what  lower  form  it  springs.  Ex- 
perimental psychology  can  neither  state 
the  problem  in  the  same  way  nor  treat  it 
by  the  same  method.  It  learns  from  nat- 
ural history  how  difficult  it  is  in  many 
cases  to  determine  the  characters  of  indi- 
viduality, far  less  complex  though  they  be 
than  those  of  personality ;  simple,  easy 
solutions  it  mistrusts,  and  far  from  sup- 
posing the  problem  to  be  resolvable  at 
the  first  attack,  it  finds  the  solution  at  the 
final  term  of  its  researches,  as  the  result 
of  laborious  investigations.  It  is  there- 
fore quite  natural  that  the  representatives 
of  the  old  school,  being  a  little  off  their 
bearings,  should  accuse  those  of  the  new 
school  of  "  stealing  their  Me,"  though 
nobody  has  attempted  anything  of  the 
kind.  But  the  language  of  either  side  is 
so  different  from  that  of  the  other,  and 
their  methods  are  so  opposite  that  they 
no  longer  understand  one  another. 

At  the  risk  of  increasing  the  confusion, 
I  would  try  to  find  out  what  is  to  be 
learned  from  teratological,  or  morbid,  or 
merely  rare  cases,  touching  the  formation 
and   disorganization   of  personality,   but 


without  pretending  to  treat  the  subject 
in  its  entirety :  that  undertaking  were,  it 
seems  to  me,  premature. 

Personality  being  the  highest  form  of 
psychic  individuality,  a  preliminary  ques- 
tion arises  :  What  is  an  individual  ?  Few 
problems  have  in  our  days  been  more  dis- 
cussed by  naturalists  than  this,  and  few 
remain  more  obscure  as  regards  the 
lower  grades  of  animal  life.  It  is  not  yet 
time  to  treat  it  in  detail :  in  the  conclu- 
sion of  this  work,  after  we  shall  have 
studied  the  constituent  elements  of  per- 
sonality, we  will  consider  personality 
itself  as  a  whole.  Then  we  shall  take  oc- 
casion to  compare  personality  with  the; 
lower  forms  through  which  nature  hass 
essayed  to  produce  it,  and  to  show  thai 
the  psychic  individual  is  only  the  expres-. 
sion  of  the  organism  :  like  it  of  low 
grade,  undifferentiated,  incoherent,  or- 
complex  and  integrated.  For  the  present 
it  suffices  to  remind  the  reader  who  has 
already  some  acquaintance  with  these; 
studies,  that  as  we  descend  in  the  animaL 
series,  we  see  the  psychic  individual 
formed  by  more  or  less  perfect  fusion  of 
less  complex  individuals— -a,  colony-con-, 
sciousness  being  produced  by  the  co-op- 
eration of  local  consciousness.  These 
discoveries  in  natural  history  are  of  the:- 
utmost  importance  for  psychology.  Own- 
ing to  them  the  problem  of  personality 
takes  a  new  form :  it  mus,  t  be  approached 
from  below;  and  one  is^led.to  ask; 
whether  the  human  personality  itself  is-, 
not  a  "coalition  whole  "  whose  extreme- 
complexity  makes  ks  origin  difficult  to  . 
discover,  or  even  inscrutable,  did  not  the 
existence  of  elemental  forms  throw  some 
light  upon  the  process  of  this  fusion. 

Human  personality — and  of  this  alone 
can  we  treat  to  any  purpose,  especially  in 
a  pathological  essay — is  a  concrete  whole, 
a  complex.     To.  know  what  it  is,  we  must 


THE   DISEASES    OF   PERSONALITY. 


analvze  it,  and  here  analysis  is  of  neces- 
sity 'artificial,  for  it  separates  groups  of 
phenomena  that  are  not  merely  juxta- 
posed but  co-ordinated,  and  standing 
toward  one  another  not  in  the  relation  of 
mere  simultaneity  but  of  mutual  depend- 
ence. Still  analysis  is  indispensable. 
Adopting  therefore  a  division  of  the  sub- 
ject which  I  hope  will  be  its  own  justifi- 
cation, I  will  consider  successively  the 
Organic,  the  Affective,  and  the  Intellect- 
ive conditions  of  personality,  laying  stress 
upon  anomalies  and  irregularities.  Upon 
a  final  survey  of  the  subject  we  shall 
group  together  again  these  dissevered 
elements. 


But  before  we  begin  the  exposition  and 
interpretation  of  the  facts,  it  will  be  well 
to  have  an  understanding  as  to  the  nature 
■of  consciousness.  I  do  not  propose  to 
write  a  monograph  on  consciousness,  for 
■that  would  cover  pretty  nearly  the  whole 
field  of  psychology :  it  will  be  enough  to 
:state  the  problem  with  precision. 

Details  apart,  we  find  only  two  hypoth- 
eses :  one  very  ancient,  according  to 
■\vhich  consciousness  is  the  fundamental 
-property  of  the  "soul,"  or  the  "mind," 
-constituting  its  essence  ;  the  other  very 
-recent,  which  regards  consciousness  as  a 
simple  phenomenon  superadded  to  the 
cerebral  activity,  as  an  occurrence  having 
its  own  conditions  of  existence,  and  which 
.comes  or  goes  as  circumstances  decide. 

The  former    hypothesis    has    been   in 
vogue  so  long  that  it  is  easy  to  judge  of 
its   merits   and  its    defects.     I    am  _  not 
called  upon  to  pass  sentence  upon  it ;  I 
will  simply  show  its  utter  powerlessness 
to  explain  the   mind's   unconscious    life. 
In  the  first  place,  for  a  long  time  it  took 
no  cognizance  of   this   unconscious  life. 
Leibnitz's   clear   and   profound   observa- 
tions on  that   point   lie  forgotten   or   at 
least  in  abeyance  ;  and  till  well  on  in  the 
present   century  the   most   distinguished 
psychologists  (with  a  few  exceptions)  re- 
•  stricted  themselves  to  consciousness.     At 
last,  when  the  question    must  be  heard, 
.  and  when  it  was  clear  to  every  one  that  to 
regard  psychic  life  as  embracing  simply 
the  data  of  consciousness  is  a  conception 
so  poor  and  jejune  as  to  be  of  no  use  in 
practice,  then  the  metaphysical  psycholo- 
gists were  in  a  quandary.     They  adopted 
the  hypothesis  of  "unconscious  states." 
.  an     ambiguous    and    semi-contradictory 
-  term  soon  widely  accepted  :  the  term  it- 
self betrays  the  confusion  of  ideas  amid 
^vvhich  it  arose.     What  is  meant  by  "  un- 


conscious states  ?  "  The  wise  note  their 
existence,  without  trying  to  account  for 
them  ;  the  less  wise  talk  of  latent  thought, 
of  unconscious  consciousness — expres- 
sions so  vague,  so  illogical,  that  many  au- 
thors have  admitted  as  much.  In  truth,  if 
the  soul  be  defined  to  be  thinking  sub- 
stance, whereof  states  of  consciousness 
are  modifications,  it  is  plainly  a  contradic- 
tion in  terms  to  ascribe  to  it  unconscious 
states.  No  fetch  of  language,  no  trick  of 
dialectic  can  help  the  matter  :  and  foras- 
much as  the  high  importance  of  these  un- 
conscious states  as  factors  of  psychic  life 
is  undeniable*  there  is  no  escape  from  the 
situation. 

The  second  hypothesis  clears  the 
ground  of  all  this  logomachy.  It  does 
away  with  the  factitious  problems  that 
swarm  in  the  first  (eg.  whether  con- 
sciousness be  a  general  or  a  particular 
faculty,  etc.),  and  we  may  fearlessly  claim 
for  it  the  benefit  of  the  lex  parcimonia. 
It  is  the  simpler,  the  clearer,  the  more 
consistent  of  the  two.  Compared  with 
the  other,  it  may  be  characterized  as  ex- 
pressing the  unconscious  in  physiolog- 
ical terms  (states  of  the  nervous  system) 
and  not  in  psychological  terms  (latent 
thought,  sensations  not  sensed,  etc.). 
But  this  is  only  a  particular  case  of  the 
hypothesis  :  we  have  now  to  consider  it 
as  a  whole. 

I  would  remark  first  that  conscious- 
ness, like  all  general  terms,  must  be  re- 
solved into  concrete  data.  Just  as  there 
is  not  a  will  in  general,  but  only  volitions, 
so  there  is  not  a  consciousness  in  general, 
but  only  states  of  consciousness :  and 
these  alone  are  real.  As  for  defining  the 
state  of  consciousness,  the  fact  of  being 
conscious,  that  were  a  vain  and  idle  at- 
tempt .  it  is  a  datum  of  observation,  an 
ultimate  fact.  Physiology  shows  that  its 
production  is  always  associated  with  the 
activity  of  the  nervous  system  and  in  par- 
ticular of  the  brain.  But  the  converse 
proposition  is  not  true  :  though  psychic 
activity  always  implies  nerve  activity, 
nerve  activity  does  not  always  imply 
psychic  activity.  Nerve  activity  has  far 
greater  extension  than  psychic  activity  : 
hence  consciousness  is  something  super- 
added. In  other  words,  we  must  regard 
a  state  of  consciousness  as  a  complex 
fact  (evenement,  event,  occurrence)  which 
presupposes  a  particular  state  of  the  ner- 
vous system  ;  nor  is  this  nervous  process 
an  accessory  but  on  the  contrary  an  inte- 
gral part  of  the  fact — nay,  its  ground- 
work, its  fundamental  condition ;  once 
produced,  the  fact  exists  in  itself ;   when 


THE   DISEASES   OF  PERSONALITY. 


consciousness  is  added,  the  fact  exists 
for  itself ;  consciousness  completes  it, 
gives  it  the  finishing  touch,  but  does  not 
constitute  it. 

Upon  this  hypothesis  we  readily  under- 
stand how  every  manifestation  of  psychic 
life — sensations,  desires,  feelings,  voli- 
tions, recollections,  reasonings,  inven- 
tions, etc.,  may  be  alternately  conscious 
and  unconscious.  There  is  nothing  mys- 
terious in  this  alternation,  because  in 
every  case  the  essential  conditions,  i.e., 
the  physiological  conditions,  remain  the 
same,  and  consciousness  is  only  comple- 
mentary— the  finish. 

The  question  would  remain,  why  this 
finish  sometimes  is  added,  sometimes  is 
lacking ;  for  were  there  not  in  the  phys- 
iological phenomenon  itself  something 
more  in  the  former  case  than  in  the  lat- 
ter, the  adverse  hypothesis  would  be  in- 
directly strengthened.  If  it  could  be 
shown  that  whenever  certain  physiologi- 
cal conditions  are  present  there  is  con- 
sciousness, that  when  they  disappear, 
consciousness  too  disappears,  and  that 
when  they  vary,  consciousness  varies : 
then  we  should  have  no  longer  an  hy- 
pothesis but  a  scientific  truth.  That  is  a 
distant  prospect  indeed.  Still  we  may 
confidently  predict  that  consciousness  at 
least  will  never  give  us  these  revelations 
touching  itself.  As  Maudsley  justly  says, 
consciousness  cannot  be  at  once  effect 
and  cause — cannot  be  at  once  itself  and 
its  molecular  antecedents  :  it  lives  for  an 
instant  only  and  cannot  by  a  direct  intu- 
ition turn  back  to  its  immediate  physio- 
logical antecedents  ;  and  besides,  to  de- 
scend again  to  these  material  antecedents 
were  to  lay  hold  not  of  itself  but  of  its 
cause. 

It  would  be  for  the  present  chimerical 
to  undertake  to  define  even  roughly  the 
necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  of  the 
apparition  of  consciousness.  We  know 
that  the  cerebral  circulation,  as  regards 
the  quantity  and  the  quality  of  the  blood, 
has  a  good  deal  to  do  with  the  case.  Of 
this  we  have  striking  proof  in  experi- 
ments made  on  the  heads  of  animals  im- 
mediately after  decapitation.  So  too  we 
know  that  the  duration  of  the  nervous 
processes  in  the  centers  is  an  important 
point.  Psychometric  research  daily  shows 
that  a  state  of  consciousness  takes  longer 
time  in  proportion  to  its  greater  complex- 
ity, and  that  on  the  other  hand  automatic 
acts,  whether  primordial  or  acquired,  the 
rapidity  of  which  is  extreme,  do  not  en- 
ter the  consciousness.  It  may  also  be 
affirmed  that  the  apparition  of  conscious- 


ness is  connected  with  the  period  of  the 
disassimilation  of  nerve  tissue,  as  Herzen 
has  shown  in  detail.*  But  all  these  re- 
sults are  but  partial  gains,  while  a  scien- 
tific account  of  the  genesis  of  a  phenom- 
enon requires  a  determination  of  all  its 
essential  conditions. 

This  the  future  will  yield  perhaps.  In 
the  mean  time  we  shall  best  strengthen 
our  hypothesis  by  showing  that  it  alone 
explains  one  highly  important  character 
— and  not  merely  a  condition — of  con- 
sciousness, namely  its  infer?nittence.  To 
avoid  all  misunderstanding  at  the  outset, 
be  it  noted  that  the  question  is  not  as  to 
the  discontinuity  of  states  of  conscious- 
ness with  one  another.  Each  has  its 
limits  which,  while  they  allow  it  to  be  as- 
sociated with  others,  preserve  its  own  in- 
dividuality. Not  of  this  do  we  speak, 
but  of  the  well  known  fact  that  con- 
sciousness has  interruptions  :  in  ordinary 
language,  a  man  is  not  always  thinking. 

True  it  is,  that  this  assertion  has  been 
contradicted  by  the  majority  of  metaphy- 
sicians. But  they  have  never  furnished 
proof  in  support  of  their  thesis  ;  and,-as 
all  the  facts  apparently  are  against  it,  the 
burden  of  proof  seems  to  lie  upon  its  ad- 
vocates. Their  whole  argument  is  in 
effect  that  since  the  soul  is  essentially  a 
thing  that  thinks,  consciousness  must 
needs  always  exist  in  some  degree,  even 
though  no  trace  of  it  subsists  in  the  mem- 
ory. But  this  is  simply  begging  the  ques- 
tion, for  the  hypothesis  we  maintain  chal- 
lenges their  major  premise.  Their  alleged 
proof  is,  after  all,  only  an  inference 
drawn  from  a  contested  hypothesis. 

Let  us  put  aside  all  a  priori  solutions 
and  look  at  the  question  as  it  is  in  itself. 
Let  us  consider,  not  cases  of  syncope, 
artificial  anaesthesia,  epileptic  vertigo,  co- 
ma, etc.,  but  the  familiar  and  frequently 
occurring  psychic  state  of  sleep.  It  has 
been  asserted  that  sleep  is  never  dream- 
less ;  but  that  is  a  purely  theoretic  asser- 
tion, based  on  the  thesis  that  the  soul  is 
ever  thinking.  The  only  fact  that  can 
be  cited  in  support  of  this  proposition  is 
that  sometimes  a  sleeper,  when  called  or 
questioned,  responds  in  suitable  fashion, 
but  on  waking  has  no  recollection  of  the 
occurrence.  But  this  fact  does  not  justi- 
fy a  general  conclusion,  and  the  theory 
of  the  metaphysicians  is  met  by  the 
physiologists  with  another.  Physiology 
teaches  us  that  the  life  of  every  organ 
comprises  two  periods,  one  of  compara- 


*La  Condizione  fisica  della  Conscienza.    Roma, 
1879. 


4 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


tive  repose,  or  of  assimilation,  the  other 
of  activity,  or  of  disassimilation  ;  that  the 
brain  presents  no  exception  to  this  law, 
and  that  experience  shows  the  duration 
of  sleep,  in  the  several  epochs  and  circum- 
stances of  life,  to  be  in  direct  ratio  to  the 
need  of  assimilation.  The  cause  of  sleep 
is  the  necessity  of  repairing  losses,  of 
making  the  nutritive  circulation  succeed 
to  the  functional  circulation.  In  wake- 
fulness, the  brain  burns  up  more  material 
than  is  given  to  it  by  the  blood,  so  that 
oxidation  soon  grows  less,  and  with  it  the 
excitability  of  the  nerve  tissue.  Preyer's 
experiments  show  that  sleep  comes  when, 
in  consequence  of  prolonged  activity,  the 
substance  of  the  brain,  like  that  of  a 
fatigued  muscle,  finds  itself  overloaded 
with  a  certain  quantity  of  acid  detritus. 
The  very  presence  of  these  products  ar- 
rests, at  a  given  moment,  the  cerebral 
activity,  which  does  not  reappear  till  re- 
pose has  allowed  complete  elimination  of 
these  waste  matters.  *  It  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  complete,  absolute  sleep, 
without  any  dream,  is  the  exception ;  but 
that  such  sleep  occurs,  and  that  not  rarely, 
is  sufficient  to  establish  the  intermittent 
character  of  consciousness. 

The  physiological  thesis  possesses  a 
probative  value  very  different  from,  and 
much  stronger  than,  that  of  the  meta- 
physical thesis.  And  it  must  be  remem- 
bered— an  important  point — that  all  those 
who  have  investigated  the  question 
whether  there  exists  perfect  cerebral  sleep, 
are  men  of  cultivated  and  active  minds- 
psychologists,  physicians,  literary  men — 
in  whom  the  brain  is  ever  wakeful,  vi- 
brating like  a  sensitive  musical  instru- 
ment in  response  to  the  slightest  excita- 
tion :  in  them  consciousness  is  a  habit, 
'so  to  speak.  Those  who  put  to  them- 
selves the  question  whether  sleep  is  al- 
ways accompanied  by  dreams,  are,  in  fact, 
the  ones  least  fitted  to  give  a  reply  in  the 
negative.  Among  hand  workers,  this  is 
not  the  case.  A  farm-laborer  living  re- 
mote from  all  intellectual  agitation,  ever 
restricted  to  the  same  occupations,  to  the 
same  routine,  usually  does  not  dream.  I 
know  several  peasants  who  look  on  a 
dream  as  a  rare  occurrence  in  their  hours 
of  sleep. 

"  The  most  convincing  proof  that  the  mind 
can  be  completely  inactive  during  sleep — 
that  it  can  have  its  existence  momentarily  m- 


*  By  absorbing  a  certain  quantity  of  lactate  of 
soda,  taken  as  a  type  of  disassimilation  products  in 
the  brain,  Preyer  produced  yawning,  somnolence, 
and  even  sleep. 


terrupted  or  suspended — would  indisputably 
be  afforded  if  the  instant  of  falling  asleep 
should  connect  immediately  with  the  instant 
of  awaking,  and  if  the  intervening  time 
should  be  as  though  it  had  not  been.  The 
philosophers  who  do  not  believe  in  perfect 
sleep  have  themselves  pointed  out  this  test, 
at  the  same  time  declaring  that  it  has  never 
been  verified.  But  I  have  been  witness  of 
the  fact  under  the  following  circumstances  : 
One  morning,  at  2  o'clock,  I  was  called  to 
attend  a  person  in  the  neigborhood  attacked 
by  cholera.  As  I  was  about  to  go  out,  my 
wife  gave  me  some  direction  about  the  can- 
dle I  held  in  my  hand,  and  then  fell  asleep. 
I  came  back  after  about  half  an  hour  The 
noise  of  the  key  turning  in  the  lock  as  I 
opened  the  door,  awakened  my  wife  suddenly. 
So  deep  had  been  her  sleep,  so  close  was  the 
conjunction  of  the  moment  when  she  fell 
asleep,  with  the  moment  when  she  was  awak- 
ened, that  she  supposed  she  had  not  slept  at 
all,  and  that  she  took  the  sound  of  the  key 
upon  my  return,  for  the  same  sound  at  my 
going.  Seeing  me  re-enter,  she  believed  I 
was  simply  turning  back  on  my  steps,  and 
asked  me  the  reason ;  great  was  her  aston- 
ishment on  learning  that  I  had  been  absent 
half  an  hour."  t 

I  know  not  how  facts  of  this  kind  can 
be  met,  except  by  falling  back  upon  the 
inevitable  hypothesis  of  states  of  con- 
sciousness that  have  left  no  trace  in  the 
memory  :  but  that  hypothesis,  I  repeat, 
is  gratuitous  and  improbable.  Those 
who  are  subject  to  fits  of  swooning  with 
loss  of  consciousness,  know  by  experience 
that,  while  the  fit  is  on,  they  may  suffer  a 
fall  or  contusion  of  a  member,  or  over- 
turn a  chair,  and,  yet,  on  coming  to  them- 
selves, have  no  idea  of  what  has  hap- 
pened. Is  it  likely  that  these  rather  se- 
rious accidents,  had  they  been  accompa- 
nied by  consciousness,  would  have  left  no 
memory  lasting  at  least  a  few  seconds. 
I  do  not  in  any  wise  deny  that  in  certain 
circumstances,  whether  normal  or  morbid, 
— for  instance,  in  hypnotism — states  of 
consciousness  that  leave  no  trace  appar- 
ent at  the  awakening,  may  later  be  re- 
called ;  I  will  restrict  as  much  as  any  one 
may  wish,  the  cases  of  complete  interrup- 
tion of  consciousness  ;  but  one  single 
case  suffices  to  raise  up  insuperable  diffi- 
culties against  the  hypothesis  of  the  soul 
being  substance  which  thinks.  On  the 
opposite  hypothesis,  all  is  easily  explained. 
If  consciousness  is  an  occurrence  depend- 


+  Despine,  Psychologie  Naturelle,  I.,  p.  522. 
Writers  on  insanity  mention  cases  where,  a  patho- 
logical state  suppressing  consciousness  abruptly, 
the  patient,  after  a  longer  or  shorter  interval,  re- 
sumes his  conversation  at  the  word  where  he  had 
been  stricken.  See  other  facts  of  like  nature  in 
Winslow,  On  Obscure  Diseases,  etc.,  p.  322  et  seq. 


THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 


5 


ent  on  determinate  conditions,  it  need 
not  surprise  us  if  sometimes  it  is  wanting. 
Were  this  the  place  to  discuss  the 
question  of  consciousness  thoroughly,  we 
might  show  that  on  our  hypothesis  the 
relation  of  the  conscious  to  the  uncon- 
scious is  no  longer  unsettled  or  contra- 
dictory. The  term  unconscious  may  al- 
ways be  expressed  by  this  periphrasis  : 
A,  physiological  state  which,  though 
sometimes,  and  even  most  frequently  it 
is  accompanied  by  consciousness,  or  may 
have  been  so  accompanied  originally,  is 
at  present  not  accompanied  by  conscious- 
ness. This  characterization,  though  neg- 
ative as  regards  psychology,  is  positive 
as  regards  physiology.  It  declares  that 
in  every  psychic  happening  the  funda- 
mental, active  element,  is  the  nervous 
process,  and  that  the  other  is  but  con- 
comitant. Consequently  it  is  easy  to 
see  that  all  of  the  manifestations  of  psy- 
chic life  may  be  unconscious  and  con- 
scious by  turns:  for  the  former  case 
there  is  required  (and  this  suffices)  a 
determinate  nervous  process,  that  is  to 
say,  the  calling  into  action  of  a  determi- 
nate number  of  nerve  elements  forming 
a  determinate  association,  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  all  other  nerve  elements  and  of 
all  other  possible  associations.  For  the 
second  case  it  is  required  (and  this 
suffices)  that  supplementary  conditions 
of  whatever  kind  be  added,  without 
changing  aught  in  the  nature  of  the 
phenomenon,  save  to  render  it  conscious. 
And  here  we  see  how  unconscious  cere- 
bration does  so  much  work  quietly,  and 
how,  oftentimes  after  protracted  incuba- 
tion, it  manifests  itself  by  unexpected 
results.  Each  state  of  consciousness 
represents  only  a  very  small  part  of  our 
psychic  life,  for  unconscious  states  ever 
underlie  it  and  as  it  were  thrust  it  for- 
ward. Every  volition,  for  instance,  has 
roots  deep  down  in  our  being ;  the  mo- 
tives that  accompany  and  apparently  ex- 
plain it  are  never  more  than  a  part  of  the 
true  cause.  So  it  is  with  many  of  our 
sympathies ;  and  so  evident  is  this  fact, 
that  minds  most  deficient  in  observation 
often  wonder  that  they  cannot  account 
for  their  likes  and  dislikes. 

It  were  tedious  as  well  as  needless  to 
pursue  this  demonstration  farther.  Should 
the  reader  wish  to  do  so  he  may  consult,  in 
Hartmann's  Philosophy  of  the  Uncon- 
scious, the  section  entitled  "  Phenomenol- 
ogy." There  he  will  find  classified  all 
the  manifestations  of  the  mind's  uncon- 
scious life,  and  he  will  see  that  there  is 
not  one  fact  that  is  not  explained  by  the 


hypothesis  here  maintained.  Let  him 
then  apply  to  the  same  facts  the  other 
hypothesis. 


One  point  more  remains  to  be  con- 
sidered. The  theory  which  regards  con- 
sciousness as  a  phenomenon,  and  which 
springs  (as  could  be  shown  were  the  di- 
gression allowable  here)  from  that  funda- 
mental principle  in  physiology  that  "  re- 
flex action  is  the  type  of  nerve  action  and 
the  basis  of  all  psychic  activity,"  to  many 
sound  intellects  appears  paradoxical  and 
irreverent.  They  think  it  robs  psychol- 
ogy of  all  stability  and  dignity.  They 
are  loath  to  admit  that  all  the  highest 
manifestations  of  nature  are  instable, 
fleeting,  superadded,  and,  as  regards  their 
conditions  of  existence,  subordinate. 
But  that  is  only  a  prejudice.  Conscious- 
ness, whatever  be  its  origin,  and  its  na- 
ture, loses  naught  of  its  value ;  it  is  to  be 
esteemed  for  what  it  is  in  itself ;  and  for 
the  one  who  takes  the  evolution  point  of 
view,  it  is  not  the  origin  that  is  of  im- 
portance but  the  height  attained.  Ex- 
perience too  teaches  us  that  as  we 
ascend  in  the  series,  natural  compounds 
are  more  and  more  complex  and  instable. 
Were  stability  to  measure  dignity  the 
highest  place  would  belong  to  minerals. 
This  objection  then,  a  purely  sentimental 
one,  is  inadmissible.  As  for  the  diffi- 
culty of  explaining  on  this  hypothesis 
the  unity  and  continuity  of  the  conscious 
subject,  it  is  not  yet  time  to  speak  of  it. 
It  will  be  considered  in  due  course. 

But  the  hypothesis  of  consciousness  as 
phenomenon  has  a  weak  side  :  its  sincer- 
est  partisans  have  maintained  it  under  a 
form  that  has  won  for  them  the  title  of 
advocates  of  absolute  automatism.  They 
are  wont  to  compare  consciousness  to  a 
ray  of  light  from  the  furnace  of  a  steam- 
engine  that  lights  up  the  machine  but 
has  no  effect  whatever  on  its  work ;  ac- 
cording to  them  consciousness  has  no 
more  action  than  the  shadow  that  ac- 
companies the  wayfarer's  steps.  If  these 
similes  have  no  purpose  save  to  express 
the  doctrine  in  a  telling  way,  there  is 
nothing  to  say  ;  but  taken  in  their  strict 
sense  they  are  exaggerated  and  inexact. 
Consciousness  in  itself  and  by  itself  is  a 
new  factor ;  and  in  this  there  is  nothing 
mystical  nor  supernatural,  as  we  shall 
see. 

In  the  first  place,  from  the  hypothesis 
itself,  a  state  of  consciousness  supposing 
a  greater  number  of  physiological  con- 
ditions (or  at  least  different  ones)  than 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


does  the  same  state  when  it  remains  un- 
conscious, it  follows  that  two  individuals, 
one  of  them  in  the  former  state,  the  other 
in  the  latter,  are  not,  other  things  being 
equal,  strictly  comparable. 

Stronger  proofs  still  remain — not  logi- 
cal deductions  but  facts.  When  a  phys- 
iological state  is  become  a  state  of  con- 
sciousness, it  thereby  acquires  a  special 
character.  Before,  it  had  relation  to 
space,  and  could  be  conceived  of  as  the 
calling  into  action  of  a  certain  number  of 
nerve  elements  occupying  a  determinate 
superficies  :  but  now  it  takes  a  position  in 
time — comes  after  this,  follows  that, 
whereas  for  unconscious  states  there  is 
neither  before  nor  after.  It  now  is 
capable  of  being  recalled,  i.  <?.,  recognized 
as  having  occupied  a  definite  position 
among  other  states  of  consciousness. 
Hence  it  is  become  a  new  factor  in  the 
individual's  psychic  life,  a  result  that  may 
serve  as  a  starting  point  for  some  new 
work  whether  conscious  or  unconscious  ; 
and  so  far  is  it  from  being  the  product  of 
a  supernatural  operation  that  at  bottom 
it  is  simply  a  case  of  that  organic  regis- 
tration which  underlies  all  memory. 

To  reach  greater  clearness  let  us  take 
a  few  examples.  Volition  is  always  a 
state  of  consciousness:  it  says  that  a 
thing  should  be  done  or  prevented.  It  is 
the  final  and  definite  result  of  a  multitude 
of  states,  conscious,' semi-conscious,  and 
unconscious  ;  but  once  affirmed,  the  voli- 
tion becomes  in  the  individual's  life  a  new 
factor.  The  resolution  taken  marks  a  se- 
quence, and  it  is  capable  of  being  recom- 
menced, or  modified,  or  inhibited.  Au- 
tomatic acts  unaccompanied  by  conscious- 
ness do  not  admit  of  anything  like  this. 
Novelists  and  poets,  accurate  observers  of 
human  nature,  have  often  noted  the  situ- 
ation where  a  passion — love  or  hate — af- 
ter lying  for  a  long  time  latent  and  un- 
conscious, at  last  comes  to  the  light,  as- 
sumes definite  form,  becomes  conscious. 
Its  character  is  then  changed  ;  it  acquires 
increased  intensity,  or  it  is  overpowered 
by  other  antagonistic  passions.  Here 
again  consciousness  is  a  new  factor  that 
has  modified  the  psychological  situation. 
Take  another  example.  One  may  by  in- 
stinct, that  is  by  unconscious  cerebration, 
solve  a  problem,  yet  quite  possibly  at  an- 
other time  he  may  be  stalled  by  a  similar 
problem.  If  on  the  other  hand  the  solu- 
tion is  reached  through  conscious  reason- 
ing, difficulty  with  the.  second  problem  is 
far  less  probable,  for  each  step  forward  is 
a  new  position  won,  and  thereafter  we  no 
longer  walk  as   blind.     But  this   in   no 


wise  belittles  the  part  played  in  invention 
and  discovery  by  the  unconscious  work  of 
the  brain. 

These  examples,  taken  at  random,  suf- 
fice to  show  that  the  similes  mentioned 
above  are  true  with  respect  to  every  state 
of  consciousness  in  itself.  It  is  indeed 
in  itself  only  a  light  that  makes  visible 
unconscious  work  :  but  viewed  in  its  re- 
lation to  the  future  development  of  the 
individual  it  is  a  factor  of  the  highest  im- 
portance. 

And  what  is  true  of  the  individual  is 
true  also  of  the  species  and  of  the  succes- 
sion of  species.  Considered  merely  with 
reference  to  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  and 
quite  apart  from  all  psychological  consid- 
erations, the  apparition  of  consciousness 
upon  the  earth  was  an  event  of  prime  con- 
sequence. Thereby  was  made  possible 
for  the  animal  world  experience,  i.e., 
a  higher  order  of  adaptation.  Wherein 
consciousness  had  its  origin  we  need  not 
inquire.  Some  highly  ingenious  hypoth- 
eses have  been  put  forward  upon  the  sub- 
ject— hypotheses  that  enter  the  domain 
of  metaphysic — but  these  experimental 
psychology  need  not  discuss,  for  it  as- 
sumes consciousness  as  a  datum.  It  is 
probable  that  consciousness,  like  every 
other  manifestation  of  life,  first  made  its 
appearance  in  a  rudimentary  form,  and 
seemingly  with  poor  endowment.  But 
when  it  had  become  capable  of  establish- 
ing in  the  animal  a  memory  in  the  psy- 
chic sense,  so  enabling  it  to  bank  upon  its 
past  for  the  benefit  of  the  future,  there 
was  a  new  chance  of  survival.  To  un- 
conscious, blind,  accidental  adaptation, 
dependent  on  the  environment,  there  was 
added  a  conscious,  coherent  adaptation 
dependent  on  the  animal  itself,  and  more 
steady  and  more  rapid  than  the  other :  it 
curtailed  the  labor  of  selection. 

The  part  of  consciousness,  then,  in  the 
development  of  psychic  life  is  plain.  I 
have  dwelt  upon  this  point  because  the 
supporters  of  the  hypothesis  here  main- 
tained have  usually  studied  consciousness 
only  as  it  actually  exists,  not  noting  suffi- 
ciently the  result  of  its  apparition.  They 
rightly  say  that  it  illumines,  but  they  have 
not  shown  that  it  brings  something  addi- 
tional. Consciousness,  I  repeat,  is  in  it- 
self only  phenomenon,  an  accompaniment. 
If  there  exist  animals  in  which  conscious- 
ness appears  and  disappears  every  mo- 
ment, leaving  no  trace,  these  are  mental 
automata  in  the  strictest  sense  :  but  if  the 
state  of  consciousness  leaves  a  residuum, 
an  enregistration  in  the  organism,  then  it 
acts  not  only  as  an  indicator  but  as  a  con- 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


densator  ;  and  the  metaphor  of  the  au- 
tomaton is  no  longer  valid.  This  ad- 
mitted, many  of  the  objections  to  the  the- 
ory of  consciousness  as  a  phenomenon 
fall  to  the  ground. 


CHAPTER  II. 

ORGANIC   DISTURBANCE. 

I  SHALL  treat  at  length  of  the  organic 
conditions  of  personality,  for  on  these  all 
depends  and  these  explain  all  the  rest. 
Metaphysical  psychology  has  hardly  taken 
any  notice  of  them,  therein  showing  logi- 
cal consistency,  for  in  its  view  the  Me 
comes  from  above  not  from  beneath. 
We  on  the  other  hand  must  seek  the  ele- 
ments of  personality  in  the  most  ele- 
mental phenomena  of  life  :  these  confer 
upon  it  its  distinctive  character.  The 
"  organic  sense,"  the  "  sense  of  the  body  " 
— a  sense  with  us  vague  and  obscure  gen- 
erally, though  at  times  very  well  defined  I 
— is  for  each  animal  the  basis  of  its  psy- 
chical individuality  *  This  is  that  "  prin-  | 
ciple  of  individuation"  so  much  sought! 
after  by  the  scholastic  philosophers,  for 
on  it  directly  or  indirectly  all  depends.  ; 
It  may  be  regarded  as  highly  probable 
that  as  we  descend  toward  the  lower  an- 
imals, the  organic  sense  becomes  more  j 
and  more  dominant  till  it  becomes  the  | 
whole  psychic  individuality.  But  in  man 
and  in  the  higher  animals  the  bustling  j 
world  of  desires,  passions,  perceptions,  , 
images,  ideas,  overlies  this  voiceless 
deep  :  save  at  intervals  we  forget  it  be- 
cause we  ignore  it.  It  is  as  with  facts  of 
the  social  order.  The  millions  of  human 
beings  that  make  up  a  great  nation  are 
for  itself  and  the  rest  of  the  world  reduced 
to  a  few  thousand  men  who,  so  to  speak, 
are  its  clear  consciousness,  and  who  rep- 
resent its  social  activity  in  every  phase — 
political,  industrial,  commercial,  intellect- 
ual. Still  it  is  the  millions  of  common 
people,  ignored,  leading  a  narrow,  local 
life,  living  and  dying  unnoticed,  that  con- 
stitute the  nation's  mass  :  without  them 
it  is  nothing.  They  are  the  inexhaustible 
reserve  out  of  which,  by  natural  selection, 


*  It  may  be  remarked  in  passing-  that  a  great 
metaphysician,  Spinoza,  clearly  maintains  the  same 
thesis,  though  in  different  terms.  "  The  object  of 
the  idea  that  constitutes  the  human  soul  is  the 
body.  .  .  and  nothing  but  the  body." — "The  idea 
which  constitutes  the  formal  being  of  the  human 
soul  is  not  simple  but  made  up  of  many  ideas." 
Ethics,  Part  II.,  Props.  13  and  15. 


a  few  emerge,  rising  to  the  surface ;  but 
these,  however  endowed  with  talent, 
power,  or  wealth,  have  only  an  ephem- 
eral existence.  The  degenerescence  nat- 
urally inherent  in  whatever  rises  above 
the  general  level  will  lower  them  or  their 
descendants,  while  the  mute  toil  of  the 
millions  who  live  ignored  will  continue 
to  produce  others  and  to  imprint  a  char- 
acter upon  them. 

Metaphysical  psychology  notes  only 
the  summits  of  the  prospect,  and  inner 
observation  has  but  little  to  tell  of  what 
takes  place  within  the  body ;  hence  the 
study  of  the  general  sensibility  has  been 
from  the  first  the  special  work  of  physiol- 
ogists. 

Henle  (1840)  thus  defines  general  sen- 
sibility, or  "  ccenaesthesis  "  :  It  is,  he  says, 
"  the  tonus  of  the  nerves  of  sensation,  or 
the  perception  of  the  state  of  activity  in 
which  these  nerves  constantly  exist,  e\  en 
at  moments  when  no  impression  from 
without  is  acting  upon  them."  "  It  is," 
says  he  in  another  place,  "  the  sum,  the 
indiscriminated  chaos  of  the  sensations 
that  are  continually  coming  into  the  sen- 
sorium  from  all  parts  of  the  body."  f  E. 
H.  Weber,  with  greater  precision,  defines 
ccenaesthesis  to  be  an  inner  sensibility,  an 
inner  touch,  which  informs  the  senso- 
rium  of  the  mechanical  and  chemico-or- 
ganic  state  of  the  skin,  the  mucous  and 
serous  membranes,  the  viscera,  the  mus- 
cles, the  joints. 

Louis  Peisse,  a  physician  and  a  phi- 
losopher, was  the  first  man  in  Frani  e  to 
combat  the  teaching  of  jouffroy  who 
held  that  we  know  not  our  own  bodies 
save  objectively,  as  an  extended,  solid 
mass  like  all  other  bodies  ;  lying  outside 
of  the  Me,  and  alien  to  the  percipient 
subject  as  any  strictly  external  object 
might  be —  as  a  table  or  a  chair.  Peisse 
showed,  though  rather  timidly,  that  our 
knowledge  of  our  own  bodies  is  above  all 
subjective.  His  description  of  this  or- 
ganic consciousness  seems  to  me  so  exact 
that  I  quote  it  entire. 

"  Is  it  true"  he  says,  "  that  we  have  abso- 
lutely no  consciousness  of  the  exercise  of  the 
organic  functions  ?  If  you  mean  clear,  dis- 
tinct, locally  determinable  consciousness,  like 
our  consciousness  of  external  impressions, 
plainly  it  is  lacking:  but  we  may  have  a  faint, 
indistinct,  so  to  speak,  a  latent,  conscious- 
ness of  it ;  for  instance  such  a  consciousness 
as  we  have  of  the  sensations  that  call  forth 
and  accompany  the  respirator}-  movements — 


t  Pathologische   Untersuchungen,    p.  114.     All- 
gemeine  Anatomic,  p.    728. 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


sensations  which  though  continually  repeated  ] 
pass    unnoticed   as   it  were.     May  we  not  in- 
deed regard  as  a  distant,  faint,  confused  echo 
of  the  genera]  vital  work  the  peculiar  feeling 
which  continuously  and  unremittingly  makes 
us   aware   of   the  presence  and  actual  exist- 
ence  of   our   own   body  ?     This   feeling  has 
nearly   always,  but   erroneously,    been   con- 
founded with  the    chance    local    impressions 
which  during  wakefulness  arouse,  stimulate, 
and  keep   up   the  action   of  the   sensibility. 
These   sensations,  though   incessant,  appear 
but  for  a  moment  on  the  stage  of  conscious- 
ness and  pass  away,  whereas  the  feeling  of 
which  we  speak  endures  and  persists  beneath 
this    shifting     scenery.     Condillac   properly 
enough   called  it  '  the  fundamental  feeling  of 
existence,'  and  Maine   de   Biran  the  feeling 
of  sensitive  existence.     Through  it  the  body 
is  ever  present  to  the  Me  as  its  own  ,  through 
it  the  spiritual  subject  feels  and  knows  itself 
to  exist  in  some  sort  locally  in   the  limited 
extension  of  the  organism.     It  is  a  never-fail- 
ing   remembrancer,    rendering  the   state   of 
the    body    ever  present   to    consciousness ; 
thus    does  it  most  clearly   show  the   indis- 
soluble tie  between  psychic  and  physiological 
life.     In   the    ordinary  state    of  equilibrium 
which  constitutes  perfect  health  this  feeling 
is  continuous,  uniform,  and  always  equable  ; 
and  just    because  it  is  thus  continuous,  uni- 
form and  equable  it  does  not  enter  the  Me 
as  a  distinct  specific,  local  sensation.     In  or- 
der to  be  distinctly  noted,  it  must  gain  a  cer- 
tain intensity ;  then  it  expresses  itself  by  a 
vague    impression   of  general  well-being  or 
general  discomfort,  the  former  state  indicat- 
ing a  simple  exaltation  of  physiological  vital 
action,  the  latter  betraying  a  pathological  per- 
version of  the  vital  economy,  but  in  this  case 
it  soon  becomes  localized  in  the  shape  of  par- 
ticular sensations  referred  to  one  or  another 
part  of  the  body.     Sometimes  it  manifests  it- 
self  in  a  more   indirect  way,  yet  far  more 
clearly,  when  it  chances  to  fail  at  any  given 
point'  in    the    organism,  as   for  example  in 
a     member     stricken     by      paralysis.     The 
stricken  member  still  belongs  by  nature  to 
the  living  aggregate,  but  it  is  no  longer  with- 
in the  sphere  of  the  organic  Me,  if  we  may 
use  that  phrase.     This    Me   no   longer   per- 
ceives it  as  its  own,  and  the  fact  of  this  sep- 
aration, though  negative,  is  the  object  of  a 
special  positive   sensation  familiar  to  every 
one   that   knows   what   it  is   to   suffer   total 
numbness   in  any  part  of  the  body,  as  a  re- 
sult of  cold  or  of  compression  of  the  nerves. 
This  sensation  is  nothing  else  but  the  expres- 
sion of  a  break  in  the  general  feeling  of  the 
bodily  life  :    it  shows  that  the  vital  state  of 
the    member   was  really,   though   obscurely, 
felt,  and  that  it  constituted  one  of  the  partial 
elements  of  the  general  feeling  of  the  entire 
organism's  life.     A  continuous,  monotonous 
noise,  as  that  made  by  a  wagon  in  which  one 
is   riding,  is   not   noticed   though  constantly 
heard ;  for  should  it  cease  abruptly  its  cessa- 
tion would  be  noted  instantly.     The  analogy 
may    enable    us    to   understand  the   nature 


and  characteristics  of  the  fundamental  feel- 
ing of  organic  life,  which  on  this  hypothesis 
would  be  simply  the  resultant  in  confuso  of  the 
impressions  produced  at  every  point  of  the 
living  organism  by  the  action  of  the  several 
physiological  functions,  these  impressions 
being  carried  to  the  brain  either  directly  by 
the  cerebro-spinal  nerves,  or  indirectly  by  the 
nerves  of  the  ganglionic  system."  * 

Since  the  publication  of  these  views 
(1844)  physiologists  and  psychologists 
have  been  studying  the  elements  of  this 
general  sense  of  the  body.  They  have 
determined  what  contribution  is  made  to 
the  result  by  each  vital  function ;  they 
have  shown  how  complex  this  confused 
sense  of  life  is  which  by  incessant  repeti- 
tion is  become  our  own  selves,  so  that  to 
examine  into  it  is  to  examine  into  our- 
selves. But  we  know  it  only  through  the 
variations  that  lift  it  above  the  normal 
tone  or  lower  it  beneath  the  same.  In 
special  treatises  may  be  found  full  details 
of  these  vital  functions  and  their  psychic 
bearings  ;  such  details  are  not  called  for 
here,  and  it  suffices  if  I  give  a  very  gen- 
eral view  of  them. 

First  we  have  the  organic  sensations 
connected  with  respiration,  the  sense  of 
well-being  produced  by  a  pure  atmos- 
phere, of  suffocation  in  confined  air ;  then 
the  sensations  that  come  from  the  alimen-t 
tary  canal ;  and  others,  that  are  still  more 
general,  connected  with  the  state  of 
the  nutrition.  Hunger  and  thirst,  for 
example,  appearances  to  the  contrary 
notwithstanding,  have  no  precise  local 
seat :  they  result  from  a  feeiing  of  dis- 
comfort diffused  throughout  the  entire 
organism :  the  impoverished  blood  is 
craving  something.  And  as  regards 
thirst  in  particular,  Claude  Bernard's  ex- 
periments have  shown  that  it  comes  of  a 
lack  of  water  in  the  organism,  not  from 
dryness  of  the  pharynx.  Of  all  the  func- 
tions, the  general  and  local  circulation  is 
perhaps  the  one  whose  psychological  in- 
fluence is  greatest,  and  whose  variations 
between  individuals  and  at  successive 
moments  in  the  same  individual  are  most 
striking.  Then  consider  the  organic 
sensations  resulting  from  the  state  of  the 
muscles — the  sense  of  fatigue  and  ex- 
haustion, or  the  reverse ;  finally,  those 
muscular  sensations  which,  being  asso- 
ciated with  the  external  sensations  of 
sight  and  touch,  play  so  large  a  part  in 
our  cognitions.  In  fact  the  muscular 
sensibility,  in  its  purely  subjective  form, 


♦Note   to   his   edition  of  Cabanis's  Rapports  du 
Physique  et  du  Moral,  pp.  108,  109. 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


by  itself  alone  makes  known  to  us  the 
degree  of  contraction  or  relaxation  of  the 
muscles,  the  position  of  our  members, 
etc.  I  purposely  omit  the  organic  sensa- 
tions of  the  genital  apparatus  ;  to  that 
subject  we  will  return  in  treating  of  the 
affective  bases  of  personality. 

Let  the  reader  for  a  moment  consider 
the  multitude  and  the  diversity  of  the ; 
vital  actions  just  now  summarily  classed 
under  their  most  general  heads,  and  he 
will  form  some  conception  of  what  is 
meant  by  the  phrase  "  physical  bases  of  j 
personality."  Being  ever  in  action,  they  j 
make  up  by  their  continuousness  for  their 
weakness  as  psychic  elements.  And 
then  too,  when  the  higher  forms  of  the 
mental  life  disappear,  these  organic  sen- 
sations come  forward  in  the  first  rank. 
A  very  clear  instance  of  this  is  found  in 
dreams,  whether  pleasurable  or  other- 
wise, prompted  by  the  organic  sensations 
— erotic  dreams,  nightmare,  etc.  We  are 
even  able  to  assign  with  some  degree  of  , 
precision  to  each  organ  its  special  part  in 
dreams :  the  sensation  of  weight  seems 
specially  attached  to  digestive  and  respi- 
ratory affections  ;  dreams  of  struggling 
and  fighting  accompany  affections  of  the  | 
heart.  Sometimes  pathological  sensa- 
tions, unnoticed  in  wakefulness,  make 
their  impression  during  sleep,  and  thus 
become  premonitory  symptoms.  Armand 
de  Villeneuve  dreams  that  he  is  bitten  on 
the  leg  by  a  dog  :  a  few  days  after,  the 
leg  is  attacked  by  a  cancerous  ulcer. 
Gessner  imagines  during  sleep  that  he  is 
bitten  on  the  left  side  by  a  serpent : 
shortly  afterward,  an  anthrax  appeared 
at  the  same  spot,  from  which  he  died. 
Macario  dreams  that  he  has  a  violent  pain 
in  the  throat,  but  awakes  entirely  well ; 
a  few  hours  later  he  was  suffering  from  a 
severe  amygdalitis.  A  man  sees  in  his 
dream  an  epileptic :  a  little  while  later  he 
has  an  attack  of  epilepsy.  A  woman 
dreams  of  speaking  to  a  man  who  cannot 
make  her  any  reply,  being  dumb :  on 
awaking  she  could  not  speak  a  word.  In 
all  these  cases  we  recognize  as  facts  the 
obscure  beckonings  from  the  depths  of 
the  organism  to  the  nerve  centers  ;  but 
the  conscious  life,  with  its  hubbub  and  its 
constant  bustle,  suppresses  instead  of  de- 
veloping them. 

It  is  plain  that  psychology,  by  giving 
exclusive  credit  for  so  long  a  time  to  the 
data  of  consciousness,  must  needs  have 
cast  into  the  shade  the  organic  elements 
of  personality  :  physicians,  on  the  other 
hand,  were  under  a  professional  obliga- 
tion  to  give  weight  to  the  latter.     The 


doctrine  of  temperaments,  as  ancient  as 
medicine  itself,  a  doctrine  that  is  ever 
criticised,  ever  worked  over  again,*  is  the 
vague,  fluctuating  expression  of  the  prin- 
cipal types  of  the  physical  personality,  as 
given  by  experience,  with  the  chief  psychic 
traits  that  result  from  it.  Hence  the  few 
psychologists  who  have  studied  the  sev- 
eral types  of  character  have  looked  here 
for  their  basis.  Thus  did  Kant  more 
than  a  century  ago.  If  the  determination 
of  the  temperaments  could  be  made  on  a 
scientific  basis,  the  question  of  personality 
would  be  greatly  simplified.  In  the 
mean  time,  the  first  thing  to  do  is  to  rid 
ourselves  of  the  preconceived  opinion 
that  personality  is  something  mysterious, 
heaven-descended,  without  antecedents 
in  nature.  If  we  simply  consider  the 
animals  around  us,  we  shall  have  no 
difficulty  in  seeing  that  the  difference 
between  the  horse  and  the  mule,  the 
goose  and  the  duck,  their  "  principle  of  in- 
dividuation." can  come  only  out  of  a  dif- 
ference of  organization  and  of  adaptation 
to  environment,  with  the  psychic  conse- 
quences thence  resulting,  and  that,  with- 
in the  same  species,  the  differences  be- 
tween one  individual  and  another  must 
have  come  about  originally  in  the  same 
way.  There  is  no  reason  in  the  nature 
of  things  for  classing  man  separately :  the 
simple  fact  is  that  in  man  the  very  great 
development  of  the  intellectual  and  affec- 
tive faculties  produces  an  illusion  and 
conceals  the  fact  of  origination. 

Taking  physical  personality  to  mean 
simply  a  sense  of  the  state  of  the  organ- 
ism— a  mode  of  existence  in  which,  on  the 
hypothesis,  all  consciousness,  clear  or  ob- 
scure, original  or  recalled,  of  any  outer 
fact  is  absent,  we  ask,  Does  such  a  thing 
exist  in  nature  ?  Clearly  not  in  the  higher 
animals  ;  and  it  can  be  posited  only  as  a 
highly  artificial  abstraction.  But  it  is  pro- 
bable that  this  form  of  psychic  individual- 
ity, which  is  simply  the  consciousness  the 
animal  has  of  its  own  body,  exists  in  the 
lower  species,  though  not  in  the  lowest. 

In   the    lowest  species — instance    any 


*  Quite  recently  Henle  {Anthrofiologische  Vor- 
trage  [1887] .  pp.  103, 130)  has  endeavored  to  refer  the 
temperaments  to  the  different  degrees  of  activity, 
or  tonus,  of  the  sensorial  and  motor  nerves.  When 
this  degree  is  a  low  one,  we  have  the  phlegmatic 
temperament.  In  a  higher  degree,  with  rapid  ex- 
haustion of  the  nerves,  we  have  the  sanguineous 
temperament.  The  choleric  temperament  also  pre- 
supposes a  high  tonus,  but  with  persistence  of  ner- 
vous action.  The  melancholic  temperament  can 
only  be  defined  by  the  quantity  of  the  nervous 
action:  it  presupposes  a  high  tonus  v/ilh.  a  tendency 
to  emotions  rather  than  to  will  activity. 


IO 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


multicellular  organism  composed  of  cells 
that  are  all  alike — the  constitution  of  the 
organism  is  so  homogeneous  that  each 
several  element  lives  for  itself,  and  each 
has  its  own  action  and  reaction.  But 
their  sum  no  more  represents  an  individ- 
ual than  six  horses  drawing  a  wagon  con- 
stitute one  horse.  There  is  neither  coor- 
dination nor  consensus,  but  only  juxtapo- 
sition in  space.  If,  as  many  authors  do, 
we  were  to  give  to  each  cell  the  analogon 
of  a  consciousness  (which  would  be  only 
the  psychic  expression  of  its  irritability) 
we  should  then  have  consciousness  in  the 
state  of  complete  diffusion.  Between  the 
elements  there  would  be  an  incompene- 
trability  which  would  leave  the  whole 
mass  in  the  state  of  living  matter  without 
even  external  unity. 

But  higher  in  the  animal  scale,  for  in- 
stance in  the  Hydra,  observation  finds  a 
certain  consensus  among  the  actions  and 
reactions  and  a  certain  division  of  labor. 
Still  the  individuality  is  highly  precarious  : 
Trembley  cut  one  hydra  into  fifty  individ- 
uals. But  inversely  two  hydras  may  be 
made  into  one :  it  is  only  necessary  to 
turn  the  smaller  one  inside  out  and  then 
thrust  it  into  the  larger,  so  that  the  two 
endoderms  may  come  into  contact  and 
grow  together.  As  far  as  one  may  ven- 
ture an  opinion  on  so  obscure  a  subject, 
the  adaptation  of  movements  denotes  a 
certain  unity,  temporary,  instable,  at  the 
mercy  of  circumstances,  it  may  be,  but 
probably  not  without  some  faint  conscious- 
ness of  the  organism.  If  still  we  are  ob- 
serving too  low  a  stage  of  animal  life,  we 
may  at  pleasure  go  higher  to  find  the 
point  where  the  creature  has  simply  a 
consciousness  of  its  organism — organic 
consciousness.  Even  this  form  of  con- 
sciousness probably  does  not  exist  in  its 
purity,  for  as  soon  as  the  rudiments  of  spe- 
cial senses  appear,  the  animal  rises  above 
the  level  of  general  sensibility ;  and  be- 
sides, is  general  sensibility  of  itself 
enough  to  constitute  a  consciousness  ? 
We  know  that  the  human  fcetus  makes 
efforts  to  free  itself  from  an  inconvenient 
position,  from  the  impression  of  cold, 
from  painful  irritation ;  but  are  these 
movements  unconscious  reflex  actions  ? 

But  I  haste  to  quit  these  conjectures. 
The  undisputed  fact  is  that  organic  con- 
sciousness (i.e.  the  animal's  consciousness 
of  its  body  and  of  nought  but  its  body)  is 
vastly  preponderant  in  the  greater  part  of 
the  animal  world ;  that  it  is  in  the  in- 
verse ratio  to  the  higher  psychic  develop- 
ment ;  and  that  everywhere  and  always 
this  consciousness  of  the  organism  is  the 


basis  on  which  individuality  rests.  In 
virtue  of  it  the  whole  structure  stands  : 
without  it  the  structure  is  nought.  The 
contrary  thesis  is  unintelligible,  for  is  it 
not  through  the  organism  that  we  receive 
external  impressions,  the  materia  ftritna 
of  all  mental  life  ?  And  what  is  more,  is 
it  not  upon  it  that  we  find  inscribed  and 
fixed  by  heredity,  how  we  know  not,  yet, 
as  facts  prove,  in  characters  indelible,  the 
instincts,  feelings,  aptitudes  peculiar  to 
each  species,  to  each  individual  ? 


If  then  it  be  confessed  that  the  organic 
sensations  coming  from  the  tissues,  from 
all  the  organs,  from  all  the  organic  move- 
ments, in  short  from  all  the  bodily  states, 
are,  in  whatever  form,  in  whatever  fashion 
represented  in  the  sensoriurn,  and  if  the 
psychic  personality  is  simply  their  sum,  it 
follows  that,  like  them  and  with  them, 
the  personality  must  vary,  and  that  these 
variations  range  through  all  possible  de- 
grees, from  simple  indisposition  [malaise] 
to  total  metamorphosis  of  the  individual. 
The  phenomenon  of  "  double  personality  " 
which  has  made  such  a  noise — and  I 
shall  treat  of  it  later — is  only  an  extreme 
instance.  Granted  sufficient  patience 
and  sufficient  research,  and  we  should 
find  in  mental  pathology  plenty  of  obser- 
vations to  prove  a  progression,  or  rather 
a  continuous  regression  from  the  merest 
passing  change  to  the  most  complete 
transformation  of  the  Me.  The  Me  exists 
only  on  the  condition  that  it  vary  contin- 
ually :  that  point  is  not  disputed.  As  for 
its  identity,  that  is  only  a  question  of 
number  :  it  persists  so  long  as  the  sum  of 
the  states  that  remain  relatively  fixed  is 
greater  than  the  sum  of  the  states  added 
to  or  taken  from  this  stable  group. 

At  present  we  have  to  study  only  dis- 
orders of  personality  directly  connected 
with  the  organic  sensations,  and  since  in 
itself  general  sensibility  possesses  but  an 
inconsiderable  psychic  value,  it  produces 
only  partial  disorders,  except  when  the 
transformation  is  total  or  sudden. 

We  begin  with  the  consideration  of  a 
state  hardly  to  be  called  morbid,  a  state 
probably  familiar  to  every  one  :  the  feel- 
ing of  exaltation  or  of  depression  which 
comes  upon  a  person  without  known 
cause.  The  habitual  tone  of  the  individ- 
ual changes  :  it  rises  or  falls.  In  the  nor- 
mal state  there  is  a  positive  "  euphoria  "  : 
there  is  neither  bodily  satisfaction  nor 
bodily  indisposition.  At  times,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  vital  functions  are  in 
a  higher  tone  :    there  is   unwonted  or- 


THE   DISEASES   OF  PERSONALITY. 


II 


ganic  activity  which  seeks  to  expend 
itself ;  every  enterprise  seems  easy, 
every  scheme  promising.  This  state 
of  satisfaction,  at  first  purely  physi- 
cal, becomes  diffused  over  the  whole 
nervous  organization,  summoning  up  a 
host  of  pleasurable  feelings  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  whatever  displeases.  The  subject 
sees  everything  in  a  rosy  light.  Again 
the  reverse  condition  obtains :  a  state  of 
indisposition,  depression,  inertia  and 
helplessness,  and  consequent  upon  this  a 
feeling  of  gloom,  apprehension,  down- 
heartedness.  The  man  sees  nothing  to 
cheer  him.  But  in  neither  case  has  any- 
thing occurred,  any  influence  come  from 
without  that  might  account  either  for  the 
gladness  or  for  the  gloom. 

Assuredly  we  may  not  affirm  that  the 
personality  has  been  transformed  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  term.  It  has  been 
transformed  relatively.  For  himself  and 
still  more  for  those  who  know  him,  the 
individual  is  changed,  is  no  longer  the 
same.  Translated  into  the  language  of 
analytical  psychology,  this  means  that 
his  personality  is  made  up  of  elements, 
some  of  them  relatively  stable,  the  others 
variable ;  and  that  the  variable  elements 
having  overpassed  considerably  their 
habitual  limit,  the  stable  elements  as- 
sume a  lower  ratio  to  the  whole,  without 
disappearing. 

Now  suppose — and  the  supposition 
is  realized  every  day — that  this  change, 
instead  of  passing  away  after  a  little 
while,  and  giving  place  to  the  normal 
state,  itself  persists  :  in  other  words,  sup- 
pose the  physical  causes  that  produce  it 
to  be  permanent  instead  of  being  transi- 
tory ;  then  there  results  a  new  physical 
and  mental  habitude,  and  the  individual's 
center  of  gravity  tends  to  displacement. 

This  first  change  may  lead  to  other 
changes  so  that  the  transformation  shall 
go  on  increasing.  At  present  I  will  not 
dwell  upon  this  :  my  wish  was  simply  to 
show  how  from  a  very  common  physical 
and  psychic  state  it  is  possible  to  descend 
little  by  little  to  complete  transformation. 
It  is  only  a  question  of  degrees. 

In  studying  the  disorders  of  personality 
it  is  impossible  rigorously  to  determine 
those  which  have  their  direct  cause  in 
perturbations  of  the  general  sensibility, 
for  the  latter  often,  by  their  secondary 
action,  summon  up  psychic  states  of  a 
higher  order — hallucinations,  and  morbid 
feelings  and  thoughts.  I  shall  limit  my- 
self to  cases  in  which  disorders  of  the 
general  sensibility  seem  to  be  predomi- 
nant. 


In  the  Annates  MSdico-ftsychologzques 
(Sept.  1878)  we  find  recorded  five  obser- 
vations grouped  under  one  heading  :  "  An 
aberration  of  physical  personality."  With- 
out caviling  at  the  title,  which  perhaps 
says  more"  than  it  ought  to  say,  we  see 
here  an  unknown  organic  state,  a  change 
of  the  ccenassthesis  producing,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  all  external  causes,  a  feeling  of 
bodily  annihilation.  "  While  in  «the  en- 
joyment of  perfect  health,  with  exuberant 
strength  and  vitality,  a  person  experiences 
a  sensation  of  ever  increasing  weakness, 
so  that  he  apprehends  every  moment  that 
he  is  about  to  fall  into  syncope,  and  to  be 
extinguished."  Meanwhile  the  sensibility 
is  intact ;  the  patient  eats  with  a  good  ap- 
petite ;  and  if  any  one  attempts  to  act 
contrary  to  his  will,  he  reacts  with  the 
utmost  energy.  He  keeps  repeating  that 
he  feels  himself  dying,  hfs  light  going  out 
little  by  little  ;  that  he  has  not  more  than 
a  few  hours  of  life  left.  Naturally  upon 
this  purely  physical  stock  delirious  con- 
ceptions become  engrafted  :  one  patient 
declares  that  he  is  poisoned,  another  that 
a  demon  has  entered  his  body  and  "  is 
sucking  the  life  out  of  him." 

Let  us  fix  our  attention  upon  the  im- 
mediate consequences  of  the  physical 
state.  We  find  here  that  state  of  de- 
pression already  described  and  familiar 
to  every  one,  but  in  a  far  more  serious 
and  more  stable  form.  The  mental  dis- 
order increases  equally  and  becomes 
systematized.  The  individual  becomes 
more  and  more  unlike  his  former  self. 
Another  stage  is  reached  on  the  road  to 
the  break-up  of  the  Me,  but  dissolution  is 
still  a  long  way  off. 

This  beginning  of  transformation,  re- 
sulting from  natural  causes,  is  seen  also 
in  patients  who  say  that  they  are  enveh 
oped  with  a  veil  or  with  a  cloud  ;  that 
they  are  cut  off  from  the  outer  world, 
and  insensible  to  everything.  Others — 
and  in  their  case  the  phenomena  may  be 
referred  to  disordered  muscular  sensibil- 
ity— enjoy  with  rapture  the  lightness  of 
their  bodies,  feel  themselves  suspended 
in  air,  fancy  that  they  can  fly ;  or  they 
have  a  sense  of  weight  throughout  the 
whole  body  or  in  some  of  their  members, 
or  in  one,  and  that  one  they  imagine  to 
be  of  enormous  size  and  weight.  "  A  cer- 
tain young  epileptic  at  times  felt  his  body 
so  uncommonly  heavy  that  he  could 
hardly  support  its  weight :  again  it  was  so 
light  that  he  fancied  he  did  not  touch  the 
ground.  Sometimes  his  body  seemed  to 
him  to  have  assumed   such   proportions 


12 


THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY. 


that   no   doorway   was  wide  enough   to 
afford  him  passage.  "  * 

Patients  subject  to  illusions  regarding 
the  size  of  their  bodies  may  fancy  them 
to  be  either  very  much  larger,  or  very 
much  smaller  than,  they  are. 

The  local  perversions  of  the  general 
sensibility,  though  by  nature  restricted, 
are  nevertheless  of  great  importance  psy- 
chologically. A  patient  will  assert  that 
he  no  longer  has  any  teeth,  or  that  he  has 
no  mouthy  stomach,  intestines,  brain,  etc. 
This  state  can  be  explained  only  by  a 
suppression  or  an  alteration  of  the  inward 
sensations  that  exist  in  the  normal  state, 
and  which  go  to  make  up  the  conception 
of  the  physical  Me.  Tu  the  same  cause, 
sometimes  conjoined  with  cutaneous 
anaesthesis,  are  to  be  referred  cases 
Where  the  patient  believes  that  some  one 
of  his  members  or  even  that  his  whole 
body  is  wood,  or  glass,  or  stone,  or  but- 
ter, etc. 

A  little  later  he  will  be  saying  that  he 
now  has  no  body,  that  he  is  dead.  Es- 
quirol  tells  of  a  woman  who  believed  that 
the  Devil  had  carried  her  body  away  :  in 
her  the  cutaneous  surface  was  totally  in- 
sensible. The  physician  Baudelocque, 
toward  the  end  of  his  life,  was  uncon- 
scious of  the  existence  of  his  body.  He 
used  to  say  that  he  had  no  head,  no  arms, 
etc.  Finally,  every  one  is  familiar  with 
the  fact  recorded  by  Foville  :  A  certain  sol- 
dier who  had  been  severely  wounded  in 
the  battle  of  Austerlitz  ever  afterward 
believed  himself  dead.  On  being  asked 
what  was  the  news  he  would  answer, 
"  You  wish  to  know  how  is  old  Lam- 
bert ?  He  is  no  more,  a  cannon  ball  put 
an  end  to  him.  What  you  see  is  not 
Lambert,  but  a  clumsy  machine  made  to 
resemble  him.  You  must  ask  them  to 
make  another."  In  speaking  of  himself 
he  never  said  "  mot"  (I,  me)  but  "  cela  " 
.(this  thing).  The  skin  was  insensible, 
and  he  oftentimes  would  fall  into  a  state 
of  utter  insensibility  and  immobility  last- 
ing for  several  days. 

Here  we  come  to  grave  disorders, 
meeting  for  the  first  time  a  double  per- 
sonality, or  more  strictly  a  discontinuity 
between  two  periods  of  psychic  life,  a 
failure  of  them  to  connect.  The  case 
just  mentioned  may  be  explained  thus : 
Before  his  injury,  this  soldier,  like  every 
one,  had  his  organic  consciousness,  the 
sense  of  his  own  body,  of  his  physical 
personality.       After      it,     an     essential 


*  Griesinger.     Traits   des    Maladies    Mentales^ 
p.  92.     Doumic's  translation. 


change  took  place  in  his  nervou9  organ- 
ization. As  regards  the  nature  of  this 
change  unfortunately  we  can  only  offer 
hypotheses ;  the  effects  alone  are  known 
to  us.  Whatever  the  change  may  have 
been  its  result  was  to  produce  another 
organic  consciousness,  the  consciousness 
of  a  "  clumsy  machine."  Between  this 
and  the  former  consciousness,  memory 
of  which  persisted  tenaciously,  no  con- 
nection had  been  established.  The  feel- 
ing of  identity  was  wanting  because,  as 
regards  organic  as  well  as  other  states, 
it  can  result  only  from  a  slow,  progres- 
sive and  continuous  assimilation  of  the 
new  states.  In  this  case  the  new  states 
did  not  enter  the  former  Me  as  an  in- 
tegral part.  Hence  the  odd  situation, 
in  which  the  former  personality  appears 
to  itself  as  having  been  but  now  no 
longer  existent ;  and  in  which  the  pres- 
ent state  appears  as  something  external 
and  foreign.  Finally  I  would  remark 
that  in  states  where  the  surface  of  the 
body  is  no  longer  sensitive ;  where  sen- 
sations coming  from  the  several  organs 
are  nearly  null,  and  the  superficial  and 
the  deeper  sensibility  is  extinct,  the  or- 
ganism no  longer  calls  up  those  feelings, 
images  and  ideas  which  are  its  bond  of 
union  with  the  higher  psychic  life  :  it  is 
restricted  to  the  automatic  actions  that 
constitute  the  habitude  and  routine  of 
life.  It  is  properly  speaking  "  a  ma- 
chine." 

Should  any  one  maintain  that  in  this 
instance  the  only  personality  is  that 
which  remembers,  he  may  do  so  abso- 
lutely, but  it  must  be  admitted  that  this 
personality  is  of  a  very  peculiar  kind, 
existing  only  in  the  past :  hence  it  might 
be  called  more  properly  a  memory  than 
a  personality. 

What  distinguishes  this  case  from 
those  we  shall  consider  later  is  that  here 
the  aberration  is  entirely  physical  :  it 
has  its  rise  in  the  body,  and  it  refers 
only  to  the  body.  This  old  soldier  does 
not  believe  himself  to  be  some  one  else 
(Napoleon,  for  instance,  though  he  was 
at  Austerlitz) :  the  case  is  as  free  as  pos- 
sible from  mental  elements. 

To  perturbations  of  sensibility  is  also 
to  be  referred  the  illusion  of  some  pa- 
tients or  convalescents  who  fancy  them- 
selves to  be  double.  Sometimes  there 
is  illusion  pure  and  simple  without  dupli- 
cation. In  that  case  the  morbid  state 
is  projected  outside  of  the  patient — he 
alienates  a  part  of  his  physical  person- 
ality. Instances  of  this  illusion  are  seen 
in  cases  like  that  recorded  by  Bouillaud 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


13 


where  the  patient  having  lost  sensibility  1 
on  one  side  of  the  body,  imagines  that 
he  has  lying  beside  him  on  the  bed 
another  person,  or  even  a  dead  body. 
But  when  the  group  of  morbid  organic 
sensations,  instead  of  being  thus  alien- 
ated, cling  to  the  normal  organic  person- 
ality, but  without  fusion,  then  and  so 
long  as  that  state  lasts,  the  patient  be- 
lieves that  he  has  two  bodies.  "  A  man 
convalescing  after  a  fever  believed  him- 
self to  be  made  up  of  two  individuals, 
one  abed,  the  other  walking  about. 
Though  he  had  no  appetite,  he  ate  a 
good  deal,  having,  as  he  said,  two  bodies 
to  feed."  * 

"  Pariset  having  in  his  early  years  been 
prostrated  by  epidemic  typhus,  remained 
several  days  in  a  state  of  collapse  nigh  to 
death.  One  morning  a  more  distinct  sense 
of  himself  awoke  within  him  ;  he  fell  a  think- 
ing, and  it  was  like  a  resurrection  from  the 
dead.  But,  strange  to  tell,  he  had  at  that 
moment,  or  believed  that  he  had,  two  bod- 
ies, which  appeared  to  him  to  be  lying  in 
two  separate  beds.  While  his  soul  was 
present  in  one  of  these  bodies,  he  felt  well 
and  enjoyed  a  delightful  repose.  In  the 
other  body  the  soul  endured  the  suffering 
incident  to  the  disease,  and  the  patient 
wouid  say,  How  is  it  that  I  am  so  easy  in 
this  bed  and  so  ill,  so  wretched  in  the  other? 
These  thoughts  engaged  his  mind  for  a  long 
time,  and  with  his  extraordinary  power  of 
psychological  analysis  he  oftentimes  enter- 
tained me  with  the  details  of  the  impres- 
sions he  then  received."  t 

Here  we  have  two  instances  of  double 
physical  personality.  Though  we  are 
still  but  a  little  way  on  in  our  study,  the 
reader  may  already  see  how  these  cases 
differ  from  one  another  when  closely 
examined.  The  current  phrase  "  double 
personality "  is  only  an  abstraction  : 
once  translated  into  the  language  of 
concrete  facts,  of  authentic  observations, 
it  is  seen  to  comprise  all  sorts  of  diver- 
sity. Each  case,  so  to  speak,  requires  a 
special  interpretation.  A  p7-iori,  the 
special  interpretation  might  be  found. 
If,  as  we  hold  and  as  we  will  try  to  show 
as  we  proceed,  personality  is  a  highly 
complex  composite,  plainly  its  pertur- 
bations must  needs  be  multiform.  Each 
separate  case  shows  it  to  us  broken  up 
in  a  different  way.  Here  disease  be- 
comes a  subtile  instrument  of  analysis ; 
it  makes  for  us  experiments  not  to  be 
had    otherwise.     The  difficulty  is  to   in- 


*  Leuret,  Fragments  Psychologiques  sur  la 
Folie,  p.  95. 

t  Gratiolet.  Anatomie  Comparte  du  Systhne 
Nerz'cux,  tome  2,  p.  548. 


terpret  them  aright ;  but  our  very  mis- 
takes can  lead  us  astray  only  for  a 
moment,  for  the  facts  the  future  will 
develop  will  serve  to  correct  our  conclu- 
sions or  to  verify  them. 


The  province  of  the  physical  personal- 
ity as  an  element  of  the  total  personality 
is  so  important  a  one  and  has  been  so 
overlooked,  often  on  purpose,  that  we 
can  hardly  lay  too  much  stress  upon  it. 
Here  we  may  with  some  advantage  study 
certain  rare  cases  little  regarded  by, 
psychologists,  but  which  bring  to  the 
support  of  our  thesis  some  additional 
facts  not  more  conclusive  than  those 
already  cited,  but  more  striking  :  I  mean 
cases  of  double  monsters. 

It  must  be  confessed  that  the  number 
of  such  cases  is  rather  small.  Nature 
does  not  multiply  monsters,  and  of  the 
seventy  or  eighty  species  defined  by  tera- 
tologists  the  major  part  have  no  interest 
for  us.  Furthermore,  of  double  monsters 
many  fail  to  reach  adult  age.  The  anat- 
omist and  the  physiologist  may  study 
these  with  profit,  not  so  the  psychologist. 
Finally,  accurate  observations  on  this 
matter  date  back  hardly  one  hundred 
years.  Observations  of  an  earlier  date 
are  so  tinged  with  credulity  and  so  im- 
perfectly recorded  as  to  be  of  no  value. 

The  Me,  as  has  oft  been  repeated,  is 
unpenetrable  :  it  forms  in  itself  a  perfect 
whole  strictly  limited — and  this  is  a  proof 
of  its  essential  oneness.  This  statement 
is  indisputable,  nevertheless  the  impene- 
trability of  the  Me  is  only  the  subjective 
expression  of  the  impenetrability  of  the 
organism.  One  personality  cannot  be 
another  personality,  just  because  one  or- 
ganism cannot  be  another  organism. 
But  if  through  a  concurrence  of  causes 
that  need  not  be  enumerated,  two  human 
beings  from  the  foetal  period  be  partially 
united,  the  heads — the  essential  organs 
of  human  individuality — remaining  per- 
fectly distinct,  then  what  happens  is  this : 
each  organism  is  no  longer  completely 
limited  in  space  and  distinct  from  every 
other ;  there  is  an  undivided  ownership, 
common  to  both,  of  a  part  of  the  econ- 
omy, and  if,  as  we  maintain,  the  unity 
and  the  complexity  of  the  Me  are  but  the 
subjective  expression  of  the  unity  and  the 
complexity  of  the  organism,  then  there 
must  be  partial  penetration  of  one  per- 
sonality by  the  other,  and  a  portion  of 
the  common  psychic  life  must  be  com- 
mon to  the  two,  belonging  not  to  a  Me 


14 


THE  DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


but  to  a  We.  Each  individual  here  is  a 
little  less  than  an  individual.  This  infer- 
ence is  fully  confirmed  by  experience. 

"  Anatomically  considered,  a  double  mon- 
ster is  always  more  than  a  unitary  individual 
and  less  than  two,  but  in  some  cases  it  comes 
nearer  to  unity,  in  others  to  duality.  So  too, 
physiologically  considered,  it  always  has 
more  than  a  unitary  life,  and  less  than  two 
lives  ;  but  its  twofold  life  may  approach  near- 
er to  unity  on  the  one  hand  or  on  the  other 
to  duality. 

"  If  we  consider  only  the  phenomena  of 
sensibility  and  of  will,  a  monster  made  up  of 
two  nearly  perfect  individuals  joined  only  at 
one  point  of  their  bodies  will  be  twain  men- 
tally and  morally  as  well  as  physically.  Each 
individual  will  have  its  own  sensibility  and 
its  own  will,  and  these  will  have  relation  to 
its  own  body  and  to  that  alone.  It  may  even 
happen  that  the  twins  will  differ  widely  in 
their  physical  constitution,  their  stature,  their 
physiognomy,  and  not  less  widely  m  personal 
character  and  intelligence.  When  one  is 
happy  the  other  may  be  sad;  one  will  be 
wakeful  while  the  other  sleeps ;  or  one  will 
want  to  walk  while  the  other  prefers  to  rest : 
and  out  of  this  conflict  of  two  wills  govern- 
ing two  mdissolubly  united  bodies  may  come 
movements  without  results  and  that  are 
neither  walking  nor  resting.  The  two  moi- 
eties may  quarrel  with  each  other,  or  come 
to  blows.  .  .  .  Thus  their  moral  duality,  a 
consequence  of  their  physical  duality,  will  be 
demonstrated  m  a  hundred  ways ;  neverthe- 
less, as  there  is  a  point  in  the  double  body 
situate  on  the  dividing  line  between  the  two 
individuals  and  common  to  both,  certain 
other  phenomena  not  so  numerous,  demon- 
strate in  them  a  beginning  of  unity. 

"  Impressions  made  upon  the  region  where 
the  two  are  united,  especially  at  its  central 
point,  are  perceived  simultaneously  by  both 
brains,  and  both^  too,  may  react  in  response 
to  them.  .  .  .  We  may  add  that  if  at  times 
the  peace  between  the  twins  is  disturbed, 
there  exists  between  them  nearly  always  a 
harmony  of  feelings  and  desires  and  a  mutual 
sympathy  and  attachment  that  can  hardly  be 
appreciated  by  one  who  has  not  read  all  the 
testimony. 

'•  Phenomena  of  the  same  and  of  a  differ- 
ent kind  are  seen  in  cases  where,  the  union 
becoming  closer,  the  two  heads  have  between 
them  only  one  body  and  one  pair  of  legs. 
Anatomic  analysis  shows  that  in  such  crea- 
tures each  individual  possesses  as  his  own 
one  side  of  the  one  body  and  one  of  the 
two  legs.  Physiological  and  psychological 
observation  fully  confirms  this  singular  result. 
Impressions  made  along  the  whole  length  of 
the  axis  of,  union  are  perceived  simultane- 
ously by  both  the  heads ;  those  made  on 
either  side  of  the  axis  and  at  some  distance 
from  it  are  perceived  by  one  head  only;  and 
the  same  is  true  of  the  will  as  of  sensations. 
The  brain  to  the  right  will  alone  receive  sen- 
sations through  the  right  leg  and  it  alone  will 


act  upon  that  leg,  while  the  brain  to  the  left 
will  alone  act  on  the  left  leg :  so  that  the  act 
of  walking  will  be  the  result  of  movements 
performed  by  two  limbs  belonging  to  two 
different  individuals,  and  coordinated  by  two 
distinct  wills. 

"  Finally,  in  parasital  monsters,  as  the  or- 
ganization is  here  nearly  unitary,  all  the  vital 
acts,  all  the  sensations,  all  the  manifestations 
of  will  take  place  almost  exactly  as  in  normal 
beings.  The  smaller  of  the  two  individuals, 
having  become  an  accessory  and  inactive 
part  of  the  larger,  exerts  upon  him  only  a 
weak  and  limited  influence  and  that  only  in  a 
very  small  number  of  functions."* 

To  these  general  outlines  I  will  add  a 
few  details  taken  from  the  most  famous 
instances  of  double  monstrosity. 

There  are  a  good  many  documents  ex- 
tant relating  to  Helen  and  Judith,  a  dual 
female  monster  born  at  Szony,  Hungary, 
in  1 70 1,  deceased  at  Presburg  aged 
twenty-two  years.  Helen  and  Judith 
stood  nearly  back  to  back,  being  united 
at  the  nates  and  partly  in  the  lumbar  re- 
gion. The  sexual  organs  were  double 
externally,  but  there  was  only  one  womb  ; 
there  were  two  intestinal  canals  opening 
into  one  anus.  The  two  aortas  and  the 
two  inferior  venas  cavae  were  united  at 
their  extremities,  thus  opening  two  wide 
and  direct  communications  between  the 
two  hearts  :  from  this  resulted  a  semi- 
community  of  life  and  function. 

"  The  sisters  had  neither  the  same  tem- 
perament nor  the  same  character.  Helen 
was  taller,  handsomer,  more  sprightly,  more 
intelligent  and  more  amiable  in  disposition 
than  her  sister.  Judith,  stricken  at  the  age 
of  six  years  with  hemiplegic  paralysis,  was 
always  smaller  and  of  less  active  mind.  She 
was  slightly  deformed,  and  her  speech  some- 
what impeded.  Still,  like  her  sister,  she 
spoke  the  Hungarian,  German,  French,  and 
even  a  little  English  and  Italian.  The  sis- 
ters were  tenderly  affectionate  to  each  other, 
though  in  childhood  they  sometimes  quar- 
reled and  even  came  to  blows.  The  calls  of 
nature  came  to  both  simultaneously,  except 
as  regarded  urination.  They  had  the  measles 
and  later  the  small-pox  simultaneously,  and 
whenever  it  happened  that  only  one  of  the 
sisters  was  ill  of  2ny  complaint,  the  other 
would  be  miserable  and  worried.  At  last 
Judith  was  taken  with  a  brain  trouble  and  an 
affection  of  the  lungs.  Helen,  who  for  a 
few  days  had  suffered  from  a  slight  fever,  al- 
most instantly  lost  all  her  strength,  though 
her  intellect  remained  clear  and  her  power  of 
speech  unimpaired.     After  a  brief  agony  she 


*  Isidore  Geoffroy  Saint-Hilaire,  Histoire  des 
Anomalies,  tome  3,  p.  373.  The  monster  known  as 
"  Home's  epicome  had  a  parasitic  head  which 
presented  but  a  very  imperfect  semblance  of  nor- 
mal life. 


THE   DISEASES   OF  PERSONALITY. 


succumbed,  not  to  her  own  ailment  but  to 
those  of  her  sister.  The  twins  expired  at 
the  same  instant.:' 

The  Siamese  Twins,  Chang  and  Eng, 
born  in  1811  in  the  kingdom  of  Siam, 
were  connected  from  the  navel  to  the 
xiphoid  appendix.  I.  G.  de  Saint-Hilaire, 
after  describing  their  outward  habitus, 
adds  that, 

"  The  two  brothers,  even  in  their  other 
functions  [besides  respiration  and  the  ar- 
terial pulsation]  exhibit  a  concordance  that 
is  remarkable,  though  not  absolutely  con- 
stant as  has  been  atfirmed,  and  as  Chang 
and  Eng  themselves  have  been  wont  to 
assure  those  who  went  no  farther  than  to 
put  to  the  twins  a  few  vague  questions.  No 
doubt  there  is  nothing  more  curious  than 
the  contrast  of  almost  complete  physical  du- 
ality with  absolute  moral  unity — but  there 
is  nothing  so  opposed  to  sound  theory.  I 
have  carefully  made  every  observation,  and 
gathered  all  the  information  that  could  help 
me  to  determine  the  truth  of  what  has  been 
so  often  asserted,  and  I  have  found  that,  in 
this  conflict  between  the  ill-understood  prin- 
ciples of  teratology  and  the  many  physio- 
logical doctrines  that  have  been  based  on  the 
unity  of  the  Siamese  brothers,  the  facts,  as 
was  to  have  been  expected,  are  entirely  in 
favor  of  the  former.  These  twin  brothers, 
cast  in  two  nearly  identical  moulds,  of  neces- 
sity subject  throughout  their  lives  to  the  in- 
fluence of  the  same  physical  and  moral  en- 
vironment, having  a  similar  organization  and 
receiving  the  same  education,  present  the 
spectacle  of  two  creatures  whose  functions, 
actions,   words,   whose    very  thoughts    are 

nearly  always  concordant  and  parallel 

Their  joys,  their  sorrows,  are  in  common  : 
the  same  desires  arise  at  the  same  instant  in 
these  twin  souls,  the  sentence  that  is  begun 
by  one  is  often  completed  by  the  other. 
Nevertheless  these  concordances  prove 
parity,  not  unity.  Twins  in  the  normal  state 
often  exhibit  analogous  concordances,  and 
no  doubt  they  would  present  agreements 
quite  as  remarkable  if  they  had  during  their 
whole  lives  seen  the  same  objects,  experi- 
enced the  same  sensations,  shared  in  the 
same  pleasures,  undergone  the  same  suffer- 
ings." * 

And  I  may  add  that  as  the  Siamese 
twins  grew  older,  their  differences  of 
character  became  more  and  more  pro- 
nounced :  one  of  the  latest  observers  de- 
scribes one  of  the  brothers  as  morose 
and  taciturn,  the  other  as  sprightly  and 
cheerful. 

Inasmuch  as  the  present  work  is  not 
intended  to  be  a  Psychology  of  Double 
Monsters,    which   find    a   place  in    this 

*  Hist,  des  Anomalies,  tome  3,  p,  go,  et  seq. 


i  treatise  only  as  instances  of  deviation  of 
!  personal  identity,  I  shall  simply  men- 
[  tion  the  recent  case  of  Millie  and  Chris- 
tine, in  whom  the  sensibility  of  the  lower 
members  is  in  common  ;  consequently 
the  two  spinal  cords  must  form  a  regular 
chiasma  at  the  point  of  union. 

The  law,  both  civil   and  ecclesiastical, 
takes  cognizance  of  this  phenomenon  of 
double  monsters,  as  involving  questions 
j  of  civil  status,  marriage,  right  of  succes- 
sion, baptism,  etc. ;  it  has  unhesitatingly 
recognized    two  persons   wherever  such 
monsters    present    two    distinct    heads. 
And  justly  so,  though  in  practice  embar- 
rassing questions  may  arise.     The  head 
being  in  man  the  true  seat  of  personality 
and  the  place  where  the  synthesis  of  per- 
sonality takes   place — though   this    does 
:  not  appear  so  certain  as  we  descend  the 
\  animal  scale — it  fairly  stands  for  the  in- 
I  dividual.     But  when  the  question  is  dis- 
j  cussed   scientifically  it   is  impossible,    in 
j  the  case  of  double  monsters,  to  consider 
I  each  individual  as  complete. 
j      I  will  not  weary  the   reader  with  un- 
I  necessary    comments,     since    the    facts 
speak  for   themselves.     Whoever  exam- 
i  ines  attentively  what  has  been  said,  will 
see  that  even  in  cases  where  the  person- 
I  alities  are  most  distinct,  there  is  such  a 
I  blending   of   organs  and    functions    that 
1  each  of  the  twins  can  be  himself  only  by 
;  being  more  or  iess  the  other  and  by  hav- 
ing consciousness  of  that  other. 

The  Me  therefore  is  not  an  entity  that 
acts  where  and  how  it  pleases,  controlling 
\  the  organs  in  its  own  way,  limiting  its 
;  own  province  at  will.  On  the  contrary  it 
is  so  truly  a  resultant  that  its  domain  is 
I  strictly  determined  by  its  anatomical 
.;  connections  with  the  brain,  and  that  it 
■  represents,  now  a  complete  body  less 
I  some  undivided  part,  again  a  part  of  a 
j  body  and,  in  the  case  of  parasital  raon- 
!  sters,  so  small  a  part  that  it  cannot  sub- 
|  sist,  and  becomes  aborted. 


To  prove  once  more  and  in  another 
way  that  the  organism  is  the  principle  of 
individuation  ;  and  that  it  is  such  without 
any  restriction,  directly  through  the  or- 
ganic sensations,  indirectly  through  the 
affective  and  intellective  states  of  which 
we  shall  speak  later  ;  let  us  see  what 
takes  place  in  twins.  Psychology  has 
hardly  concerned  itself  about  twins  any 
more  than  about  double  monsters,  but 
biologists  have  brought  to  light  some  cu- 
rious facts. 

First  it  is  to  be  remarked  that  double 


i6 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


births  occur  in  the  ratio  of  about  one  to 
seventy  normal  births.  Triple  and  quad 
ruple  births  are  far  more  infrequent — as 
one  to  5000  and  one  to  150,000  respec- 
tively :  but  we  will  consider  here  only 
cases  of  twin  births,  for  the  study  of 
triple  and  quadruple  births  would  only 
complicate  matters.  Again,  it  is  to  be 
remarked  that  there  are  two  kinds  of 
twins,  coming  each  from  a  separate 
ovum,  and  in  such  cases  they  may  be  of 
the  same  or  of  different  sex ;  or  from 
two  germinative  spots  in  one  ovum,  and 
then  they  are  enveloped  in  the  same 
membrane  and  are  invariably  of  one  sex. 
This  latter  case  alone  gives  us  two  per- 
sonalities strictly  comparable. 

We  will  not  take  account  of  animals, 
but  will  consider  the  human  species  only, 
and  will  attack  the  problem  in  all  its  com- 
plexity. It  is  evident  that  since  the  phys- 
ical and  the  moral  state  of  the  parents 
is  the  same  for  the  two  individuals  at  the 
instant  of  procreation,  one  cause  of  dif- 
ference is  eliminated.  And  as  their  de- 
velopment has  for  its  starting  point  one 
single  fecundated  ovum,  it  is  highly  pro- 
bable that  there  will  be  an  exceedingly 
close  resemblance  between  the  two  in 
physical  constitution,  and  hence,  accord- 
ing to  our  thesis,  in  mental  constitution. 
Let  us  first  see  what  are  the  facts  in  our 
favor;  we  will  then  consider  objections 
and  exceptions. 

Perfect  likeness  between  twins  is  a 
matter  of  every-day  observation.  In 
ancient  times  it  was  turned  to  account  by 
comic  poets,  and  ever  since  novelists 
have  made  use  of  it.  But  usually  they 
have  dealt  only  with  external  resem- 
blances, as  stature,  figure,  features,  voice. 
There  are  resemblances  far  deeper  than 
these.  Physicians  have  for  a  long  time 
remarked  that  most  twins  exhibit  an 
extraordinary  agreement  in  tastes,  apti- 
tudes, faculties,  and  even  in  their  for- 
tunes. Mr.  Galton  has  investigated  this 
subject  by  sending  out  a  list  of  questions 
to  which  he  received  eighty  replies  where- 
of thirty-six  entered  into  circumstantial 
details.  Mr.  Galton's  purpose  was  en- 
tirely different  from  ours.  In  pursuing 
his  researches  on  heredity  he  wished  to 
determine  by  a  new  method  the  respec- 
tive parts  played  by  nature  and  education  ; 
but  much  of  his  material  will  be  of  great 
use  to  us.* 

He  gives  many  anecdotes  of  the  same 


*  Seethe  title  '  History  of  Twins'"  in  Galton's 
Inquiries  into  Human  Faculty  and  its  Develop- 
ment. 


character  as  those  which  have  long  been 
current,  e.  g. :  one  sister  taking  two 
music  lessons  a  day  so  as  to  leave  her 
twin  sister  free  ;  the  perplexities  of  a  col- 
lege janitor  who  whenever  the  twin 
brother  of  one  of  the  students  came  to 
see  his  brother,  was  at  a  loss  which  of  the 
two  to  let  out,  etc.  In  other  cases  the 
twins  exhibit  a  persistent  likeness  to  each 
other  under  circumstances  little  calcu- 
lated to  preserve  it.     Thus : 

"  A  was  coming  home  from  India  on  leave ; 
the  ship  did  not  arrive  for  some  days  after  it 
was  due ;  the  twin  brother  B  had  come  up 
from  his  quarters  to  receive  A,  and  their  old 
mother  was  very  nervous.  One  morning  A 
rushed  in  saying,  '  Oh,  mother,  how  are 
you  ? '  Her  answer  was,  '  No,  B,  it's  a  bad 
joke.  You  know  how  anxious  I  am  ' — and 
it  was  a  little  time  before  A  could  persuade 
her  that  he  was  the  real  man."  t 

But  facts  regarding  mental  organiza- 
tion have  more  interest  for  us.  "  The 
next  point,"  says  Galton, 
"  which  I  shall  mention  in  illustration  of  the 
extremely  close  resemblance  between  certain 
twins  is  the  similarity  in  the  association  of 
their  ideas.  No  less  than  eleven  out  of  the 
thirty-five  cases  testify  to  this.  They  make 
the  same  remarks  on  the  same  occasion, 
begin  singing  the  same  song  at  the  same 
moment,  and  so  on;  or  one  would  commence 
a  sentence  and  the  other  would  finish  it.  An 
observant  friend  graphically  described  to  me 
the  effect  produced  on  her  by  two  such  twins 
whom  she  had  met  casually.  She  said: 
'  Their  teeth  grew  alike,  they  spoke  alike 
and  together,  and  said  the  same  things,  and 
seemed  just  like  one  person.  One  of  the 
most  curious  anecdotes  that  I  have  received 
concerning  this  similarity  of  ideas  was  that 
one  twin,  A,  who  happened  to  be  at  a  town 
in  Scotland,  bought  a  set  of  champaign 
glasses  which  caught  his  attention,  as  a  sur- 
prise for  his  brother  B,  while  at  the  same 
time,  B,  being  in  England,  bought  a  similar 
set  of  precisely  the  same  pattern  for  A. 
Other  anecdotes  of  a  like  kind  have  reached 
me  about  these  twins.'  "  | 

Bodily  and  mental  diseases,  in  them- 
selves and  in  their  evolution,  supply 
many  confirmatory  facts.  And  though 
the  latter  are  of  interest  only  to  the 
psychologist,  the  former  disclose  a  like- 
ness in  the  inmost  constitution  of  the  two 
organisms  not  to  be  seen  at  a  glance  like 
external  resemblances.     Says  Trousseau  : 

"  I  have  had  as  patients  twin  brothers 
that  were  so  extraordinarily  alike  that  it  was 

t  Galton,  Inquiries  into\Human  Faculty.    (Lon- 
don, 1833),  p.  224. 
X  Hid.,  p.  231. 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


17 


impossible  for  me  to  distinguish  them  except 
when  they  were  side  by  side.  This  bodily  re- 
semblance went  further  still  :  there  was  even 
a  more  remarkable  pathological  likeness  be- 
tween them  One  of  them,  whom  I  saw  in 
Paris  suffering  from  rheumatic  ophthalmia, 
said  to  me  :  '  This  very  moment  my  brother 
is  up  doubt  suffering  from  ophthalmia  too.'  I 
scouted  the  idea,  but  a  few  days  afterward 
he  showed  me  a  letter  he  had  just  received 
from  his  brother,  then  at  Vienne,  in  which 
he  wrote  :  '  I  have  my  ophthalmia,  you  too 
must  be  having  yours.'  Strange  as  this  may 
seem,  the  fact  was  even  so.  This  I  have 
not  on  hearsay,  but  I  myself  have  seen  it,  and 
similar  cases  have  come  to  my  knowledge  in 
my  practice."  * 


Galton  gives  many  similar  cases,  but  I 
quote  only  one.  Two  twins  bearing  a 
perfect  resemblance  to  each  other,  with 
a  strong  mutual  attachment  and  with 
identical  tastes,  were  in  government  em- 
ploy, and  lived  together"  One  fell  sick 
of  Bright's  disease  and  died  ;  the  other 
was  attacked  by  the  same  disorder  and 
died  seven  months  later. 

Pages  might  be  filled  with  similar  cases. 
And  it  is  the  same  with  mental  maladies. 
A  few  instances  will  suffice.  Moreau  of 
Tours  had  under  treatment  two  twins 
physically  alike  and  both  insane.  In 
them 

"  the  dominant  ideas  are  absolutely  the 
same.  Both  believe  themselves  to  be  the 
victims  of  imaginary  persecutions.  The 
self-same  enemies  have  sworn  to  undo 
them  and  employ  the  self-same  means  of 
attaining  their  ends.  Both  have  hallucina- 
tions of  hearing.  They  never  address  a 
word  of  conversation  to  any  one,  and  are 
loth  to  answer  questions.  They  always 
hold  themselves  aloof  and  do  not  communi- 
cate with  each  other.  An  exceedingly  curi- 
ous fact,  and  one  again  and  again  noticed  by 
the  attendants  in  their  ward  and  by  ourselves 
is,  that  from  time  to  time,  at  very  irregular 
intervals — two,  three  or  more  months — with- 
out ascertainable  cause  and  by  a  spontaneous 
effect  of  their  complaint,  a  very  marked 
change  occurs  in  the  condition  of  the  two 
brothers.  Both  of  them,  about  the  same 
period,  often  on  the  same  day,  quit  their 
habitual  state  of  stupor  and  prostration  ;  they 
utter  the  self-same  complaints  and  present 
themselves  before  the  physician,  earnestly 
begging  to  be  allowed  their  liberty.  I  have 
been  witness  of  this  rather  singular  fact  even 
when  the  twins  happened  to  be  several  kilo- 
meters apart,  one  at  Bicetre,  the  other  at  the 
Ste.  Anne  farm."  t 


*  Trousseau  Clinigue  Mtfdicale  I.,  p.  253 
t  Psychologie  Morbide,  p.   172.    See  also  an  ex- 
ceedingly curious  case  in  the  Annates  M<fdico-A*y- 
chologigues,  1863,  tome  I.,  p.  3i2.     On  the  question 


Recently  the  Journal 'of 'Mental  Science 
published  two  observations  on  insanity 
in  twins.  Here  we  see  two  sisters  much 
alike  in  features,  manners,  speech  and 
mental  traits,  so  that  they  might  easily 
be  taken  for  one  another.  They  were 
placed  in  different  wards  of  the  same 
asylum  without  the  possibility  of  seeing 
one  another,  and  yet  the  symptoms  of  im 
sanity  were  the  same  in  both. 

But  we   must   meet   some   objections. 
There  are  some  twins  of  one  sex  who  do 
not  resemble  each  other,  and  though  the 
observed  facts  do  not  tell  us  in  what  pro- 
portion true  twins  (from  one  ovum)  pre- 
sent these  differences,  one  instance  suf- 
fices to  make  the  subject  worthy  of  dis- 
cussion.     We   have   in   another    place  J 
enumerated  the  many  causes  that  in  every 
individual,    from    conception    till   death, 
tend  to  produce  variations,  that  is  to  say 
marks  proper  to  that  individual  and  dif- 
ferentiating him  from  all  others.     Here, 
as  we  have  said,  one  class  of  causes  must 
be  eliminated,  viz.,  those  which  come  im- 
mediately  from    the    parents.      But   the 
fecundated  ovum  represents  also  the  an- 
cestral influences— four,  twelve,  twenty- 
eight  possible  influences,  accordingly  as 
we  go  back  to  the  grand-parents   great- 
grand-parents,  great-great-grand-parents, 
and   so  on.     Only  by  experience  do  w£ 
learn   which   influences    prevail    and    in* 
what  degree.      Here   indeed   one   same- 
ovum  serves  to  produce  two  individuals  ■" 
but  there  is  nothing  to  prove  that  always ' 
and  everywhere  division  is  made  between 
the  two  with  strict  equivalence  in  quanJ 
tity  and  quality  of   the   materials.     The 
ova  of  all  animals  not  only  aossess  the 
same  anatomic  composition,  but  further- 
more  chemical  analysis  can  discover  in 
them  only  infinitesimal  differences;  nev-'. 
ertheless  one  ovum  produces  a  sponge 
another  a  human  being..    It  follows  that 
this  apparent  likeness  hides  profound  dif- 
ferences which  our  keenest  investigation 
fails  to  detect.     Are  these  differences  due 
to  the  nature  of  the  molecular  motions  as 
some  authors  think  ?     We  may  suop'ose 
what   we  please.,,  provided  it  be   under- 
stood that  the  ovum  is  a  complex  prod- 
uct, and   that   the.-two,  individuals    that 
come  from  it  may  not, be* rigorously  alike 
Our  difficulty  springs  simply  from  igno- 
rance of  the  processes  according  to  which 
the  primordial  elements  group  themselves 


ot  twins  the  reader  may  consult  Kleinwsechter's    ch!  iv. 


special  work,  Die  Lehre  von-  den  Zwiliizen.     Prae. 
1871  •  also  Dr.  B,  Ball,  .Insanity   in   Twins  (Hui£ 
boldt  Library,  No.  87,  page  37). 
X  L  'Hiriait?  Bsyth-olbgityte,  2d  edition,  part  II„, 


iS 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


in  order  to  constitute  each  individual,  and 
consequently  from  our  ignorance  of  the 
physical  and  psychical  difference's  thence 
resulting-.  Some  of  Galton's  correspond- 
ents mentioned  the  curious  fact  of  some 
twins  being"  "  complementary  to  each 
other."  The  mother  of  a  pair  of  twins 
wrote : 

"  There  seemed  to  be  a  sort  of  interchange- 
able likeness  in  expression  that  often  gave  Lo 
each  the  effect  of  being  more  like  his  brother 
than  himself."*  "A  fact  struck  all  our 
school  contemporaries,  that  my  brother  and 
1  were  complementary,  so  to  speak,  in  point 
of  ability  and  disposition.  He  was  contem- 
plative, poetical,  and  literary  to  a  remarkable 
degree,  showing  great  power  in  that  line.  I 
was  practical,  mathematical,  and  linguistic. 
Between  us  we  should  have  made  a  very  de- 
.  cent  sort'  of  a  man."  t 

If  the  reader  will  consider  how  complex 
man's  psychic  organization  is,  and,  in  con- 
sequence of  this  complexity,  how  un- 
likely it  is  that  two  persons  should  be 
•simply  copies  of  each  other,  he  will  be  m- 
.evitab'ly  led  to  the  conclusion  that  one 
-well-proved  fact  of  this  kind  outweighs 
-,fen  exceptions,  and  that  the  moral  like- 
is  only  the  correlative  of  the  physi- 
cal. If  per  impossibile  there  were  two 
;memso  constituted  that  their  organisms 
.should  be  identical,  and  their  hereditary 
influences  exactly  the  same  :  xiper  impos- 
sibilhis  both  of  them  received  the  same 
physical  and  moral  impressions  at  the 
same  moment :  then  the  only  difference 
'  between  them  would  be  their  position  in 
space. 

In  concluding  this  chapter,  I  am.  a  little 
ashamed  to  have  collected  so  many  proofs 
.and  arguments  to  establish  what  in  my 
,  eyes  is  a  plain  truth,  viz.,  that  as  the  or- 
ganism is,  so  is  the  personality.     I  should 
have  hesitated  to  do  it,  were  it  not  that 
•  this  truth  has  been  forgotten  and  miscon- 
ceived rather  than  denied,  and  that  au- 
thors have  nearly  always,  contented  them- 
selves with  mentioning  it  .under  the  vague 
heading  of  "  influence  of  the  physical  upon 
the  moral." 

The  facts  so  far  stiidie'd  do  not  of  them- 
selves lead  to   a  conclusion :    they   only 
prepare  the  way.     They  prQve  that  phys- 
ical personality  presupposes  the  proper- 
ties of  living  matter  and  their  coordina- 
-  tion ;  that  as  the  body  is  but  the  organ- 
ized  and   coordinated   sum   of    the  ele- 
ments that  make  it  up,  so  the  psychical 
-•personality  is  but  the  organized  and  co- 


ordinated sum  of  the  same  elements  re- 
garded as  psychic  values.  It  expresses 
their  nature  and  their  action,  nothing 
more.  This  is  proved  by  the  normal 
state,  by  teratological  cases,  and  by  the 
likeness  between  twins.  The  aberrations 
of  physical  personality,  or  as  Bertrand  % 
happily  denominates  them,  "  hallucina- 
tions of  the  bodily  sense  "  Ues  hdllucifia- 
tions  du  sens  du  corps)  confirm  this  view. 
But  there  are  deviations  of  human  per- 
sonality produced  by  other  causes,  by  a 
more  complex  mechanism  :  these  we  are 
now  to  study. 


CHAPTER  III. 

AFFECTIVE    DISTURBANCE. 

ONCE  for  all  the  reader  must  be  re- 
minded that  in  this  chapter  (as  also  in  the 
one  on  intellective  disorders)  we  are  still 
pursuing,  under  another  form,  the  study 
of  organic  conditions.  The  desires,  feel- 
ings, passions  that  give  the  fundamental 
tone  to  character,  have  their  roots  in  the 
organism,  are  pre-determined  by  it.  The 
same  is  true  of  the  highest  intellectual 
manifestations.  Nevertheless  since  the 
psychic  states  have  here  a  predominant 
role,  we  will  treat  them  as  immediate 
causes  of  changes  of  personality,  the 
while  never  forgetting  that  these  causes 
are  in  their  turn  themselves  effects. 

Without  pretending  strictly  to  classify 
affective  manifestations  (which  we  shall 
not  have  to  consider  in  detail)  we  will  re- 
duce them  to  three  groups  of  increasing 
psychological  complexity  but  decreasing 
physiological  importance.  These  are  i. 
Tendencies  connected  with  the  conserva- 
tion of  the  individual  (nutrition,  defense) ; 
2.  Those  which  relate  to  the  conservation 
of  the  species ;  and  3.  The  highest  of 
them  all,  those  which  presuppose  the  de- 
velopment of  mind  (manifestations  of  a 
moral,  religious,  aesthetic,  or  scientific 
kind  ;  ambition  in  all  its  forms  ;  and  the 
like).  If  we  consider  the  development  of 
the  individual  we  find  that  it  is  in  this 
order  that  feelings  and  sentiments  make 
their  appearance.  It  is  seen  more  clearly 
still  in  the  evolution  of  the  human  spe- 
cies. The  inferior  races,  where  educa- 
tion does  not  come  in  to  correct  nature, 
when  they  bring  together  the  accumulated 
result  of  ages  of  labor,  have  little  to  show 
bevond  the  conservation  of  the  individual 


*  Inquiries  into  Human  Faculty ',  p.  224. 
t  Ibid.  p.  240, 


%  De    PAperception    du   Corps  Humain  par  la 
Conscience,  p.  269,  et  seq.  .'",;■_ 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


19 


and  of  the  species,  and  present  only  the 
faintest  trace  of  the  sentiments  enumer- 
ated under  the  third  head. 

The  affective  states  relating  to  nutrition 
are,  in  the  child  during  its  early  years, 
trie  only  element,  so  to  speak,  of  the  nas- 
cent personality.  From  these  come  well- 
being  and  discomfort,  desire  and  aver- 
sion :  here  we  see  that  "  bodily  sense," 
of  which  we  have  spoken  so  often,  arrived 
at  its  highest  psychic  expression.  Inas- 
much as  certain  natural  causes,  too  evi- 
dent to  need  enumeration,  make  nutrition 
the  almost  exclusively  dominant  concern- 
ment in  the  infant,  the  babe  has  and  can 
have  only  an  almost  entirely  nutritive 
personality,  i.  e.,  the  vaguest  and  lowest 
form  of  personality.  The  Me,  in  the 
view  of  whoever  does  not  consider  it  as 
an  entity,  cannot  be  here  anything  but  an 
extremely  simple  composite. 

As  we  quit  the  period  of  infancy,  nu- 
trition plays  a  less  dominant  part,  but  it 
never  loses  its  just  place,  for,  of  all  the 
properties  of  the  living  being,   this  one 
alone  is  fundamental.      Hence  with  vari- 
ations in  nutrition  are  connected  serious 
alterations   of   personality.      With  nutri- 
tion reduced,  the  individual  feels  himself 
depressed,  enfeebled,  diminished.      With 
nutrition  increased,  he  feels  himself  stim- 
ulated, strengthened,  reinforced.      Of  all 
the  functions  whose  harmonious   action 
constitutes  this  fundamental  property  of 
living  beings,  the  circulation  appears  to  I 
be  the  one  whose  sudden  variations  have  I 
the  greatest  influence  upon  the  affective  ! 
states,  and   are  most  speedily  answered  j 
by   a   counter-stroke.      But  we  must  quit 
conjectures  about  details,    and    look   at 
the  facts. 

In  the  states  known  as  hypochondria, 
lypemania,  melancholia  (in  all  its  forms), 
we  find  alterations  of  personality  rang- 
ing through  all  possible  degrees,  includ- 
ing complete  metamorphosis.  Physicians 
draw  lines  of  clinical  distinction  between 
these  different  morbid  states,  but  they  do 
not  concern  us  just  now,  and  we  may 
comprise  them  under  one  common  de- 
scription. There  is  a  certain  feeling  of 
fatigue,  oppression,  anxiety,  down-heart- 
edness,  sadness,  absence  of  desire,  per- 
sistent ennui.  In  the  worst  cases,  the 
springs  of  the  emotions  are  quite  dried" 
up.  "  The  patients  become  insensible  to 
everything.  They  are  without  affection, 
whether  for  their  parents  or  for  their  chil- 
dren, and  even  the  death  of  those  who 
once  were  dear  to  them  leaves  them  ut- 
terly cold  and  indifferent.  They  can  no 
longer  weep,  and  nought  save  their  own 


j  sufferings  moves  them."*  Then,  as  re- 
gards bodily  or  mental  activity  :  such  pa- 
tients exhibit  torpor,  powerlessness  to  act 
or  even  to  will,  insuperable  inaction  for 
hours  at  a  time  :  in  a  word  that  "  abu- 
lia "  all  the  forms  of  which  we  studied  in 
the  work  on  Diseases  of  the  Will,  f 
As  regards  the  outer  world,  the  patient, 
though  not  hallucinated,  finds  all  his  re- 
lations to  it  changed.  His  habitual  sen- 
sations seem  to  have  lost  their  usual  char- 
acter. "  Everything  about  me,"  .said 
such  a  patient,  "is  still  as  it  used  to  be, 
yet  there  must  have  been  some  -changes. 
Things  still  wear  their  old  shapes  :  I  see 
them  plainly,  and  yet  they  have  -changed 
a  good  deal  too."  One  of  Esquirol's  pa- 
tients complained  "  that  his  existence  was 
incomplete.  'Every  one  of  my  senses,' 
he  used  to  say,  '  every  part  of  myself  is, 
so  to  speak,  separated  from  me,  and  no 
longer  gives  me  any  sensation  :  it  seems 
to  me  that  I  never  come  quite  up  to'the 
things  I  touch.'  "  This  state,  due  some- 
times to  cutaneous  anaesthesia,  may  be- 
come so  intensified  that  to  the  patient  "  it 
seems  as  though  the  real  world  had  com- 
pletely vanished  or  is  dead,  and  that  only 
an  imaginary  world  remains  in  which  he 
is  anxious  to  find  his  place."  \  To  all 
this,  add  the  physical  symptoms,  viz.,  dis- 
ordered circulation,  respiration,  and  se- 
cretion. There  may  be  great  emaciation, 
and  the  weight  of  the  body  may  decline 
I  rapidly  during  the  period  of  depression. 
j  The  respiratory  function  is  retarded 
as  also  the  circulation,  and  the  body's 
temperature  is  lowered. 

By  degrees  these  morbid  states  become 
embodied,  organized,  and  combine  to 
produce  a  false  conception  which  becomes 
a  center  of  attraction  toward  which 
everything  converges.  One  patient  avers 
that  his  heart  is  a  stone,  another  that  his 
nerves  are  burning  coals  ;  and  so  on. 
These  aberrations  have  all  sorts  of  forms, 
and  they  differ  from  one  patient  to  an- 
other. In  extreme  forms,  the  individual 
doubts  of  his  own  existence,  or  denies  it. 
A  young  man  who  said  he  was  for  two 
years  dead,  expressed  as  follows  his  per- 
plexity :  "  I  exist,  but  outside  of  real, 
material  life,  and  in  spite  of  myself,  noth- 
ing having  given  me  death.  Everything 
is  mechanical  with  me,  and  everything  is 
done  unconsciously."  This  contradictory 
situation,  in  which  the  subject  says  that 

*  Falret,  Archives  Generates  de  Medecine,  Dec, 
1878. 

t  No.  52  Humboldt  Library. 

X  Griesinger,  Traite1  des  Maladies  Mentales 
(  French  Trans.),  p.  265. 


2Q 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


he  is  at  once  living  and  dead,  would  seem 
to  be  the  logical,  natural  expression  of  a 
condition  of  things  in  which  the  former 
Me  and  the  present  Me,  vitality  and  an- 
nihilation, come  to  equilibrium. 

The  psychological  interpretation  of  all 
these  cases  admits  of  no  doubt :  here  are 
organic  perturbations  whose  first  result 
is  to  reduce  the  sense-faculty  in  general, 
and  whose  second  is  to  pervert  it.  Thus 
is  found  a  group  of  organic  and  psychic 
states  that  tend  to  modify  the  constitution 
of  the  Me  profoundly  and  in  its  inmost 
nature,  because  they  act  not  after  the 
manner  of  sudden  emotions  whose  effect 
is  violent  and  superficial,  but  slowly,  si- 
lently, persistently.  At  first,  this  new 
state  seems  strange  to  the  individual, 
something  outside  of  himself.  Little  by 
little,  through  custom,  it  finds  its  place, 
becomes  an  integral  part  of  the  individ- 
ual's being,  and,  if  it  is  progressive,  trans- 
forms him  entirely. 

Seeing  how  the  Me  is  broken  up,  we 
can  understand  how  it  comes  to  be. 
Doubtless,  in  most  cases,  the  change  is 
only  partial.  The  individual,  while  be- 
coming for  himself  and  for  those  who 
know  him,  other  than  he  used  to  be,  re- 
tains a  residuum  of  himself.  Complete 
transformation  can,  in  fact,  be  only  of 
rare  occurrence  ;  and  it  may  be  remarked 
that  when  the  patient  says  he  is  changed, 
transformed,  despite  the  contradiction  or 
the  ridicule  of  his  friends,  he  is  right  and 
not  they.  He  cannot  feel  otherwise,  for 
his  consciousness  is  but  the  expression  of 
his.  organic  state.  Subjectively,  he  is  not 
at  all  under  an  illusion  :  he  is  just  what  he 
must  be.  On  the  contrary  it  is  the  un- 
conscious, unavowed  hypothesis  of  a  Me, 
independent  and  existing  by  itself  as  an 
unchangeable  entity,  that  instinctively 
leads  us  to  believe  this  change  to  be  an 
external  occurrence— or,  as  it  were,  some 
unwonted  or  ridiculous  garb,  while  the 
fact  is  that  the  change  is  inward  and  in- 
volves gains  or  losses  in  the  very  sub- 
stance of  the  Me  itself. 

The  counterpart  of  these  partial  altera- 
tions of  the  Me  is  seen  in  cases 
where  it  becomes  exalted,  amplified, 
and  where  it  immeasurably  transcends 
its'  normal  tone.  Instances  of  this  are 
seen  in  the  beginning  of  general  paral- 
ysis; also  in  certain  cases  of  mania. 
This  is  in  every'  respect  the  reverse  of 
what  occurs  in  those  other  cases.  Here 
we  see  the  patient  possessed  of  a  sense 
of  physical  and  mental  well-being,  of 
abounding  strength,  of  exuberant  activ- 
ity:  he  talks  unceasingly,  is  a  fertile  de- 


viser of  projects  and  undertakings,  ever 
traveling  hither  and  thither  to  no  pur- 
pose. The  superexcitation  of  his  psychic 
life  has  a  corresponding  superactivity  of 
the  organic  functions.  Nutrition  be- 
comes more  active  and  is  often  excessive  ; 
respiration  and  circulation  are  acceler- 
ated ;  the  genital  function  is  quickened. 
Yet,  despite  the  great  expenditure  of 
force,  the  patient  feels  no  fatigue.  Then 
these  states  become  grouped  and  unified, 
and  at  length  they  in  great  part  trans- 
form the  Me.  One  man  is  conscious  of 
herculean  strength,  is  able  to  lift  prodig- 
ious weights,  to  beget  thousands  of  chil- 
dren, run  a  race  with  a  railroad  train,  etc. 
Another  possesses  an  inexhaustible  store 
of  science,  is  a  great  poet,  great  inventor, 
great  artist,  and  so  on.  Sometimes  the 
transformation  comes  still  nearer  to  com- 
plete metamorphosis :  mastered  by  the 
sense  of  boundless  power,  the  patient 
calls  himself  pope,  emperor,  god.  As 
Griesinger  justly  remarks, 

"  The  patient  feeling  proud,  daring,  light 
hearted,  conscious  to  himself  of  unwonted 
freedom  in  executing  his  projects,  his  mind 
swarming  with  ideas,  is  naturally  led  to  con- 
ceive thoughts  of  greatness,  station,  wealth, 
great  moral  or  intellectual  power.  *  *  * 
This  overweening  sense  of  strength  and  free- 
dom must  however  have  a  reason :  there 
must  exist  in  the  Me  something  to  corre- 
spond to  this  ;  the  Me  must  have  become  for 
the  time  being  something  quite  different 
from  what  it  was  before,  and  this  change  can 
be  expressed  by  the  patient  only  by  declar- 
ing himself  to  be  Napoleon,  the  Messiah,  or 
some  other  exalted  personage."* 

We  will  not  waste  time  in  proving  that 
this  transformation  of  the  Me,  whether, 
partial  or  complete,  momentary  or  perma- 
nent, is  in  kind  the  same  as  the  preceding 
cases  and  that  it  presupposes  the  same 
mechanism,  with  this  only  difference,  that 
here  the  Me  undergoes  dissolution  in  the 
reverse  way,  by  excess,  and  not  by  default. 

These  plus  or  minus  alterations  of 
personality,  this  metamorphosis  of  the 
Me,  which  raises  it  or  lowers,  would  be 
still  more  striking  if  they  succeeded  one 
another  regularly  in  the  same  individual. 
Now  this  occurs  often  in  what  is  called 
folie  circulaire,  or  folie  a  doicble  forme, 
a  malady  characterized  essentially  by  suc- 
cessive periods  of  depression  and  exalta- 
tion following  one  another  in  fixed  order, 
with  intermissions  of  lucidity  in  some  pa- 
tients. Here  we  observe  a  curious  fact. 
Upon  the  personality  that  may  be  called 


:  Oj>.  cii.,  p.  333. 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


21 


the  original  and  fundamental  one,  are 
grafted,  one  after  the  other,  two  new  per- 
sonalities not  only  quite  distinct,  but  to- 
tally exclusive  of  each  other.  Upon  this 
point  it  is  necessary  to  give  the  gist  of 
a  few  observations.*  A  woman  whose 
case  was  observed  by  Morel,  had  been 
abandoned  to  a  vicious  life  by  her  mother 
from  the  age  of  fourteen  years. 

"  Later,  in  her  shame  and  wretchedness, 
her  only  resource  was  to  enter  a  brothel. 
She  was  taken  thence  one  year  afterward  and 
placed  in  the  convent  of  the  Good  Shepherd 
at  Metz.  Here  she  stayed  two  years,  and 
the  too  strong  reaction  that  took  place  in  her 
feelings  gave  rise  to  religious  mania,  which 
was  followed  by  a  period  of  profound  stupid- 
ity." 

Being  now  placed  under  the  care  of  a 
physician,  she  would  pass  through,  two 
alternate  periods,  believing  herself  to  be 
in  turn  prostitute  and  nun.  On  emerg- 
ing from  the  period  of  stupidity, 

"  she  would  go  to  work  regularly,  and  her 
language  was  always  proper,  hut  she  would 
arrange  her  toilet  with  a  certain  coqitetterie. 
Then  this  tendency  would  increase,  her  eyes 
growing  brighter,  her  glance  lascivious  ;  she 
would  dance  and  sing.  At  last  her  obscene 
language  and  her  erotic  solicitations  would 
compel  her  sequestration  in  solitary  confine- 
ment. She  would  say  her  name  was  Mad- 
ame Poulmaire,  and  would  give  the  fullest 
details  of  her  former  life  in  prostitution. 
Then,  after  a  period  of  depression,  she 
would  become  again  gentle  and  timid,  carry- 
ing even  to  scrupulousness  the  sense  of  pro- 
priety. She  would  now  arrange  her  toilet 
with  the  utmost  austerity.  The  tone  of  her 
voice  too  would  assume  a  peculiar  character, 
as  she  spoke  of  the  Good  Shepherd  convent 
at  Metz  and  of  her  longing  to  return  thither. 
Now  her  name  would  be  Sister  Martha  of 
the  Five  Wounds,  Theresa  of  Jesus,  Mary  of 
the  Resurrection,  etc.  She  would  not  speak 
in  the  first  person  singular,  but  would  say  to 
the  attendant  sister,  '  Take  our  dress ' ; 
4  there  is  our  handkerchief.'  Nothing  was 
her  own  any  more,  according  to  the  rule  in 
convents.  She  would  have  visions  of  angels 
smiling  upon  her,  and  moments  of  ecstasy." 

In  a  case  reported  by  Krafft-Ebing,  a 
neuropathic  patient,  son  of  an  insane  fa- 
ther, "  during  the  period  of  depression 
was  disgusted  with  the  world,  and  all  his 
thoughts  were  about  the  nearness  of 
death,  and  about  eternity,  and  his  pur- 
pose then  was  to  become  a  priest.  Dur- 
ing his  maniacal  periods  he  was  noisy, 

*  They  can  be  found  in  extenso  in  Ritti.  Traits 
Clinique  de  la  Folie  a  Double  Forme.  Paris,  183? 
Obss.  XVII.,  XIX.,  XXX.,  XXXI. 


pursued  his  studies  with  mad  ardar, 
would  not  hear  of  theology,  and  thought 
only  of  practicing  medicine." 

An  insane  woman  at  Charenton,  pos- 
sessing very  remarkable  power  and  origi- 
nality of  mind, 

"  from  day  to  day  would  change  in  personality, 
in  condition,  in  life,  and  even  in  sex:  Now 
she  would  be  a  young  lady  of  blood  royal 
betrothed  to  an  emperor;  anon  a  plebeian 
woman  and  a  democrat :  to-day  a  wife  and  in 
the  family  way ;  to-morrow  still  a  maid.  It 
would  happen  also  that  she  would  think  her- 
self a  man,  and  one  day  she  imagined  herself 
to  be  a  political  prisoner  of  importance,  and 
composed  some  verses  upon  the  subject." 

Finally  in  the  observation  which  fol- 
lows we  find  the  complete  formation  of 
a  second  personality. 

"  A  lunatic  in  the  Maison  de  Vanves,"  says 
Billod,t  "  about  every  eight  months  would 
let  his  beard  grow  and  would  show  himself 
to  all  the  inmates  in  unusual  garb  and.  with 
unwonted  behavior,  giving  himself  out  to  be 
one  Nabon,  an  artillery  lieutenant  lately  re- 
turned from  Africa  to  take  the  place  of  his 
brother.  The  patient  would  then  remain 
several  months  in  a  state  of  great  exultation, 
adapting  all  his  conduct  to  his  new  charac- 
ter. After  some  time  he  would  announce 
the  return  of  his  brother  who,  he  would  say, 
was  in  the  village  and  was  now  to  take  his 
place.  Then  some  day  he  would  have  his 
beard  shaved  off,  would  make  a  complete 
change  in  his  habits  and  demeanor,  and 
would  resume  his  true  name.  But  now  he 
would  present  all  the  signs  of  melancholia, 
walking  about  slowly,  loving  silence  and 
solitude,  continually  reading  the  Folio-wing 
of  Christ  and  the  Fathers  of  the  Church.  In 
this  mental  state,  a  lucid  one  if  3"OU  please, 
but  one  that  I  am  far  from  considering  as 
normal,  he  would  remain  till  the  coming 
back  of  '  Lieutenant  Nabon.'  " 

The  two  cases  first  cited  are,  in  reality, 
but  an  exaggeration,  a  largely  magnified 
copy,  so  to  speak,  of  the  normal  state. 
The  Me  is  always  made 'up  of  contradic- 
tory tendencies — virtues  and  vices,  mod- 
esty and  arrogance,  avarice  and  prodi- 
gality, desire  for  rest  and  need  of  action, 
and  so  on.  Usually  these  opposite  tend- 
encies equilibrate  one  another,  or  at  least 
the  one  which  dominates  is  not  without 
its  counterpoise.  In  the  cases  before  us, 
in  virtue  of  pretty  well  ascertained  or- 
ganic conditions,  not  only  is  equilibrium 
impossible,  but  a  group  of  tendencies  be- 
comes hypertrophied  at  the  expense  of 
the    antagonist   group,    which    becomes 


t  Annates  Me'dico-fisychologiques,   1858. 


22 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


atrophied  ;  then  an  inverse  reaction  takes 
place,  so  that  the  personality,  instead  of 
consisting  of  those  mean  oscillations 
whereof  each  one  represents  one  side  of 
human  nature,  passes  ever  from  one  ex- 
cess to  another.  We  may  remark  that 
these  diseases  of  personality  consist  of  a 
reduction  to  a  simpler  state  :  but  we  must 
not  yet  dwell  upon  that  point. 


Nutrition  being  less  a  function  than 
the  fundamental  property  of  whatever 
has  life,  the  tendencies  and  the  feelings 
connected  with  it  possess  a  very  general 
character.  The  same  cannot  be  said  of 
what  concerns  the  conservation  of  the 
species.  That  function,  attached  as  it  is 
to  a  definite  part  of  the  organism,  finds 
expression  in  very  definite  feelings. 
Hence  this  is  well  fitted  to  verify  our 
thesis  ■  for  if  personality  is  a  composite 
varying  according  to  its  constituent  ele- 
ments, a  change  in  the  sex  instincts  will 
change  the  personality,  a  perversion  will 
pervert  it,  an  interversion  will  intervert  it : 
and  this  is  just  what  happens. 

First   let   us   recall  some  known  facts, 
-though  commonly   the   conclusions    they 
enforce   are   not   drawn.     At   puberty  a 
new  group  of  sensations  and  consequently 
of  feelings,  sentiments  -and   ideas   comes 
into  existence.     This  influx  of  unwonted 
psychic  states — stable  because  their  cause 
is  stable,  coordinated  to  one  another  be- 
cause their   source  is    one — tends    pro- 
foundly to  modify  the  constitution  of  the 
Me.     It  feels  undecided,  troubled  with  a 
vague   and  latent  unrest  whose  cause  is 
hid.     Little  by  little  these  new  elements 
of  the   moral   life  are  assimilated  by  the 
existing  Me,  enter  into  it,  are   converted 
into  it,  withal  making  it  other  than  it  was. 
It  is  changed  ;  a  partial  alteration  of  the 
personality  has  taken  place,  the  result  of 
which  has  been  to  produce  a  new  type  of 
character — the     sexual    character.     This 
development  of  an  organ  and  of  its  func- 
tions, with  their  train  of  instincts,  imagin- 
ings, feelings,  sentiments  and  ideas,  has 
produced  in  the  neuter  personality  of  the 
child  a  differentiation — has  made  of  it  a 
Me  male  or  female,  in  the  complete  sense 
of  the  term.     Till  now  there  existed  only 
a  sort   of  rough   draft    \ebauche\  of   the 
complete  personality,  but  that  has  served 
to  obviate  all  sudden  shock  in  the  change, 
to   prevent   a  rupture  between  the   past 
and  the  present,  to  make  the  personality 
continuous. 

If  now  we  pass  from  the  normal  devel- 
epment  to  exceptional  and   pathological 


cases,  we  shall  find  variations  or  trans- 
formations of  personality  dependent  on 
the  state  of  the  genital  organs. 

The  effect  of  castration  upon  animals  is 
wTell-known.  Not  less  known  is  its  effect 
upon  man.  A  few  exceptions  apart  (and 
such  are  found  even  in  history)  eunuchs 
present  a  deviation  from  the  psychic  type. 
"  Whatever  we  know  about  them,"  says 
Maudsley,  "  confirms  the  belief  that  they 
are  for  the  most  part  false,  lying,  coward- 
ly, envious,  revengeful,  void  of  social  and 
moral  feeling,  mutilated  in  soul  as  well 
as  in  body."  Whether  this  moral  degra- 
dation be  the  direct  result  of  castration, 
as  some  authors  assert,  or  whether  it  re- 
sult from  an  equivocal  social  situation,  is 
a  question  that  does  not  affect  our  thesis  : 
whether  the  result  comes  directly  or  in- 
directly from  the  mutilation,  the  cause 
remains  the  same. 

As  regards  hermaphrodites  experience 
verifies  what  we  might  have  predicted  a 
ftrio?-i.      With  the  characteristics  of  one 
sex  they  present  some  of  those  peculiar 
to  the  other,  but  instead  of  combining  the 
functions  of  both,  they  possess  oniy  im- 
perfect organs,  and  commonly  these  are 
sexually  impotent.     The  moral  character 
of  hermaphrodites  is  sometimes  neutral, 
again  masculine,  in  other  cases  feminine. 
Abundant  instances  are  cited  by  writers 
who  have  treated  the  question.  *  "  Some- 
times  the    hermaphrodite,    after   having 
shown  a  very  strong  liking  for  women,  is 
animated  with  the  very  opposite  instincts 
by  the  descent  of  the  testicles."     In  a  case 
recently  observed  by  Dr.  Magitot  an  her- 
maphrodite  woman    successively   mani- 
fested   feminine    tastes   and    very   pro- 
nounced masculine  appetites.     "  In  gen- 
eral the  affective  faculties  and  the  moral 
dispositions  show  the  effects  of  the  mal- 
formation of  the  organs.      Nevertheless, 
it  is  but  fair  "  says  Tardieu,   "  to  make 
large  allowance  for  the  influence  of  the 
habits    and  occupations    imposed    upon 
these  individuals  by  the  error  as  to  their 
real  sex.     Some  of  them  being  from  the 
first  educated  as  girls,  dressed  as  girls, 
employed  in  women's  work,  married  per- 
haps as  women,  retain  the  thoughts,  the 
habits,  the  demeanor  of  the   female  sex. 
Such  was  the  case  with  Maria  Arsano, 
deceased  at  the  age  of  eighty  years,  who 
was  in    fact  a  man  whose  character  had 
been  made  feminine  by  habit." 

I  do  not  propose    here    to  detail  the 


*  For  the  facts  see  Isidore  Geoffroy  Saint-Hil- 
aire  Histoire  des  Anomalies  vol.  II.,  p.  65,  ei  seq. 
.Also  Taraieu  and  Laugier,  Dictionnaire  de  Mcdc- 
cine,  art.  Hermaphkodisme. 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


23 


perversions  or  aberrations  of  the  sexual 
instinct,  *  each  one  of  which  imprints  its 
mark  upon  the  personality,  altering  it 
more  or  less,  transiently  or  permanently. 
These  partial  alterations  reach  their  term 
in  total  transformation,  in  change  of  sex. 
There  are  many  instances  of  this  :  the 
following  may  serve  as  a  type.  Lalle- 
mant  records  the  case  of  "  a  patient  who 
believed  himself  to  be  a  woman,  and  who 
wrote  letters  to  an  imaginary  lover. 
At  the  autopsy  there  was  found  an  hyper- 
trophy with  induration  of  the  prostate, 
and  an  alteration  of  the  ejaculatory 
canals."  It  is  probable  that  in  many 
cases  of  this  kind  there  has  been  perver- 
sion or  abolition  of  the  sexual  feelings. 

Some  exceptions,  however,  are  to  be 
noted.  From  sundry  detailed  observations 
(which  see  in  Leuret,  Fragments  Psy- 
chol., p.  114  et  seq.)  we  learn  of  individ- 
uals who  assume  the  gait,  the  habit,  the 
voice,  and,  as  far  as  they  may,  the  garb 
of  the  sex  they  imagine  themselves  to  be- 
long to,  though  they  present  no  anatomi- 
cal or  physiological  anomaly  of  the  sex- 
ual organs.  In  such  cases  the  starting 
point  of  the  metamorphosis  is  to  be 
sought  elsewhere :  it  must  be  found  in 
the  cerebro-spinal  organ.  Indeed  when 
we  speak  of  the  sexual  organs  as  consti- 
tuting or  as  modifying  personality,  we  are 
to  be  understood  as  speaking,  not  of 
those  organs  themselves  alone  as  defined 
by  their  anatomic  conformation,  but  also 
of  their  relations  to  the  encephalon,  in 
which  they  are  represented.  Physiolo- 
gists locate  in  the  lumbar  region  of  the 
spinal  column  the  reflex  genito-spina! 
center.  From  that  center  to  the  brain  all 
is  undiscovered  territory  ;  for  the  hypoth- 
esis of  Gall,  who  made  the  cerebellum 
the  seat  of  physical  love,  is  not  much  in 
favor,  despite  the  confirmatory  observa- 
tions of  Budge  and  of  Lussana.  But 
however  great  our  ignorance  upon  this 
point,  sexual  impressions  must  reach  the 
encephalon,  for  they  are  felt,  and  there 
are  centers  from  which  psychic  incitations 
are  sent  out  to  the  sexual  organs  to  put 
them  in  action.  These  nerve-elements, 
whatever  their  nature,  their  number,  or 
their  seat ;  whether  they  are  localized  or 
diffused,  are  the  cerebral,  and  conse- 
quently the  psychic,  representatives  of 
the  sexual  organs  ;  and  since  in  produc- 
ing a  special  state  of  consciousness  they 
usually  produce  others  also,  there  must 

*  For  a  full  discussion  of  this  question  see  the 
article  by  Dr.  Gley,  "  Sur  les  Aberrations  de  1'  In- 
stinct Sexuel "  in    the  Revue  Philosophique,  Jan. 


be  some  association  between  this  group 
of  psycho-physiological  states  and  a  cer- 
tain number  of  others.  The  conclusion 
to  be  drawn  from  the  cases  already  cited, 
is  that  there  has  arisen  a  cerebral  disorder 
of  unknown  character  (a  woman  suppos- 
ing herself  to  be  a  man,  or  vice  versa) 
whence  results  a  fixed  erroneous  state  of 
consciousness.  This  fixed  state  of  con- 
sciousness, predominating  over  the  nor- 
mal states,  calls  forth  natural,  almost 
anatomical  associations,  which  are  as  it 
were  its  radiations  (the  feelings,  the  ways, 
the  speech,  the  dress  of  the  imaginary 
sex)  :  it  tends  to  complete  itself.  Here 
is  a  metamorphosis  from  above  not  from 
below  ;  and  here  we  have  an  instance  of 
what  is  called  the  influence  of  the  moral 
upon  the  physical.  We  will  endeavor  to 
show  further  on  that  the  Me  upon  which 
most  psychologists  have  based  their  rea- 
sonings is  formed  by  a  like  process. 
Further  these  cases  belong  among  the 
intellective  deviations  of  personality,  of 
which  we  shall  treat  in  the  next  chapter. 

Before  we  quit  this  subject,  I  would 
notice  a  few  facts  hard  to  account  for, 
but  which  nevertheless  cannot  be  seri- 
ously alleged  against  our  thesis.  I  refer 
to  the  phenomenon  of  "  opposite  sex- 
uality "  \sexualite  co7itro,ire~\  often  men- 
tioned of  late,  and  about  which- a  few 
words  will  suffice.  Certain  patients  ob- 
served by  Westphal,  Krafft-Ebing,  Char- 
cot and  Magnan,  Servaes,  Cock,  et  at, 
present  a  congenital  introversion  of  the 
sexuai  instinct,  whence  results,  despite 
their  normal  physical  constitution,  an  in- 
stinctive and  violent  attraction  to  a  per- 
son of  the  same  sex,  with  strong  repul- 
sion toward  the  opposite  sex  :  in  short,  "  a 
woman  will  be  a  woman  physically  but 
psychically  a  man  :  a  man  will  be  physi- 
cally a  man,  psychically  a  woman." 
These  facts  are  entirely  at  variance  with 
what  logic  and  experience  teach  us  :  here 
the  physical  and  the  moral  are  in  mutual 
contradiction.  Strictly  speaking-,  those 
who  regard  the  Me  as  an  entity  might 
quote  these  facts  as  proving  its  indepen- 
dence, its  autonomous  existence.  Never- 
theless that  were  a  gross  illusion,  for  their 
whole  argument  would  rest  upon  two  very 
weak  bases,  viz.,  on  some  facts  of  very 
rare  occurrence,  and  on  the  present  diffi- 
culty of  finding  an  explanation  of  them. 
No  one  will  deny  that  cases  of  "  opposite 
sexuality"  are  but  an  infinitesimal  fac- 
tion of  the  sum  of  the  cases  known  to 
us  by  experience.  By  their  rarity  they 
form  an  exception,  and.  by  their  nature  a 
psychological  monstrosity  :  but  monstros- 


24 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


ities  are  not  miracles,  and  it  behooves  us 
to  find  out  whence  they  come. 

We  might  attempt  to  account  for  them 
in  many  ways,  but  that  usually  means 
that  no  explanation  is  sufficient.  I  will 
not  inflict  these  explanations  upon  the 
reader.  Like  every  other  science,  psy- 
chology must  be  resigned  to  be  ignorant 
for  a  time,  and  must  not  fear  to  confess 
ignorance.  Herein  it  differs  from  meta- 
physics, which  undertakes  to  explain  all 
things.  Physicians  who  from  their  own 
medical  point  of  view  have  studied  these 
strange  creatures,  regard  them  as  degen- 
erate individuals.  The  point  of  special 
interest  for  us  would  be  to  know  why 
degenerescence  takes  this  form  and  not 
another.  Probably  the  explication  of 
this  mystery  is  to  be  sought  in  the  mul- 
tiple elements  of  heredity,  in  the  complex 
play  of  the  conflicting  male  and  female 
elements :  I  leave  the  question  to  minds 
more  clear-sighted  and  more  fortunate 
in  discovering  the  causes  of  things.  But 
aside  from  the  question  of  the  cause,  one 
can  hardly  refuse  to  recognize  a  devia- 
tion of  the  cerebral  mechanism,  as  in  the 
cases  quoted  by  Leuret,  and  in  like  in- 
stances. But  the  influence  of  the  sexual 
organs  upon  the  nature  and  formation  of 
character  is  so  little  open  to  question 
that  to  dwell  upon  it  were  to  waste  time, 
and  an  hypothetical  explanation  of  "  op- 
posite sexuality  "  would  in  no  wise  further 
our  research. 


The  instincts,  desires,  tendencies,  senti- 
ments, etc.,  that  relate  to  the  conserva- 
tion of  the  individual  and  to  that  of  _  the 
species,  have  their  material  conditions 
clearly  determined,  the  former  in_  the 
totality  of  organic  life,  the  latter  in  a 
special  set  of  organs.  But  when  from 
the  primordial  and  fundamental  forms  of 
the  affective  life  we  pass  to  those  which 
are  of  secondary  formation  and  which 
have  sprung  up  later  in  the  course  of 
evolution  (tendencies  social,  moral,  intel- 
lectual, aesthetic,  etc.),  then,  to  say  noth- 
ing of  the  impossibility  of  assigning  to 
these  their  direct  organic  bases,  we  find 
that  they  are  by  no  means  so  general ; 
none  of  them,  except  perhaps  the  moral 
and  the  social  tendencies,  express  the 
individual  in  his  totality;  they  are  partial, 
and  represent  only  one  group  in  the  sum 
total  of  his  tendencies.  Hence  no  one  of 
them  has  of  itself  the  power  of  producing 
a  metamorphosis  of  the  personality.  As 
long  as  the  habitude  we  call  bodily  sense 
(or  ccenassthesis)  and  that  other  habitude 


which  is  memory,  do  not  come  into  play, 
there  can  be  no  complete  transforma- 
tion :  the  individual  may  be  changed,  he 
does  not  become  another. 

But   these   variations,    though   partial, 
are    interesting.      They  show   the   tran- 
sition   from  the    normal    to   the   morbid 
state.     In  studying   the    diseases  of  the 
will  *  we  found  in  ordinary  life  many  fore- 
shadowings  of  the  graver  forms.     Here, 
too,  common  observation  shows  us  how 
little  cohesion   and  unity  the  normal  Me 
possesses.       Apart   from    perfectly    bal- 
anced   characters    (though    in    the   strict 
sense  of  the  term  such  characters  do  not 
exist)  there  are  in  every  one   of  us  ten- 
dencies of  every  kind,  in  every  degree  of 
contrariety,  with  all  possible  intermediate 
shades  of  difference,  and  with  all  sorts  of 
combinations    between   them.     For   the 
Me  is  not   merely  a  memory,  an   accu- 
mulation of   recollections    linked   to    the 
present  moment,  but  a  sum  of  instincts, 
tendencies,  desires,  which  are  simply  its 
innate  and  acquired  constitution  entering 
into  action.     Memory  is  the  Me  statical, 
the  group  of  tendencies  is  the  Me  dynam- 
ical.    If,  instead  of  being  influenced  un- 
consciously by  the  idea  of  the  Me  being 
an    entity — a   prejudgment  instilled  into  , 
us   both   by   education    and   by  the   so- 
called    testimony   of   consciousness — we 
were  to  take  it  for  what  it  is,  namely  a 
coordination  of  tendencies  and  of  psychic 
states  whose   proximate  cause  is  to  be 
sought   in  the  coordination  and  consen- 
sus of  the  organism,  we  should  no  longer 
be  surprised  at  its  oscillations — incessant 
in  fickle,  but  rare  in  stable  characters — 
which  for  a  longer  or  a  shorter  time,  or 
even  for«an  almost  infinitesimal  instant, 
exhibit  the  person  in  a  new  light.     Some 
organic   state,    some   external    influence, 
reinforces  some  tendency ;  it  becomes  a 
center  of   attraction  toward   which  con- 
verge the  directly  associated   states  and 
tendencies  ;  then  associations  grow  closer 
and  closer ;  the  center  of  gravity  of  the 
Me  becomes   displaced,  and  the  person- 
ality is  altered.   "  Two  souls  "  said  Goethe 
"dwell   in    my  breast."     Nor  two   only! 
If  the  moralists,  poets,  dramatists  have 
shown  us  to  satiety  these  two  Mes   con- 
tending in  one  Me,  common  experience 
shows  yet  more  :  it  shows  us  many  Mes, 
each  as  it  comes  to  the  forefront,  exclud- 
ing  the  others.     This  is  less   dramatic, 
but  more  true.     "  Our  Me  differs  widely 
from  itself  at  different  times :  according 


*  See  the  work  so  entitled  (Humboldt  Library 
No.  52). 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


2=; 


to  a  person's  ago,  his  various  duties,  the 
occurrences  of  his  life,  the  excitements  of 
the  moment,  such  or  such  an  aggrega- 
tion of  ideas  which  at  a  given  moment 
represents  the  Me,  becomes  more  highly 
developed  than  others,  and  takes  the 
foremost  place.  We  are  another  and  yet 
the  same.  My  Me  as  physician,  my  Me 
as  man  of  science,  my  sensuous,  my 
moral  Me,  etc,  in  other  words,  the  com- 
plex of  ideas,  inclinations,  will-tenden- 
cies, so  denominated,  may  at  any  time 
come  into  a  state  of  mutual  opposition 
and  repulsion.  This  would  result  not 
only  in  discord  and  scission  between 
thought  and  will,  but  also  in  total  loss  of 
power,  for  each  of  these  two  isolated 
phases  of  the  Me,  if  in  all  these  spheres 
there  was  not  a  more  or  less  open  way 
for  the  return  of  the  consciousness  of 
some  of  these  fundamental  directions."  * 
The  orator,  master  of  speech,  who  while 
speaking  judges  himself ;  the  actor  who 
notes  his  own  performance  ;  the  psychol- 
ogist who  studies  himself,  all  are  in- 
stances of  this  normal  scission  of  the  Me. 
Between  these  momentary  and  partial 
transformations  (which  because  they  are 
common  do  not  strike  one  as  psychologi- 
cally important;  and  the  more  serious 
states  we  have  yet  to  consider,  there  ex- 
ist intermediate  variations  either  more 
stable  or  more  far-reaching,  or  both. 
The  dipsomaniac,  for  example,  leads  two 
alternate  lives  :  in  one  he  is  sober,  dis- 
creet, industrious ;  in  the  other  quite 
overmastered  by  passion,  reckless,  heed- 
less. It  is  as  though  two  incomplete  and 
contrary  individuals  were  grafted  on  a 
common  trunk.  The  same  is  true  of 
those  who  are  subject  to  irresistible  im- 
pulses and  who  declare  that  an  external 
force  constrains  them  to  act  in  spite  of 
themselves.  We  may  cite  also  those 
transformations  of  character  which  are 
accompanied  by  cutaneous  anaesthesia. 
One  of  the  most  curious  instances  of  this 
was  observed  by  Renaudin :  A  young  man 
whose  conduct  had  always  been  exem- 
plary, suddenly  gave  way  to  evil  tenden- 
cies. His  mental  state  gave  no  clear  evi- 
dence of  alienation,  but  it  was  noticed 
that  the  whole  surface  of  his  body 
had  become  absolutely  insensible.  The 
cutaneous  anaesthesia  was  intermittent. 
"  When  it  ceased,  the  young  man's  dispo- 


*  Griesinger,  Maladies  Metitales,  p.  55.  See  a 
good  essay  by  Pauihan  on  Les  Variations  de  la 
Personnalite  a  V Etat  Normal  {Rev.  Philos.,  June 
1882). 


sition  was  quite  different ;  he  was  now 
docile,  affectionate,  fully  conscious  of  his 
painful  situation  :  when  it  returned,  im- 
mediately his  evil  inclinations  controlled 
him,  and  these,  as  we  found  out,  might  go 
even  so  far  as  to  incite  him  to  homicide.'' 

Inevitably  we  come  back  in  every  case 
to  the  organism.  But  this  excursus 
through  diverse  fields  of  observation, 
however  monotonous  it  may  be,  exhibits 
to  us  the  variations  of  personality  in  all 
its  aspects.  Since  no  two  cases  are  iden- 
tical, each  one  offers  a  special  decompo- 
sition of  the  Me.  The  cases  last  cited 
show  us  a  transformation  of  character 
without  lesion  to  the  memory.  As  we 
proceed  with  our  review  of  the  facts,  one 
conclusion  will  more  and  more  impress 
itself  upon  our  minds,  viz. ,  that  personal- 
ity results  from  two  fundamental  factors 
— the  bodily  constitution  with  its  tenden- 
cies and  feelings,  and  the  memory. 

If  (as  in  the  cases  so  far  considered) 
only  the  first  of  these  factors  is  modified, 
the  result  is  a  momentary  dissociation 
followed  by  a  partial  change  of  the  Me. 
If  the  modification  is  so  profound  that 
the  organic  bases  of  memory  suffer  a  kind 
oi  paralysis,  and  become  incapable  of  be- 
ing revived,  then  the  disintegration  of  the 
Me  is  complete  :  there  is  no  longer  a  past, 
and  there  is  a  different  present.  Then  a 
new  Me  is  formed,  and  usually  it  knows 
nothing  of  the  former  Me.  The  cases  of 
this  kind  are  so  well  known  that  I  will 
simply  mention  them,  viz.,  the  case  of  the 
American  lady  described  by  Macnish, 
that  of  Felida,  described  by  Dr.  Azam, 
and  those  recorded  by  Dufay.t  Just  be- 
cause they  involve  the  entire  personality, 
these  cases  come  under  no  specific  head- 
ing, and  we  have  no  reason  for  mention- 
ing them  here  rather  than  anywhere  else, 
except  that  we  wish  to  remark  that  the  tran- 
sition from  one  personality  to  another  is 
always  accompanied  by  a  change  of  the 
character,  associated  no  doubt  with  the 
unknown  organic  change  which  dominates 
the  whole  situation.  This  change  is 
very  clearly  pointed  out  by  Dr.  Azam  : 
his  patient  (Felida)  is  at  one  period 
gloomy,  cold,  reserved  ;  in  the  other  pe- 
riod, gay,  sprightly,  cheerful,  full  of  life, 
even  boisterous.  The  change  is  greater 
still  in  the  following  case,  which  I  give  in 


+  For  a  full  account  of  the  observations,  see 
Taine,  De  V Intelligence,  vol.  I.  p.  165  ;  Azam, 
Revue  Scient,,  20  May,  1876,  18  Sept.,  1877,  IO  Nov. 
1879  ;  Dufay,  ibidem,  15  July,  1876.  As  regards  the 
part  played  by  memory  in  pathological  cases,  see 
Diseases  of  Memory  (Humboldt  Library  No  46  J, 
page  16  et  seq. 


26 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


some  detail  because  it  is  recent  and  little 
known.* 

The  subject,  a  youth  of  seventeen  years, 
V.  L. — had  an  attack  of  hystero-epilepsy 
and  quite  lost  all  recollection  of  one  year 
of  his  life.  His  character  underwent  a 
total  change. 

Born  of  "  an  unmarried  vagabond  girl 
and  an  unknown  father,  as  soon  as  he 
was  able  to  walk  he  began  straying  about 
the  streets  and  begging.  Later  he  be- 
came a  thief,  and  was  arrested  and  sent 
to  the  St.  Urbain  penal  colony,  where  he 
worked  as  a  farm-hand."  One  day  while 
employed  in  the  vineyard  he  grasped  in 
his  hand  a  snake  concealed  in  a  bundle  of 
vine-cuttings.  His  fright  was  extreme, 
and  on  his  return  to  the  colony  in  the 
evening  he  lost  consciousness.  This  fit 
returned  again  and  again  ;  his  legs  grew 
weak  ;  at  last  came  paralysis  of  his  lower 
limbs,  his  intelligence  remaining  intact. 
He  was  now  transferred  to  the  Bonneval 
Asylum.  There  the  physician  reported  of 
him  that  he  had  "  a  kindly,  sympathetic 
expression"  ;  that  he  was  "  of  a  mild  dis- 
position, and  grateful  for  the  care  be- 
stowed upon  him.  He  would  tell  the 
story  of  his  life  with  fullest  details,  even 
his  thefts,  of  which  he  was  ashamed.  He 
laid  the  blame  to  his  homelessness  and 
to  the  influence  of  his  companions,  who 
led  him  into  evil.  He  regretted  the  past, 
and  declared  that  in  the  future  he  would 
lead  a  better  life."  It  was  decided  to  fit 
him  for  some  occupation  compatible  with 
his  infirmity.  He  learned  to  read,  also 
to  write  a  little.  He  was  taken  every 
morning  to  the  tailor's  shop,  and  being 
placed  upon  a  table,  assumed  quite  nat- 
urally the  tailor's  posture,  his  legs  being 
paralyzed  and  greatly  atrophied  and  con- 
tracted. At  the  end  of  two  months  he 
could  sew  very  well,  and  was  a  diligent 
worker." 

He  had  now  an  attack  of  hystero-epi- 
lepsy which  continued  for  fifty  hours,  be- 
ing succeeded  by  a  quiet  sleep.  Then 
his  former  personality  came  back. 

"  On  awaking,  V —  wanted  to  get  up.  He 
asked  for  his  clothes,  and  succeeded  in  put- 
ting them  on.  though  awkwardly;  then  he 
took  a  few  steps  about  the  room.  The  par- 
aplegia had  disappeared.  His  gait  was  un- 
steady and  his  legs  could  not  sustain  the 
weight  of  his  body,  but  that  was  due  to  the 
atrophied  state  of  the  muscles.  When  his 
clothes  were  on,  he  wanted  to  go  out  to 
work  on  the  farm  with  his  comrades.  We 
saw  at  once  that  the  lad  thought  he  was  still 


at  St.  Urbain's,  and  that  he  wanted  to  re- 
sume his  habitual  occupations.  He  had  in 
fact  no  recollection  of  his  attack :  did  not  re- 
cognize any  one  here — neither  the  doctor  and 
nurses,  nor  his  fellow-patients.  He  refused 
to  believe  that  he  had  been  paralyzed,  say- 
ing that  we  were  making  sport  of  him.  We 
attributed  this  to  a  momentary  vesania,  not 
an  unusual  sequel  of  strong  hysteric  seizures. 
But  time  went  on,  and  still  memory  did  not 
return.  V —  remembered  distinctly  his  hav- 
ing been  sent  to  St.  Urbain's,  that  'the  other 
day '  he  was  frightened  by  a  snake,  but  from 
that  point  forward  all  was  blank.  He  re- 
membered nothing  :  he  had  no  consciousness 
even  of  the  lapse  of  time. 

"  Naturally  we  suspected  that  he  was 
feigning,  as  hysterical  subjects  are  wont  to 
do,  and  we  tried  in  every  way  to  make  him 
contradict  himself,  but  in  vain.  Thus,  we  had 
him  taken  to  the  tailor's  shop  without  letting 
him  know  where  he  was  going.  We  walked 
alongside  of  him,  careful  not  to  give  him  a 
hint  as  to  what  direction  he  should  take. 
V —  did  not  know  where  he  was  going.  Ar- 
rived at  the  shop,  he  gave  no  sign  of  know- 
ing where  he  was,  and  declared  he  came 
there  now  the  first  time.  A  needle  was  put 
in  his  hand  and  he  was  asked  to  use  it  in 
sewing,  but  he  set  about  it  as  clumsily  as 
any  one  does  who  attempts  for  the  first  time 
to  perform  the  task.  Garments  were  shown 
him  on  which  he  had  done  the  coarser 
stitching  while  in  the  paralytic  state.  In 
vain  :  he  recalled  nothing  of  all  this.  After  a 
month  of  experiments,  observations,  and 
tests  of  every  kind,  we  were  convinced  that 
V —  remembered  nothing." 

One  of  the  most  interesting  points  of 
this  case  is  the  modification  of  the  pa- 
tient's character — a  reversion  to  his  prior 
life  and  hereditary  antecedents. 

"  He  is  no  more  the  same  person  :  he  is 
now  quarrelsome,  and  an  inordinate  eater. 
He  makes  rude  answers.  He  cared  not 
for  wine  and  usually  gave  his  share  of  wine 
to  his  comrades:  now  he  steals  theirs. 
When  some  one  tells  him  that  once  he  used 
to  steal,  but  that  he  ought  not  to  begin 
thieving  again,  he  boldly  says  that  'if 
he  was  a  thief,  he  has  paid  for  it,  for  they 
have  put  him  in  prison.'  He  is  employed  in 
the  garden.  One  day  he  ran  away,  taking 
with  him  some  property  and  sixty  francs  be- 
longing to  one  of  the  infirmarians.  He  was 
captured  five  leagues  away  from  Bonneval, 
just  after  he  had  sold  his  clothes  to  purchase 
others  and  was  making  ready  to  take  the 
train  for  Paris.  The  arrest  was  not  easily 
made,  for  he  struck  and  bit  the  keepers  who 
had  come  in  pursuit  of  him.  Brought  back 
to  the  asylum,  he  became  furious,  shouting, 
and  rolling  upon  the  ground,  so  that  he  had 
to  be  confined  in  a  cell." 


*  The    case   is  reported  by  Dr.  Camuset  in  the 
Annates  Medico-fisychologiques,  Jan.,  1882. 


Although  we  have  not  yet  studied  the 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


27 


anomalies  of  personality  in  all  its  forms, 
it  will  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  attempt 
a  few  partial  and  provisional  conclusions 
which  will  serve  to  lessen  the  obscurity 
of  the  subject.  I  will  confine  myself 
however  to  one  point — to  cases  of  false 
personality  consisting  essentially  of  a 
fixed  idea,  an  overweening  idea  toward 
which  converges  the  whole  group  of  con- 
cordant ideas,  all  others  being  eliminated 
and  as  it  were  annihilated :  as  when 
persons  believe  themselves  to  be  God, 
pope,  emperor,  and  speak  and  act  accord- 
ingly. The  study  of  the  intellectual  con- 
ditions of  personality  will  furnish  us 
with  many  an  instance  of  this — hypno- 
tized subjects,  for  example,  who  assume 
a  personality  or  enact  a  role  at  the  oper- 
ator's will ;  but  the  instances  we  are  al- 
ready familiar  with  warrant  a  question  as 
to  what  we  are  to  learn  from  them. 

At  first  view,  these  cases  are  quite 
simple  as  regards  the  mechanism  of  their 
formation.  The  prime  origin  is  ob- 
scure ;  why  is  this  particular  idea  pro- 
duced and  not  some  other  ?  Commonly 
we  know  nothing  whatever  about  it,  but 
once  the  morbid  conception  produced,  it 
grows  and  grows,  till  at  last  it  reaches 
its  highest  point,  through  the  mere  au- 
tomatism of  association  of  ideas.  Hence 
it  is  not  my  intention  to  dwell  upon  this 
point,  but  to  show  that  these  pathologi- 
cal cases  explain  for  us  an  illusion  into 
which  psychology  has  almost  always 
fallen  when  it  has  based  itself  simply  up- 
on internal  observation — the  illusion  of 
substituting  for  the  real  Me  a  factitious 
Me  that  is  far  simpler. 

In  order  to  comprehend  the  real,  con- 
crete personality  and  not  an  abstraction 
substituted  in  its  room,  what  we  must  do 
is,  not  to  shut  ourselves  up  in  our  con- 
sciousness and,  closing  our  eyes,  proceed 
to  question  it  :  rather  must  we  open  our 
eyes  and  observe.  The  child,  the  peas- 
ant, the  laborer,  the  millions  of  people 
who  walk  the  streets  or  who  work  in  the 
fields ;  who  have  never  heard  of  Fichte 
or  Maine  de  Biran  ;  who  have  never  read 
a  dissertation  on  the  Me  and  the  non-Me, 
nor  a  single  line  on  psychology — have 
each  one  his  own  definite  personality, 
and  this  personality  they  instinctively  af- 
firm. Every  moment  ever  since  that  for- 
gotten epoch  when  their  Me  was  first 
constituted,  i.  e.,  when  it  was  formed  as 
a  coherent  group  amid  the  occurrences 
that  assail  it,  that  group  has  maintained 
itself  steadily,  steadily  undergoing  modi- 
fication. In  great  part  it  is  made  up  of 
states  and  acts   nearly  automatic  which 


in  each  individual  constitute  the  bodily 
sense  (or  ccensesthesis)  and  the  routine 
of  life  ;  which  serve  as  support  to  all  the 
rest,  but  whose  every  alteration,  how 
brief  or  partial  soever,  is  immediately 
felt.  In  great  part  too  it  is  made  up  of 
a  complex  of  sensations,  images,  ideas, 
representing  the  habitual  environment 
within  which  the  individual  lives  and 
moves,  with  the  recollections  thereto  at- 
tached. All  this  represents  organized 
states,  firmly  linked  together,  mutually 
calling  each  other  forth,  systemized. 
The  fact  we  actually  are  cognizant  of, 
though  we  may  not  inquire  into  the 
cause.  "Whatever  is  new,  unwonted  ;  all 
changes  in  the  state  of  the  body  or  of  its 
environment,  are  unhesitatingly  adopt- 
ed, classed  by  an  instinctive  act  as  form- 
ing part  of  the  personality  or  as  being 
external  to  it.  Not  by  a  definite  and  ex- 
plicit judgment  is  this  operation  perform- 
ed each  moment,  but  by  an  uncon- 
scious logic  far  more  profound  than  the 
logic  of  the  schools.  Had  we  to  charac- 
terize with  one  word  this  natural,  spon- 
taneous, real,  form  of  personality  I 
should  call  it  an  habitude .  nor  can  it 
be  anything  else,  since,  as  we  maintain, 
it  is  but  the  expression  of  an  organism. 
Let  the  reader,  instead  of  observing  him- 
self, proceed  objectively  :  that  is,  let  him 
observe  and  interpret  with  the  aid  of  the 
data  of  consciousness  the  state  of  those 
who  have  never  reflected  upon  their  per- 
sonality, and  he  will  see  that  the  forego- 
ing thesis  is  true,  and  that  real  personal- 
ity affirms  itself  not  by  reflection  but  by 
acts. 

Let  us  now  consider  factitious  or  arti- 
ficial personality.  When  the  psycholo- 
gist essays  to  comprehend  himself,  as  he 
says,  by  inward  observation,  he  attempts 
the  impossible.  When  he  sets  about  the 
task,  either  he  restricts  himself  to  the 
present,  and  that  helps  him  little  :  or,  let- 
ting his  reflection  extend  over  the  past, 
he  affirms  himself  to  be  the  same  that  he 
was  a  year  or  ten  years  ago  ;  he  does  but 
express  learnedly  and  laboredly  what  any 
peasant  knows  as  well  as  himself.  By 
inner  observation  he  can  grasp  only  tran- 
sitory phenomena,  and  so  far  as  I  know 
answer  has  never  been  made  to  these 
just  observations  of  Hume  : 

"As  for  me,  whenever  I  contemplate  what  is 
inmost  in  what  I  call  my  own  self,  I  always 
come  in  contact  with  such  or  such  special 
perception  as  of  cold,  heat,  light  or  shadow, 
love  or  hate,  pleasure  or  pain.  I  never  come 
unawares  upon  my  mind  existing  in  a  state 
void  of   perceptions :  I  never  observe   aught 


28 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


save  perception.  ...  If  any  one,  after  seri- 
ous reflection  and  without  prejudices,  thinks 
he  has  any  other  idea  of  himself,  i  confess  that 
1  can  reason  no  longer  with  him.  The  best  I 
can  say  for  him  is  mat  perhaps  he  is  right  no 
less  than  1,  and  that  on  this  point  our  na- 
tures are  essentially  different.  It  is  possible 
tnat  he  may  perceive  something  simple  and 
permanent  wnicli  he  calls  himself,  but  as  for 
me  f  am  quite  sure  i  possess  no  such  prin- 
ciple."    iiume,  Works,  vol.  I,  p.  321. 

Since  Hume's  day  some  one  has  said  : 
"  Through  tlie  sense  ot  erlort  and  of  resist- 
ance we  leel  that  we  cause  "  [par  I  effort 
et  la  resistance,  nous  nous  sentons  cause]. 
True  ;  and  pretty  nearly  all  schools  agree 
that  in  this  way  the  ivie  distinguishes  it- 
self from  the  non-Me  :  but  the  sense  of 
effort  nevertheless  is  still  simply  a  state 
of  consciousness — the  sense  of  the  mus- 
cular energy  spent  to  produce  a  given 
act. 

To  seek  to  grasp  by  analysis  a  syn- 
thetic whole  as  personality  is,  or  by  an  in- 
tuition of  consciousness  lasting  at  most  a 
few  seconds  to  seize  a  complex  like  the 
Me,  were  to  attempt  the  solution  of  a 
problem  whose  data  are  mutually  con- 
tradictory. The  psychologists  have  gone 
to  work  differently.  They  have  con- 
sidered states  of  consciousness  as  ac- 
cessories, and  the  tie  that  connects  them 
as  the  essential  thing  :  and  it  is  this  mys- 
terious underlying  something  that,  under 
the  name  of  unity,  identity,  or  continuity, 
becomes  the  true  Me.  Nevertheless 
plainly  we  have  here  only  an  abstraction, 
or  more  precisely  a  schema.  For  the  real 
personality  has  been  substituted  the  idea 
of  personality — a  very  different  thing. 
This  idea  of  personality  is  like  all  general 
terms  formed  in  the  same  way,  as  sensi- 
bility, will,  etc.;  but  it  is  no  more  like  the 
real  personality  than  the  plan  of  a  city  is 
like  the  city  itself.  And  as  in  the  cases 
of  aberration  of  personality  that  have  led 
to  the  present  remarks,  one  idea  has 
taken  the  place  of  a  complex,  forming  an 
imaginary  and  a  diminished  personality,  so 
bv  the  psychologist  the  schema  of  person- 
ality is  substituted  for  the  concrete  per- 
sonality, and  it  is  upon  this  beggarly 
framework  that  he  rests  all  his  reasoning, 
inductions,  deductions  and  dogmatizings. 
Of  course  this  comparison  is  made  on  the 
condition  of  mutatis  mutandis  and  with 
many  restrictions,  which  the  reader  will 
find  out  for  himself. 

In  short,  for  one  to  reflect  on  his  Me 
is  to  take  an  artificial  position  which 
changes  its  nature — to  substitute  an  ab- 
stract representation  for  a  reality.     The 


true  Me  is  that  which  feels,  thinks,  acts, 
without  exhibiting  itself,  so  to  speak,  to 
itself  upon  a  stage.  For  the  Me  is  in  its 
nature  and  by  its  definition  a  subject ; 
and  to  become  an  object  it  must  undergo 
a  reduction,  an  adaptation  to  the  mind's 
optical  conditions,  and  that  transforms  it, 
mutilates  it. 

Till  now  we  have  considered  the  ques- 
tion only  on  its  negative  side.  To  what' 
positive  hypothesis  as  to  the  nature  of 
personality  are  we  led  by  the  observation 
of  morbid  cases  ?  First  let  us  lay  aside 
the  hypothesis  of  a  transcendental  entity 
— an  hypothesis  that  cannot  be  recon- 
ciled with  pathology,  and  which  explains 
nothing. 

Let  us  put  aside  also  the  hypothesis 
which  makes  of  the  Me  "  a  bundle  of  sen- 
sations "  or  of  states  of  consciousness,  as 
many  have  held  it  to  be,  following  Hume. 
So  to  think  is  to  take  appearances  for 
reality,  a  group  of  signs  for  a  thing,  or 
more  exactly,  to  take  effects  for  their 
cause.  Besides,  if,  as  we  hold,  conscious- 
ness is  only  an  indicative  phenomenon,  it 
cannot  be  a  constitutive  state. 

We  have  to  penetrate  deeper,  to  that 
consensus  of  the  organism  of  which  the 
conscious  Me  is  but  the  psychological  ex- 
pression. Has  this  hypothesis  any  firmer 
ground  than  the  other  two?  Both  ob- 
jectively and  subjectively  considered,  the 
characteristic  trait  of  personality  is  that 
continuity  in  time,  that  permanence  which 
is  called  identity.  This  has  been  denied 
of  the  organism,  on  grounds  so  well 
known  that  there  is  no  need  to  state 
them  :  but  it  is  strange  that  those  who 
refuse  to  concede  continuity,  identity,  to 
the  organism  should  fail  to  see  that  all 
the  arguments  for  a  transcendental  prin- 
ciple hold  good  also  for  the  organism, 
and  that  all  the  arguments  that  can  be 
brought  against  the  latter  have  the  same 
force  against  the  former.  That  every 
higher  organism  is  one  in  its  complexity 
is  an  observation  at  least  as  old  as  the 
Hippocratic  writings  ,  and  since  Bichat's 
time  no  one  attributes  this  unity  to  a 
mysterious  vital  principle  ;  certain  writers 
however  make  a  great  noise  about  the 
constant  molecular  renovation  which  con- 
stitutes life,  and  ask,  Where  is  the  iden- 
tity ?  But  as  a  fact  every  one  believes  in 
this  identity  of  the  organism.  Identity 
is  not  immobility.  If,  as  some  savants 
hold,  life  has  its  seat  not  so  much  in  the 
chemical  substance  of  the  protoplasm, 
as  in  the  motions  of  the  particles,  then  it 
is  a  "combination,  of  motions,"  or  a 
"  form  of   motion,"    and    this    constant 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


29 


molecular  renovation  must  itself  be  sub-  I 
ordinate   to  more   recondite    cone: 
However   that   may  be,  every   unbiased  j 
mind  will  admit  that  the  organism  pos-  i 
sesses    identity.     What   h]  -    then ! 

could  be  more  simple  or  more  natural  j 
than  to  consider  the  conscious  identity  as  j 
the  inward  manifestation  of  the  external  1 
identity  subsisting  in  the  organism  - 

On  this  physical  basis  of  the  organism  ! 
rests  also,  according  to  our  thesis,  what ; 
we  call  the  unity  of  the  Me,  i.e.,  the  in- j 
terdepender.ee  which  links  together   the 
states  of  consciousness.    The  unity  of  the 
Me  is  the  unity  of  a  complexus,  an d 
by  a  metaphysical  illusion  do  we  accord  j 
to  it  the  ideal  unity  of  the  mathematical ! 
point.     It  consists  not  in  the  act  of  a  sup-  j 
posedly  simple   "  essence,"  but  in  a  co- ! 
ordination   of   the   nerve   centers,  w 
themselves    represent  a   coordination  of  j 
the  functions  of  the  organism.     It  is  true  I 
that  here  we  have  to  do  with  hypotheses,  j 
but    at  least  they  have    no  superna; . ir ..'. 
charac  t    ■ 

Take  man  in  the  fcetal  state,  before 
the  be  ling  of  psychic  life:  leave  out 
ail  the  tereditary  dispositions  aire;:. 
any  way  impressed  upon  him,  which  will 
later  com;  into  play.  At  some  undefined 
lest  in  the  last  weeks  of 
tne  foe  -  :,  some  sort  of  body  sense 
(coenaest  must  come  into  existence 

— a  vague  feeling  of  well-being  or  of  dis- 
comfort. Ho  vever  confused  this  may 
be  sup  josed  to  be,  it  implies  certain  mod- 
ifications in  the  nerve  centers,  as  far 
as  their  rudimentary  state  may  allow. 
When  sensations    objective  or  not) 

of  external  causation  are  added  to  these 
simple  vital,  organic,  sensations,  they 
too  necessarily  produce  a  modification  in 
the  nerve  centers.  But  they  are  not  in- 
scribed on  a  tabula  rasa  ;  the  warp  of 
the  psychic  life  is  already  laid,  and  this 
warp  is  general  sensibility,  the  feeling  of 
life,  which,  even  though  it  be  very  vague, 
absolutely  constitues,  at  this  period  of 
life,  almost  the  total  sum  of  conscious- 
ness. Thus  we  have  a  glimpse  of  the 
origin  of  the  connection  between  states 
of  consciousness.  The  first  sensation — 
supposing  one  to  exist  in  the  isolated 
state— does  not  come  like  an  aerolite  in 
a  desert :  at  its  entrance  even  it  is  con- 
nected with  others — with  the  states 
which  constitute  the  bodily  sense,  and 
which  are  simply  the  psychic  expression 
of  the  organism.  In  terms  of  physiology, 
this  means  that  the  modifications  of  the 
nervous  system  representing  materially 
sensations  and  the  desires  that  arise  out 


of  them  (these  being  the  first  elements 
:  the  higher  psychic  life)  are  added  to 
prior  modifications  which  are  the  material 
representatives  of  the  vital  and  organic 
Sensations;  and  that  thereby  relations 
are  established  between  these  nervous 
elements  ;  so  that  from  the  first  the  com- 
plex unity  of  the  Me  editions  of 
existence,  and  these  it  finds  in  that  gen- 
eral consciousness  of  the  organism  so 
much  overlouked,  though  it  .-rthe- 
iess  the  main  supper;  :  lithe  rest.  In 
short,  all  depends  upon  the  unity  of  the 
jrganism :  and  when  the  psychic  life, 
having  itself  passed  the  embry  mi  -  stage, 
has  taken  shape,  the  I  ]  ly  be  com- 
pared to  a  rich  piece  of  tapestry  where 
the  warp  has  completely  ;  ;ared, 
being  in  some  instances  li  >  it  erlaid 
with  figures,  in  others  being  embroidered 
in  high  relief ;  the  psychologist  who  em- 
ploys inner  observation  only,  sees  but  the 
figures  and  the  embroidered  designs,  and 
loses  himself  in  a  maze  of  conjecture  as 
bat  may  underlie  them  ;  if  he  were 
but  to  change  his  position  >r  tc  look  at 
the  reverse  side,  he  would  save  himself 
many  a  useless  induction,  and  would  learn 


The  same  thesis  might  be  discussed 
under  the  form  of  a  criticism  of  Hume. 
The  Me  is  not,  as  Hume  held,  a  mere 
bundle  of  perceptions.  Without  appeal- 
ing to  psychology,  but  confining  one's  self 
to  simple  ideological  analysis,  one  ob- 
serves here  the  omission  of  one  important 
point,  viz.,  the  relations  between  the  pri- 
mordial states.  Relation  is  an  element 
vague  in  its  nature,  and  hard  to  deter- 
mine, since  it  does  not  exist  by  itself. 
Still,  it  is  something  more  and  something 
else  than  the  two  states  which  limit  it. 
In  Herbert  Spencer's  Principles  of  Psy- 
chology is  found  a  searching  study  :  0 
little  noticed)  of  the  elements  of  psychic 
life,  with  hypotheses  as  to  their  material 
conditions.  Quite  recently  Mr.  W. 
James  has  taken  the  question  up  again.* 
He  compares  the  course  of  cur  con- 
sciousness with  its  uneven  flow  to  the 
progress  of  a  bird  that  alternately  flies 
and  perches.  The  resting-places  are  oc- 
cupied by  relatively  stable  sensations 
and  images  :  the  spaces  passed  over  in 
flight  are  represented  by  thoughts  of  re- 
lations between  the  points  of  rest :  the 
latter — the  "  transitive  portions  "  are 
nearly  always  forgotten.     It  seems  to  me 


*  See  Mind,  Jan., 


334,  p.  1  et  sec. 


30 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


that  this  is  our  thesis  in  another  form — 
the  continuity  of  the  psychic  phenomena 
by  reason  of  a  deep,  hidden  substratum, 
to  be  sought  in  the  organism.  In  truth, 
that  were- a  precarious  sort  of  personality 
which  should  have  no  other  ground,  but 
consciousness,  and  this  hypothesis  is 
found  wanting  when  tested  by  the  sim- 
plest facts  :  as  for  instance  when  an  ex- 
planation is  asked  of  the  fact  that  after  a 
sound  sleep  of  six  or  eight  hours  I  unhes- 
itatingly declare  my  identity.  To  refer 
the  essence  of  our  personality  to  a  mode 
of  existence  (consciousness)  that  disap- 
pears at  least  during  one-third  of  our 
life,  is  to  offer  a  curious  solution. 

We  therefore  maintain,  as  we  have 
elsewhere  done  with  regard  to  memory, 
that  individuality,  in  itseif  and  such  as  it 
exists  actually  in  the  nature  of  things,  is 
not  to  be  confounded  with  individuality 
as  it  exists  for  itself  in  virtue  of  con- 
sciousness (personality).  The  organic 
memory  is  the  basis  of  all  the  highest 
forms  of  memory,  these  being  only  its 
more  perfect  phases.  The  organic  indi- 
viduality is  the  basis  of  all  the  highest 
forms  of  personality,  which  are  only  its 
development.  Of  personality,  as  of  mem- 
ory, I  hold  that  it  is  completed,  perfected, 
by  consciousness,  not  constituted  by  con- 
sciousness. 

Although,  in  order  to  keep  these  re- 
marks within  due  limits,  I  have  carefully 
abstained  from  all  digression,  from  criti- 
cism of  opposite  doctrines,  and  from  ex- 
position of  points  of  detail,  I  must,  in 
passing,  point  out  one  question  which 
suggests  itself  naturally  :  Does  the  con- 
sciousness of  our  personal  identity  rest 
upon  memory,  or  vice  versa  ?  One  per- 
son will  say,  without  memory  I  should  be 
but  a  present  existence  incessantly  re- 
newed, and  that  does  away  with  ail  pos- 
sibility, however  faint,  of  identity.  An- 
other will  say,  without  a  feeling  of  iden- 
tity binding  them  together  and  impressing 
a  character  upon  them,  my  recollections 
would  not  be  mine  :  they  would  be  for- 
eign to  me.  Is  it  then  memory  which 
produces  the  sense  of  identity,  or  is  it  the 
sense  of  identity  which  produces  memory  ? 
Neither !  These  are  both  effects,  whose 
cause  is  to  be  sought  in  the  organism : 
for  on  the  one  hand  its  (the  organism's) 
objective  identity  is  expressed  in  that  sub- 
jective state  which  we  call  the  sense  of 
personal  identity ;  and  on  the  other  hand, 
it  is  here  (i.e.  in  the  organism)  that  are 
enregistered  the  organic  conditions  of 
our  recollections,  and  here  too  is  found 
the  basis  of  our  conscious  memory.     The 


feeling  of  personal  identity,  as  well  as 
memory  in  the  psychological  sense,  are 
effects  whereof  the  one  cannot  be  the 
cause  of  the  other.  Their  common  ori- 
gin is  in  the  organism,  where  identity  and 
organic  enregistration  {i.e.  memory)  are 
one.  Here  we  touch  one  of  those  nial- 
posited-questions  which  abound  in  the 
hypothesis  of  an  entity-consciousness. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

INTELLECTIVE  DISTURBANCE. 

In  certain  morbid  states  the  traditional 
five  senses  are  subject  to  serious  pertur- 
bations, their  functions  becoming  per- 
verted or  distorted.  Do  these  "pares- 
thesias "  and  "  dysaethesias  "  play  any 
part  in  changes  of  personality  ?  Before 
we  examine  this  point,  we  have  first  to 
ask,  what  happens  when  one  or  more  of 
the  senses  are  suppressed  ?  Is  the  per- 
sonality then  altered,  maimed,  or  trans- 
formed ?  Experience  seems  to  give  an- 
swer in  the  negative. 

Total  loss  of  any  sense  may  be  either 
acquired  or  congenital.  We  will  first  con- 
sider the  former  case.  We  will  set  aside 
the  two  secondary  senses,  taste  and  smell, 
as  well  as  touch  in  its  several  forms,  allied 
as  it  is  to  the  general  sensibility ;  and  we 
will  consider  only  hearing  and  sight.  In- 
stances of  acquired  blindness  and  deaf- 
ness are  not  rare  :  quite  frequently  they 
produce  modifications  of  character,  but 
such  changes  are  not  radical,  and  the  in- 
dividual remains  the  same.  Congenital 
blindness  and  congenital  deaf-muteness 
affect  the  personality  more  profoundly. 
Those  who  are  deaf-mutes  from  birth,  if 
they  have  to  depend  on  their  own  re- 
sources and  are  not  instructed  in  the  deaf- 
mute  language,  remain  in  a  state  of  men- 
tal inferiority.  This  has  sometimes  been 
exaggerated,*  but  it  is  nevertheless  incon- 
testable, and  it  is  due  to  causes  so  often 
explained  that  there  is  no  need  to  recall 
them  here.  The  conscious  personality 
falls  below  the  normal  stage  :  but  in  this 
case  we  have  an  arrest  of  development 
rather  than  an  alteration  of  personality  in 
the  strict  sense  of  the  term. 

As  for  those  born  blind,  many  of  them, 
as  we  know,  are  clever  and  ingenious, 
and  there  is  no  ground  for  supposing  in 
their  case  any  diminution  or  alteration  of 


*  See  on  this  point  the  facts  reported  by  Kuss- 
maul,  Die  Stbrzingeii  der  Sprache,  VII.  p.  16  et  seq* 


THE  DISEASES    OF   PERSONALITY. 


personality.  However  odd,  to  our  minds, 
their  conception  of  the  visible  world, 
which  they  image  to  themselves  accord- 
ing to  hearsay  only,  that  does  not  seri- 
ously affect  either  the  nature  of  their  per- 
sonality or  the  idea  they  have  of  it. 

Take  the  case  of  Laura  Bridgman — the 
most  noted  case  of  sense  privation  on  rec- 
ord, a  case-  minutely  studied,  and  fully 
detailed.*  Here  we  see  a  woman  bereft 
at  the  age  of  two  years  of  sight  and  hear- 
ing, almost  entirely  deprived  of  the  senses 
of  smell  and  taste,  and  possessing  only 
the  sense  of  touch.  Doubtless  very  great 
credit  is  due  to  the  painstaking  and  intel- 
ligent training  which  has  fashioned  her 
mind:  nevertheless  her  instructors  could 
not  endow  her  with  new  senses,  and  her 
one  sense  of  touch  had  to  suffice  for  all 
purposes.  Now  Laura  Bridgman  is  seen 
to  possess  an  individuality  of  her  own, 
and  a  clearly  marked  character,  being  of 
a  kindly  disposition,  almost  invariably 
good-humored,  untiring  in  her  efforts 
toward  self-instruction  :  in  short,  she  is  a 
person. 

Disregarding  the  innumerable  details 
involved  in  the  foregoing  cases,  we  may 
safely  conclude  that  congenital  or  ac- 
quired privation  of  one  or  more  of  the 
senses  involves  no  morbid  state  of  the 
personality.  In  the  less  favorable  cases 
there  is  a  relative  arrest  of  development, 
which  is  remedied  by  education. 

For  those  who  hold  the  Me  to  be  an 
exceedingly  complex  composite — and  such 
do  we  hold  it  to  be — every  change,  addi- 
tion, or  subtraction,  in  its  constituent  ele- 
ments affects  it  more  or  less.  But  the  aim 
of  our  analysis  is  precisely  to  distinguish, 
in  these  elements,  what  is  essential  from 
what  is  accessory.  What  the  external 
senses  (touch  excepted)  bring  in  is  not  an 
essential  factor.  The  senses  determine 
and  circumscribe  the  personality ;  they  do 
not  constitute  it.  Were  it  not  rash  to  trust 
to  pure  logic  in  questions  of  observation 
and  experience,  this  conclusion  might  be 
deduced  a  priori.  Sight  and  hearing  are 
pre-eminently  objective  :  they  reveal  to 
us  what  is  without,  not  what  is  within. 
As  for  touch,  a  complex  sense  which 
many  physiologists  resolve  into  three  or 
four  senses,  this,  in  so  far  as  it  makes  us 
acquainted  with  the  properties  of  the 
outer  world — in  so  far  as  it  is  an  eye  for 
the  blind — belongs  in  one  group  with 
sight  and  hearing  ;  otherwise,  it  is  only 


*  See  Mary  Swift  Lamson,  Life  and  Education 
of  Laura  Dewey  Bridgman,  the  Deaf,  Dumb,  and 
Blind  Girl. 


one  form  of  the  sense  we  have  of  our  own 
body. 

It  may  seem  strange  to  say  that  pares- 
thesia and  dysesthesia,  of  which  we  are 
now  to  treat,  i.  <?.,  simple  sensorial  per- 
turbations or  alterations,  disorganize  the 
Me.  Yet  observation  proves  this,  and 
reflection  explains  it.  This  work  of  de- 
struction comes  not  from  them  alone  ; 
the}/  are  but  an  external  episode  of  an  in- 
ternal disorder  that  lies  deeper,  and  which 
affects  the  bodily  sense  (or  ccemesthesis). 
These  sensorial  disturbances  are  causes 
assistant  rather  than  efficient.  This  the 
facts  will  show. 

Alterations  of  personality  with  sensorial 
disturbances,  but  without  noteworthy 
hallucinations,  without  loss  of  judgment, 
are  found  in  certain  morbid  states.  We 
select  as  a  type  the  neurosis  studied  by 
Krishaber  under  the  title  "  cerebro-card- 
iac  neuropathy."  It  matters  little  whether 
or  no  this  group  of  symptoms  deserves  to 
be  regarded  as  a  distinct  pathological 
unit  :  that  is  a  question  for  physicians,  t 
Our  investigation  is  not  concerned  with 
it. 

First  let  us  consider  briefly  the  physio- 
logical disturbances  whose  immediate  ef- 
fect is  to  produce  a  change  in  the  ccenes- 
thesis,  or  bodily  sense.  First,  there  are 
disorders  of  the  circulation,  consisting 
principally  in  an  extreme  irritability  of  the 
vascular  system,  due  probably  to  excita- 
tion of  the  central  nervous  system,  whence 
results  contraction  of  the  small  vessels, 
ischsemia  in  certain  regions,  insufficient 
nutrition,  and  exhaustion.  Then  there 
is  disordered  locomotion,  dizziness,  a  con- 
stant feeling  of  vertigo,  unsteady  gait  as 
from  intoxication,  hesitating  step,  invol- 
untary impulse  to  walk  "  as  though  moved 
oy  a  spring." 

Passing  from  interior  to  exterior,  we 
find  the  sense  of  touch,  which  forms 
the  transition  from  general  sensibility  to 
the  special  senses.  Some  subjects  have 
a  feeling  as  if  they  no  longer  weighed 
anything,  or  of  being  very  light.  Many 
lose  all  precise  notion  of  resistance,  and 
cannot  by  touch  alone  determine  the 
shapes  of  objects.  They  believe  them- 
selves to  be  "  apart  from  the  universe  "; 
their  body,  as  it  were,  surrounded  by  in- 
sulating media  interposed  between  it  and 
the  outer  world. 

"There  was  formed,"  says  one  who  was  so 
affected,  "a  sort  of  murky  atmosphere  round 


t  Krishaber,  De  la  Neuropathic  Ce'rebro-Cardi- 
|  ague.     Paris,  Masson,  1873. 


12 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


about  my  person  ;  nevertheless,  I  saw  per- 
fectly well  that  it  was  a  clear  day.  The  word 
'  murky  '  does  not  express  my  thought  ex- 
actly :  in  German  I  should  call  it  '  dumpf,' 
which  means  heavy,  thick,  dull.  This  sensa- 
tion was  not  only  visual,  but  cutaneous.  The 
'  thick  '  atmosphere  enveloped  me  ;  I  saw  it, 
felt  it  ;  it  was  as  if  I  were  surrounded  by  a 
bad  conductor  of  some  kind  which  insulated 
me  from  the  outer  world.  I  cannot  tell  you 
how  impressive  this  sensation  was  :  I  felt  as 
though  I  had  been  carried  away  to  an  im- 
mense distance  from  the  world,  and  involun- 
tarily 1  cried  out  aloud,  '  I  am  far  away,  far 
away.'  Still,  I  knew  very  well  that  I  was 
not  far  away,  and  I  remembered  distinctly  all 
that  had  happened  to  me  :  but  between 
the  moment  before  and  the  moment  after  my 
attack,  stood  an  interval  of  immeasurable 
duration,  a  distance  like  that  from  earth  to 
sun." 

The  sense  of  sight  is  always  affected. 
To  say  nothing-  of  slight  disorders  of  vis- 
ion (photophobia,  amblyopia),  some  pa- 
tients see  all  objects  double  :  to  others, 
all  surfaces  seem  fiat,  and  to  them  a  man 
looks  like  a  reliefless  silhouette.  For 
many  patients,  surrounding  objects  appear 
to  shrink  in  size,  and  to  retreat  into  im- 
measurable distance. 

The  troubles  of  the  sense  of  hearing 
are  of  a  similar  nature.  The  patient  does 
not  recognize  the  sound  of  his  own  voice  : 
it  seems  to  come  from  far  away,  or  to  be 
lost  in  space,  so  that  it  never  can  reach 
the  ears  of  those  he  is  talking  with  .;  and 
their  replies  are  no  less  difficult  to  hear. 

If  we  bring  together  in  thought  all  these 
svmptoms  (which  are  accompanied  by 
physical  pain,  and  by  changes  in  the 
sense  of  taste  and  of  smell)  we  find  our- 
selves in  presence  of  a  group  of  internal 
and  external  sensations  of  a  new  charac- 
ter, united  by  their  simultaneity  in  time, 
but  more  deeply  united  by  the  morbid 
state  which  is  their  common  source. 
Here  we  see  all  the  elements  of  a  new 
Me  :  sometimes  a  new  Me  is  formed.  "  I 
have  lost  consciousness  of  my  being  :  I 
am  no  more  myself " — such  is  the  lan- 
guage of  patients  as  reported  by  most  ob- 
servers. Some  patients  go  farther  and  at 
times  fancy  themselves  to  be  double  ; 
"  A  curious  thought  possesses  my  mind  in 
spite  of  myself  "  said  one  patient,  a  civil 
engineer ;  "  I  believe  myself  to  be  double. 
I  feel  within  me  a  Me.  that  thinks  and  a 
Me  that  acts."     (Krishaber,  Obs.  6.) 

This  process  of  formation  has  been  so 
well  studied  by  Mr.  Taine,  that  I  need 
not  do  the  work  over  again. 

"  One  might  best  compare  the  state  of 
the  patient  to  the  state  of   a  caterpillar 


wmich,  retaining  all  its  ideas  and  all  its 
recollections  of  the  caterpillar  state,  should 
in  an  instant  become  a  butterfly,  with  the 
senses  and  sensations  of  a  butterfly.  Be- 
tween the  old  state  and  the  new,  between 
the  first  Me  (that  of  the  caterpillar)  and 
the  second  Me  (that  of  the  butterfly)  there 
is  a  deep  cleft,  a  complete  rupture.  The 
new  sensations  find  no  anterior  series 
with  which  to  connect,  the  patient  cannot 
interpret  them,  cannot  use  them :  he 
does  not  recognize  them,  for  him  they 
are  as  unknown.  Hence  two  strange 
conclusions,  first,  '  I  am  not ' ;  the  sec- 
ond, a  little  later,  '  I  am  another.'  "  * 

It  is  difficult  for  a  sane,  well-balanced 
mind  to  conceive  of  so  extraordinary  a 
mental  state  as  this.  The  skeptical  ob- 
server who  looks  at  the  matter  from  with- 
out, does  not  accept  these  conclusions, 
but  the  patient,  who  looks  at  it  from  with- 
in, finds  them  rigorously  correct.  For 
him  this  continual  feeling  of  vertigo  and 
intoxication  is  like  a  permanent  chaos,  in 
which  the  state  of  normal  equilibrium 
and  coordination  either  cannot  exist  or 
at  least  cannot  endure. 

If  now  we  compare  with  the  other  more 
or  less  serious  forms  this  change  of  the 
personality  a  senszbits  lasis,  we  find  that 
a  new  Me  is  not  in  all  cases  formed : 
when  it  is  formed,  it  always  disappears 
with  the  sensorial  disturbances.  It  never 
supplants  entirely  the  normal  Me ;  there 
is  an  alternation  between  the  two ;  the 
elements  of  the  original  Me  retain  so 
much  cohesion  that  it  resumes  at  intervals 
the  supremacy.  Hence  the  illusion — but 
which  is  not  in  the  strict  sense  an  illusion 
for  the  patient — that  he  is  double. 

As  for  the  psychological  mechanism  by 
w-hich  he  thinks  himself  double,  that  is 
explained  by  the  memory.  I  have  before 
endeavored  to  show  that  real  personality, 
with  its  enormous  mass  of  sub-conscious 
and  conscious  states,  presents  itself  to 
our  mind  in  an  image  or  fundamental 
tendency  which  we  call  the  idea  of  our 
personality.  This  vague  conception 
{schema),  which  represents  the  real 
personality  much  as  the  general  idea  of 
"  man  "  represents  a  man,  or  as  the  plan  of 
a  city  represents  that  city,  suffices  for  the 
ordinary  needs  of  our  mental  life.  In 
neuropathic  patients  there  must  be  two 
images  or  scke/nas  which  succeed  each 
other  in  the  consciousness,  as  the  physi- 
ological state  gives  precedence  to  the 
new  Me  or  the  old.     But  in  the  transition 


*  Revue  Philosophique,  vol.  I.,  p.   289.     See  also 
L'  Intelligence,  4th  ed.,  vol.  II.,  appendix. 


THE   DISEASES   OF    PERSONALITY. 


33 


from  the  one  to  the  other,  however  sud- 
den it  may  appear,  there  is  a  certain  con- 
tinuity. There  is  no  absolute  beginning 
of  the  one  state  of  consciousness  with 
absolute  ending  of  the  other,  but  with  an 
hiatus,  vacancy  between.  Like  all  states 
of  consciousness,  these  have  a  certain 
duration  :  they  occupy  some  portion  of 
time,  and  the  terminal  end  of  one  touches 
the  initial  end  of  the  other.  Nay  they 
trench  upon  each  other,  while  one  is 
beginning  the  other  still  subsists,  though 
vanishing  :  for  a  certain  period  they  co- 
exist. In  our  opinion  it  is  during  this 
period  of  co-existence  or  of  transition, 
that  the  patient  thinks  himself  twain. 

Finally  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the 
sensorial  disorders  are  only  the  result  of 
a  deeper  disorder  that  is  felt  throughout 
the  organism ;  and  that  consequently 
here  again  the  bodily  sense  plays  the 
principal  part  in  the  pathology  of  person- 
ality. 

We  can  now  understand  how  the  con- 
genital or  acquired  suppression  of  one  or 
more  of  the  senses  leaves  the  personality 
intact  at  bottom,  while  momentary  per- 
versions of  a  less  serious  aspect  trans- 
form it.  Physiologically  considered,  we 
have  in  the  first  case  a  sum  of  nervous 
elements  condemned  to  inertia  either  at 
their  origin  or  in  the  course  of  the  indi- 
vidual's life  :  here  the  personality  is  like  a 
weak  or  a  weakened  orchestra,  which 
however  serves  for  all  necessary  purposes. 
In  the  second  case  all  the  nervous  ele- 
ments subsidiary  to  the  impaired  external 
senses,  to  muscular  sensibility,  and  to  or- 
ganic and  visceral  sensibility,  have  under- 
gone an  unwonted  modification :  it  is  as 
with  an  orchestra  in  which  most  of  the 
instruments  have  changed  tone. 


A  natural  transition  from  sense  percep- 
tions to  ideas  is  seen  in  hallucinations, 
and  we  have  now  to  consider  the  part 
played  by  these  in  anomalies  of  personal- 
ity. Let  us  at  the  outset  recall  some 
general  considerations  touching  the  hal- 
lucinatory state.  *  Four  hypotheses  have 
been  offered  to  explain  it. 

i.  The  peripheric  or  sensorial  theory, 
which  finds  the  seat  of  hallucinations  in 
the  sense-organs. 

2.  The  psychic  theory,  which  localizes 
it  in  the  center  of  ideation. 


*  For  a  full  exposition  of  the  question  see  Binet's 
important  articles  in  the  Revue  Pkilosophique, 
April  and  May,  1884. 

3 


3-  The  mixed,  or  psycho-sensorial  the- 
ory. 

_  4-  The  theory  which  refers  hallucina- 
tion to  the  perceptive  centers  of  the  cor- 
tical layer. 

_  Observation  teaches  us  that  hallucina- 
tions affect  now  one  sense  only,  again 
several  senses;  that  usually  they  extend 
to  both  sides  of  the  body,  less 'often  to 
only  one  side— right  or  left  indifferently; 
more  rarely  still  they  are  bilateral  but  at 
the  same  time  present  a  different  charac- 
ter at  each  side:  thus  one  ear  may  be 
assailed  by  threats,  abuse,  evil  counsels, 
while  the  other  may  hear  only  words  of 
comfort;  or  one  eve  may  see  only  things 
depressing  and  repugnant,  while  the 
other  may  see  gardens  full  of  flowers. 
The  latter  cases,  those  at  once  bilateral 
and  contradictory,  are  most  interestinp- 
for  us.  s 

Fortunately  we  have  to  explore  only  a 
very  restricted  area  of  this  immense  do- 
main. Let  us  clearly  define  our  subject. 
In  the  normal  state  the  individual  that 
senses  and  thinks  is  adapted  to  his  en- 
vironment. Between  the  group  of  inter- 
nal states  and  relations  that  constitute 
the  mind,  and  the  group  of  external  states 
and  relations  that  constitute  the  outer 
world,  there  exists  a  correspondence,  as 
Herbert  Spencer  has  shown  in  detaih 
In  the  hallucinate  this  correspondence  is 
destroyed:  hence  false  judgments  audi 
senseless  acts,  that  is  non-adapted  acts^ 
Nevertheless  all  this  constitutes  a  disease 
of  the  reason,  not  of  the  personality..  No, 
doubt  the  Me  suffers  an  impairment,  but 
as  long  as  the  consensus  which  eo.f*sti-. 
tutes  it  has  not  disappeared,  and.  has  not 
split  in  two,  or  has  not  alienated  a  part 
of  itself  fas  we  shall  see  later;  thsre  is  no, 
proper  disease  of  personality  and: the  dis- 
orders are  secondary  and  superficial. 
Consequently  we  may  leave-  aut  of  con- 
sideration the  immense  majsrniy  of  cases 
of  hallucination. 

Neither  need  we  take  account  of  the- 
large  number  of  patients  who.  misappre- 
hend others'  personalities—  who  take  the  • 
physicians  and  the  nu-ses  in  the  asylum. 
for  their  own  relatives*  or  who  take  'their 
own  relatives  for  the-  ifnaginasy  person- 
ages of  their  ravings,,  f- 

The   ground   beieg   thias  e?eared,   the 
cases  that  remain  io.,be  studied  are  not. 

t  For  some  patients  the.  same  individual  is  alter- 
nately transformed  into  an;. imaginary  personage 
and  kept  in  his  reaJ  personality,  A  wwsn  patient 
would  now  recogni?^.  her  husband,  again  would 
take  him  for  an  intruder.  She  had  him  arrested 
by  the  police,  and  he,  had,,  much,  trouble  us  proving- 
his  identity.  ■- 


34 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


very  numerous,  comprising'  only  changes 
of  personality  with  their  basis  in  halluci- 
nation. Nearly  always  there  is  simply  an 
alienation  (in  the  etymological  sense)  of 
certain  states  of  consciousness  which  the 
Me  does  not  consider  as  its  own,  which 
it  makes  objective,  which  it  sets  outside 
itself,  and  to  which  it  at  last  attributes 
an  actual  existence  independent  of  its 
own. 

As  regards  hearing,  the  history  of  relig- 
ious insanity  furnishes  many  instances : 
I  will  cite  the  simpler  cases,  those  in 
which  the  hallucinatory  state  stands  alone 
at  first.  A  woman  was  beset  by  an 
inner  voice  "  which  she  heard  only  in  her 
ear,"  and  which  made  opposition  to  what- 
ever she  herself  willed.  The  voice  was 
ever  for  evil,  while  the  patient  willed  the 
good.  It  would  at  times  cry  out  to  her 
though  it  could  not  be  heard  externally 
"'  Take  your  knife  and  kill  yourself." 
Another  woman,  subject  to  Hysteria,  at 
first  uttered  words  that  <she  did  not  in- 
tend tp  utter,  and  soon  she  began  to  ex- 
press these  alien  thoughts  in  a  voice  dif- 
ferent from  her  ordinary  voice.  At  first 
this  voice  made  remarks  of  an  ordinary 
'  tenor  or  not  inconsistent  with  reason  : 
afterward  it  assumed  a  habit  of  nega- 
tion. 

"  To-day,  after  thirteen  years,  the  voice 
isimply  confirms  what  the  patient  has  just 
said,  or  comments  upon  her  words,  criticises 
them,  ridicules  them.  The  tone  of  this  voice, 
when  the  '  spirit '  speaks,  always  differs  a 
little  and  sometimes  differs  totally  from  the 
patient's  ordinary  voice,  and  hence  it  is  that 
she  believes  in  the  reality  of  the  spirit.  I 
have  myself  often  observed  these  facts.  "  * 

As  regards  sight,  aberrations  of  this 
kind  are  less  frequent.  "  A  very  intelli- 
gent man  "  says  Wigan  (page  126), 
"had  the  faculty  of  bringing  before  him- 
.self  his  own  double.  He  would  laugh 
heartily  when  the  double  appeared,  and  the 
double  would  laugh  too.  This  was  for  a  long 
time  a  matter  of  amusement  for  him  but  the 
final  result  was  pitiable.  The  man  gradu- 
ally came  to  believe  that  he  was  haunted  by 
himself.  To  put  an  end  to  this  wretched  life 
he  arranged  his  affairs,  and  unwilling  to 
enter  on  another  year,  at  midnight  of  Dec.  31 
he  shot  himself  with  a  pistol  in  the  mouth." 

Finally,  Dr.  Ball  f  describes  the  case 
•of  a  young    man  who,  while    traveling 


*  Gnesinger,  Mental  Diseases,  French  trans,  p. 
-285.  Baillarger  reports  a  similar  case  in  the  An- 
nates Mc'dico-Psyck.,  ist.  series,  vol.  VI.  p.  151. 

^Cerebral  Dualism.  See  Humboldt  Library  No, 
^7-  P-3i- 


in  South  America  had  a  sunstroke  which 
"  left  him  very  ill :  he  was  unconscious  for 
a  month.  A  few  days  after  having  regained 
his  senses,  he  heard  distinctly  a  man's  voice 
perfectly  articulated,  uttering  the  words, 
'How  are  you  to-day?'  The  patient  an- 
swered and  a  short  conversation  ensued. 
The  next  day  the  same  question  was  re- 
peated. This  time  the  patient  looked  about, 
and  could  see  no  one  in  the  room.  '  Who 
are  you  ? '  he  said,  '  I  am  Mr.  Gabbage,' 
answered  the  voice.  Some  days  later  the 
patient  had  a  glimpse  of  his  interlocutor, 
who  thenceforward  presented  the  same 
features  and  dress.  He  saw  him  always 
from  the  front,  but  only  his  bust ;  he  alvvavs 
wore  a  hunting  costume,  and  had  the  look  of 
a  vigorous  and  well  built  man  of  about 
thirty-six  years,  with  a  heavy  beard ;  com- 
plexion dark,  eyes  large  and  black,  and  eye- 
brows strongly  marked.  Impelled  by  a 
justifiable  curiosity,  our  patient  would  fain 
know  the  calling  of  his  questioner  and  how 
and  where  he  lived,  but  the  man  never  con- 
sented to  tell  more  about  himself  than  his 
name." 

At  last  Gabbage  grew  more  and  more 
exacting,  ordering  the  young  '  man  to 
throw  into  the  fire  his  newspaper,  his 
watch  and  chain,  to  poison  a  young 
woman  and  her  -child,  to  throw  himself 
out  of  a  third-story  window,  etc. 

In  these  facts  we  see  the  beginning  of 
a  dissolution  of  personality.  We  will 
further  on  cite  other  cases  not  having 
their  ground  in  hallucination,  and  which 
will  enable  us  better  to  understand  these. 
That  coordination  more  or  less  perfect 
which  in  the  normal  state  constitutes 
the  Me,  is  here  partially  broken  up.  In 
the  group  of  states  of  consciousness 
which  we  feel  to  be  our  own  because 
they  are  produced  or  experienced  by 
ourselves,  there  is  in  such  cases  one 
which,  though  it  has  its  source  in  the 
organism,  does  not  enter  into  this 
consensus,  stands  apart,  appears  as  though 
foreign  to  it.  Here  we  have  in  the  or- 
der of  thought  the  analogon  of  irresist- 
ible impulse  in  the  order  of  action — a 
partial  incoordination.  % 

Certainly  these  voices  and  these  vis- 
ions emanate  from  the  patient :  why 
then  does  he  not  regard  them  as  his 
own  ?  It  is  a  difficult  question  but  I 
will  endeavor  to  answer  it.  There  must 
exist  anatomical  and  physiological  causes 
which  would  solve  the  problem,  but  un- 
fortunately   they    are    hidden    from   us. 


%  With  regard  to  irresistible  impulse  as  a  phe- 
nomenon of  partial  incoordination,  see  Diseases 
of  the  Willy  Chapter  III.  (Humboldt  Library 
No.  52.) 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY 


as 


Being   ignorant   of  the   causes,    we    can ; 
view  only  the  surface,  the  symptoms,  the 
states  of  consciousness,  with  the  signs  I 
which    interpret    them.       Take    then    a 
state  of  consciousness   (with  its  organic 
conditions;  having  this   special   character 
of  being    local,    i.  e.,   one    that    has   the 
faintest  possible  relation    to  the  phvsical 
an  J  psychic  organization.     To   make  my 
meaning  clear  by  antithesis,   take  a  vio- 
lent,   sadden    emotion :    it    reverberates 
everywhere,  stirs  the  whole  life,  physical 
and  mental :  there  is  thorough  diffusion. 
Our  case  is  the  reverse  of  this.     Organi- 
cally and  psychically,  it  has  but  few  con- 
nections, and  these  precarious,   with  the 
rest   of  the   individual.      It    is    outside, 
like  a  foreign  body  lodged  in  the   organ- 
ism, and  not  sharing  in  its  life.     It  does 
not   enter  the  general  sensibility   (coen- 
aesthesis)    which    maintains    and    unifies 
the  whole.     It  is  a  cerebral  phenomenon 
almost     without;    a     support,    like     the 
thoughts  imposed  by  suggestion  in   hyp- 
notism.     What  gives   force   to  this   at- 
tempt at  an  explanation  is  the  fact  that 
the  morbid  state,  unless  it  be    removed 
by  nature  or  by  medical  treatment,   has 
an    irresistible    tendency  to  expand    and 
grow  strong  at  the  expense  of  the  origi- 
nal personality,  which  begins  to   decline, 
preyed  upon  by  this  parasite.     Neverthe- 
less, in  this  case   it  retains  its    original 
character  :  it  does  not  constitute  a  dupli- 
cation of  personality  but  an  alienation. 

I  offer  this  effort  toward  an  explana- 
tion only  as  an  hypothesis,  well  aware 
that  our  ignorance  of  the  organic  condi- 
tions of  the  phenomenon  makes  defini- 
tive proof  impossible.  In  presenting  this 
explanation  I  have  had  to  anticipate  what 
will  later  be  said  with  regard  to  ideas, 
and  which  will  perhaps  furnish  us  with 
new  arguments  in  favor  of  our  hypothe- 
sis. 


We  come  now  to  speak  of  recent  ex- 
periments on  hallucinations ;  these,  in 
conjunction  with  other  facts,  have  led 
certain  authors  to  offer  an  explanation  of 
double  personality  so  simple  as  to  be 
palpable,  so  to  speak.  These  authors 
show  first  the  functional  independence 
of  the  two  hemispheres  of  the  brain,  and 
thence  infer  that  from  their  synergy 
results  equilibrium  of  the  mind,  but 
from  their  disaccord  sundry  perturba- 
tions and  finally  scission  of  the  psychic 
individual.  There  are  here  two  '  dis- 
tinct questions  that  are  clearly  recog- 
nized  by   many   of  the   authors  we  are 


about  to  quote,  but  which  have  been  con- 
founded by  others. 

_  A  physician-  of  note  as  a  psychologist. 
Sir  Henry  Holland,  was  the  first  to  study 
in  1840,  the  brain  as  a  double  organ,  and 
to  suggest  that    certain   mental  aberra- 
tions might  be  due  to  ill-regulated  action 
of  the  two  hemispheres,   seeing  that,  in 
some  cases,  the  one  seems  to  correct  the 
perceptions  and  the  feelings  of  the  other. 
In    1844   Wigan    went   farther,    holding 
that  we  have  two  brains,  not  one  brain, 
and  that  "the  corpus  callosum,  instead 
of  being  a  bond  of  union  between  them, 
is  a   wall  of  separation."*     Later  prog- 
ress in  brain  anatomy  yielded  more  posi- 
tive  results,   showing  'the    inequality  in 
weight    of  the  two   lobes   of   the   brain, 
their  constant  asymmetry,  differences  in 
the  topography  of'  the  cortex,  etc.     Bro- 
ca's  discovery  of  the  seat  of  aphasia  was 
a  new  argument  of  great  value.     It  was 
further  supposed  that  the  left  hemisphere 
might  be  the  principal  seat  of  intelligence 
and  will,  while  on  the  right  hemisphere 
would  devolve  more  especially  the  life  of 
nutrition  (Brown-Sequard).     I  condense 
this  account,  which  else  might  be  long, 
to  come  at  once  to  hallucinations.     The 
occurrence  simultaneously  of  contradic- 
tory   hallucinations — joyous    and   sad 

attracted  the  attention  of  observers. 
There  was  something  better  than  obser- 
vation, too — experimentation  ;  and  hyp- 
notism made  this  possible.  The  hyp- 
notized subject  has  three  phases  :  the 
lethargic,  characterized  by  nervo-mus- 
cular  excitability;  the  cataleptic,  pro- 
duced by  raising  the  eyelids  of  the  sub- 
ject ;  the  somnambulic,  caused  by  pres- 
sure on  the  vertex.  If  during  the  cata- 
leptic state  we  lower  the  right  eyelid,  we 
thereby  act  upon  the  left  brain,  and 
determine  a  lethargic  state  of  the  right 
side  only.  Hence  the  subject  finds  him- 
self as  it  were  divided  in  twain :  he  is 
hemilethargic  on  the  right  side,  hemi- 
cataleptic  on  the  left.  I  take  from 
Richer 's  well-known  work  an  account 
of  what  takes  place. 

"  I  set  upon  a  table  a  pail  of  crater,  a  basin, 
and  soap.  As  soon  as  the  patients  eve  is 
drawn  to  these  objects,  or  her  hand  touches 
one  of  them,  apparently  quite  of  her  own  ac- 
cord she  pours  water  into  the  basin,  takes  the 
soap,  and  washes  her  hands  with  scrupulous 


*  Wigan,  77;,?  Duality  of  Mind  Proved  by  the 
Structure^  Functions,  and  Diseases  of  the  Brain 
and  by  the  Phenomena  of  Mental  Derangement 
and  shown  to  be  Essential  to  Moral  Responsibility 
London,  1844.  This  Hi-compacted  work  does  Dot 
bear  out  the  promise  of  its  tiUe. 


36 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


care.  If  now  we  close  the  lid  of  one  of  her 
eyes,  the  right  for  instance,  the  whole  right 
side  becomes  lethargic,  and  the  right  hand  is 
staved,  while  the  left  hand  continues  to  per- 
form its  movements.  Raise  the  eyelid  again, 
and  both  hands  resume  their  action  as  be- 
fore." The  same  thing  occurs  with  the  left 
side.  "  Put  in  the  patient's  hands  the  box 
containing  her  knitting,  and  she  will  open  it, 
Uke  out  her  work,  and  knit  away  with  re- 
markable skill.  Close  one  of  her  eyes,  and 
the  corresponding  hand  stops,  the  arm  fall- 
ing inert  to  her  side,  while  the  other  hand 
strives  to  continue,  unaided,  a  work  that 
now  is  impossible.  The  mechanism  keeps 
on  working  on  one  side,  but  it  modifies  its 
motions  in  order  to  make  them  effective." 

The  author  recounts  several  instances 
hke  this  :  I  will  cite  only  the  last  one.  be- 
cause it  confirms  Broca's  experiment. 
One  places  in  the 'subject's  hands  an  open 
book  directing  her  gaze  upon  one  of  the 
lines.     She  begins  to  read. 

*'  During  the  reading,  if  you  close  the  right 
eye— and  bv  the  decussation  of  the  optic 
nerves,  it  is  the  left  brain  that  is  now  affected 
—she  stops  short  in  the  middle  of  a  word  or 
of  a  phrase.  When  the  right  eye  is  opened 
again,  she  forthwith  completes  the  inter- 
rupted word  or  phrase.  If  on  the  other 
hand  the  left  eye  be  closed,  she  continues 
her  reading,  hesitating  a  little  because  she  is 
amblyopic  and  achromatopsic  in  the  right 
eye."  * 

These  experiments  may  be  varied.  A 
different  attitude  is  given  to  the  members 
of  each  side  of  the  body :  then  the  sub- 
ject shows,  on  one  side,  the  expression  of 
one  giving  a  command,  on  the  other,  that 
of  one  that  is  smiling  and  sending  kisses. 
We  can  produce  the  hallucinatory  state 
on  the  right  side  only,  or  on  the  left  side 
only.  Or  let  two  persons  approach  the 
ear  of  the  subject ;  one,  on  the  right, 
speaks  of  the  fine  weather,  and  there  is  a 
smile  on  the  right  side  of  the  subject's 
countenance :  the  other,  on  the  left,  tells 
how  it  rains,  and  the  left  side  manifests 
dissatisfaction,  while  the  labial  commis- 
sure falls.  Or  again,  while  one  is  sugges- 
ting through  the  right  ear  the  hallucina- 
tion of  a  fete  ehampetre,  let  another  at 
the  opposite  ear  imitate  the  barking  of  a 
dog  :  then  the  right  side  of  the  face  ex- 
presses pleasure,  the  left  uneasiness. 

These  experiments  (of  which  we  give 
only  the  baldest  summary),  together  with 
many  other  facts,  lead  inevitably  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  two  hemispheres  are 


relatively  independent ;  that  this  does 
not  at  all  contradict  their  normal  coordi- 
nation ;  but  that  in  certain  pathological 
cases  this  relative  independence  may  be- 
come an  absolute  dualism. 

Some  authors  go  farther,  and  hold  that 
this  cerebral  dualism  suffices  to  account 
for  all  disaccord  in  the  mind,  from  mere 
hesitation  in  choosing  between  two  things, 
to  complete  duplication  of  personality. 
If  we  simultaneously  will  the  good  and  the 
bad ;  if  w:e  have  criminal  impulses  and  a 
conscience  that  condemns  them  ;  if  the 
insane  at  times  are  conscious  of  their  in- 
sanity ;  if  the  delirious  have  lucid  mo- 
ments ;  if  finally  some  individuals  believe 
themselves  to  be  double,  the  reason  is 
simply  that  the  two  hemispheres  are  in 
disaccord :  the  one  is  sane,  the  other 
morbid  :  one  state  prevails  in  the  right 
brain,  its  opposite  in  the  left- -a  sort  of 
psychological  manicheism. 

Griesinger,  on  encountering  this  theory, 
for  it  was  put  forward  timidly  in  his  day, 
having  cited  the  facts  supposed  to  make 
in  its  favor,  and  having  described  the 
case  of  one  of  his  patients  who  "  was 
conscious  that  he  was  out  of  his  mind  on 
one  side  of  his  head,  the  right,"  concludes 
in  these  words  :  "  As  for  me,  I  am  not  in 
the  least  disposed  to  accord  any  great 
weight  to  these  facts."  Have  they 
gained  in  cogency  since  ?  It  is  very 
doubtful.  In  the  first  place,  since  the 
theory  rests  on  the  question  of  number, 
are  there  not  individuals  who  believe 
themselves  to  be  triple  ?  I  find  at  least 
one  case.  "  I  have  met,"  says  Esquiros, 
"  in  an  institution  for  the  insane  a  priest 
who,  having  applied  his  mind  too  intently 
to  the  mystery  of  the  Holy  Trinity,  came 
at  last  to  see  around  him  triple  objects. 
He  fancied  that  he  himself  was  in  three 
persons,  and  wanted  to  be  served  at 
table  with  three  covers,  three  plates, 
three  napkins. "+  Other  cases  could,  I 
suppose,  be  found,  were  one  to  search  for 
them  :  but  I  do  not  care  to  take  advan- 
tage of  this  case  of  triplicity,  for  it  is  sus- 
ceptible of  many  interpretations.  The 
theory  in  question  is  opposed  by  stronger 
reasons,  based  upon  familiar  facts.  Its 
ultimate  ground  is  the  perfectly  gratui- 
tous hypothesis  that  the  contest  is  always 
between  two  states  only.  This  is  flatly 
contradicted  by  experience.  Who  is 
there  that  has  never  found  himself  hesi- 
tating between  doing  this  and  doing  that 
and  refraining  from  acting  at  all  ?  be- 
tween   making  a   journey   northward  or 


*  P.    Richer,  Etudes  Cliniques  sur   F   Hystero- 
Ef>Uej>sie,  p.  391. 


t  Revue  des  Deux  Mondcs,  15  Oct.,  1845,  p.  307. 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


37 


southward,  or  remaining  at  home  ? 
Many  a  time  in  our  lives  does  it  happen 
that  we  have  to  make  our  choice  between 
three  alternatives  each  one  of  which  nec- 
essarily excludes  the  other  two.  Where 
shall  we  locate  the  third  ?  for  under  that 
strange  form  the  question  has  been 
raised. 

In  some  cases  of  congenital  atrophy  of 
the  brain  which  appear  to  be  confirmed 
by  authentic  observations,  we  find  indi- 
viduals possessing  from  infancy  only  one 
cerebral  hemisphere,  yet  their  intellectual 
development  has  been  up  to  the  ordinary 
standard,  and  they  have  been  like  other 
human  beings.  *  In  such  individuals,  ac- 
cording to  the  hypothesis  we  are  com- 
bating, there  couid  have  been  no  interior 
conflict.  But  it  is  needless  to  pursue  this 
criticism  further,  and  I  content  myself 
with  recalling  Griesinger's  remark  upon 
a  verse  in  Faust .  Not  two  souls  only,  but 
many  souls  dwell  within  us. 

Idle  indeed  were  this  discussion  if  it 
did  not  afford  us  a  view  of  our  subject 
under  a  different  aspect.  These  contra- 
dictions within  the  personality,  this  par- 
tial scission  in  the  Me,  such  as  we  see 
them  in  the  lucid  moments  of  insanity 
and  delirium,  or  in  the  self-condemnation 
of  the  dipsomaniac  while  he  raises  the 
cup  to  his  lips,  are  not  oppositions  in 
space  (of  one  hemisphere  against  the 
other)  but  oppositions  in  time.  To  bor- 
row a  favorite  expression  of  Lewes's,  they 
are  successive  "  attitudes  "  of  the  Me. 
This  hypothesis  accounts  for  everything 
that  is  explained  by  the  other  and  be- 
sides it  explains  what  that  does  not. 

If  one  is  fully  imbued  with  the  idea  that 
personality  is  a  consensus,  one  will  easily 
see  how  the  mass  of  conscious,  sub-con- 
scious, and  unconscious  states  which  make 
it  up  may  at  a  given  moment  be  summed 
up  in  a  tendency  or  a  predominant  state 
which,  for  the  person  himself  and  for 
others,  is  its  expression  at  that  moment. 
Straightway  this  same  mass  of  constitu- 
ent elements  is  summed  up  in  an  opposite 
state  which  has  become  predominant. 
Such  is  our  dipsomaniac,  who  drinks  and 
who  condemns  himself.  The  state  of 
consciousness  predominant  at  a  given  mo- 
ment is  for  the  individual  himself  and  for 
others  his  personality. 

Clearly  three  states  or  more  may  suc- 
ceed one  another  (co-exist  apparently)  by 
the  same  mechanism.     We  are  no  longer 


*  Cotard,  Etude sur  V  Atrofhie  Cerebrate.  Paris, 
186S.  Diet.  Encyc.des  Scijnces  Medicates,  art.  Cek- 
VEAU.pp.  298,  453. 


restricted  to  the  number  two.  True,  it 
must  be  admitted  that  this  inner  scission 
occurs  more  frequently  between  two  con- 
trary states  than  between  three  or  more. 
This  is  owing  to  certain  conditions  of 
consciousness  which  we  must  recall. 

Is  there  actual  co-existence  of  two  states 
of  consciousness,  or  only  so  rapid  a  suc- 
cession of  one  to  the  other  as  to  resemble 
simultaneousness  ?  The  question  is  a 
very  difficult  one  and  has  not  yet  been 
settled,  though  it  will  perhaps  one  day  be 
settled  by  the  psycho-physicists.  Hamil- 
ton and  others  have  maintained  that  we 
may  have  as  many  as  six  impressions  at 
once,  but  their  conclusion  is  grounded  on 
very  inexact  observations.  The  determi- 
nation of  the  duration  of  states  of  con- 
sciousness by  the  rigorous  processes  of 
physics  is  a  great  step  in  advance.  Wundt 
has  endeavored  to  go  further,  and  to  deter- 
mine by  experiment  what  he  justly  calls  the 
extension  of  consciousness  ( Umfang  des 
Bewusstseins),  that  is,  the  maximum  num- 
ber of  states  that  it  can  simultaneously 
contain.  His  experiments  have  had  to 
do  only  with  exceedingly  simple  impres 
sions  (the  strokes  of  a  pendulum  at  fixed 
intervals  punctuated  by  strokes  on  a 
small  bell)  and  therefore  they  are  not 
in  all  respects  applicable  to  the  complex 
states  we  are  considering.  He  finds  that 
"  twelve  representations  form  the  max- 
imum '  extension '  of  consciousness  in 
the  case  of  successive  relatively  simple 
states."  t  Experience  then,  seems  to 
pronounce  in  favor  of  a  very  rapid  suc- 
cession, equivalent  to  a  co-existence.  The 
two,  three,  or  four  contrary  states  would 
be  at  bottom  a  succession. 

Further,  we  know  that,  to  use  a  com  - 
parison  that  is  often  employed,  con- 
sciousness, like  the  retina,  has  its  "  blind 
spot."  Distinct  vision  is  but  a  small  por- 
tion of  the  total  vision.  Distinct  con- 
sciousness is  only  a  small  portion  of  the 
total  consciousness.  Here  we  hit  the 
natural,  the  incurable  cause  of  that  illu- 
sion whereby  the  individual  identifies 
himself  with  his  existing  state  of  con- 
sciousness, particularly  when  the  same  is 
intense  ;  and  of  necessity  this  illusion  is 
far  stronger  for  himself  than  for  others. 
We  see  also  why  (apparent)  co-existence 
is  easier  for  two  contrary  states  than  for 
three ;  and  far  easier  than  for  a  larger 
number.  This  fact  is  due  to  the  limita- 
tions of  the  consciousness.     As  we  said 


+    Grundziige   der  Physiol. 
ol.  II.,  p.  215. 


Psychologie,  2d  ed., 


33 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY, 


before,  there  is  an  opposition  in  time,  not 
in  space. 

In  short,  the  relative  independence  of  the 
two  hemispheres  is  not  open  to  doubt : 
neither  may  we  doubt  that  the  personal- 
ity is  perturbed  by  disaccord  between 
them.  But  to  reduce  the  whole  matter 
to  a  simple  division  between  the  left  side 
and  the  right  is  an  hypothesis  not  sup- 
ported by  any  weighty  argument. 


A  few  words  with  regard  to  memory. 
We  have  no  occasion  to  study  memory 
separately,  for  it  pervades  our  subject 
everywhere.  Personality,  in  fact,  is  not 
a  phenomenon  but  an  evolution ;  not  a 
momentary  thing  but  a  history  ;  not  a 
present  nor  a  past  but  both.  We  will  not 
consider  what  I  may  call  the  objective, 
intellectual  memory — the  sense  percep- 
tions, images,  experiences,  cognitions 
stored  up  within  us.  All  these  may  dis- 
appear, in  part  or  wholly,  through 
diseases  of  memory,  of  which  we  have 
given  many  illustrations  elsewhere.* 
We  will  consider  now  only  the  subjec- 
tive memory — memory  of  ourselves,  of 
our  physiological  life  and  of  the  sensa- 
tions or  feelings  that  accompany  it.  This 
distinction  is-  purely  artificial,  but  it  will 
enable  us  to  simplify  matters. 

First,  does  such  a  memory  exist  ? 
One  might  say  that  in  the  perfectly 
healthy  individual  the  vital  tone  is  so  con- 
stant that  the  consciousness  he  has  of  his 
body  is  but  a  present  ever  repeated  ; 
but  this  monotony,  if  it  exists,  by 
excluding  consciousness  would  on  the 
other  hand  favor  the  formation  of  an  or- 
ganic memory.  As  a  fact  there  are  al- 
ways going  on  changes — inconsiderable 
they  may  be — and  as  we  are  conscious 
only  of  differences,  these  are  felt.  So 
long  as  they  are  faint  and  partial  the  im- 
pression of  uniformity  persists,  because 
actions  that  are  continually  repeated  are 
represented  in  the  nervous  system  far 
more  enduringly  than  ephemeral  changes. 
Consequently  the  memory  of  them  is  or- 
ganized beneath  consciousness,  and  it  is 
hence  all  the  more  firmly  based.  Here 
we  see  the  groundwork  of  our  identity. 
These  slight  changes  act  in  the  long  run, 
producing  what  is  called  an  insensible 
change.  After  ten  years  of  absence,  an 
object,  say  a  monument,  is  the  same  to 
the  eye,  but  it  is  not  the  same  as  regards 
feeling  and  sentiment  .  here  it  is  not  the 


*  Diseases  of  Memory  (Humboldt  Library    No 


faculty  of  sense  perception  but  its  accom- 
paniment that  has  changed.  But  we 
have  here  the  state  of  sanity  and  health 
— the  simple  transformation  that  is  nat- 
ural to  everything  that  lives  and  that 
evolves. 

Such  is  organic  memory,  such  its  habit. 
But  now  let  certain  disturbing  causes  in- 
tervene of  which  we  can  demonstrate  the 
effects,  subjective  and  objective.  There 
is  produced  a  profound  and  sudden,  or  at 
least  a  rapid  and  persistent  transforma- 
tion of  the  ccenassthesis.  What  is  the  re- 
sult ?  Experience  alone  can  tell,  for  in 
our  ignorance  of  the  causes  we  are  re- 
duced to  simple  empiricism.  In  extreme 
cases — and  we  will  not  notice  others — the 
individual  is  changed.  His  metamorphosis 
occurs  in  three  principal  forms,  as  regards 
the  memory, 

ist.  The  new  personality,  after  a  longer 
or  shorter  period  of  transition,  alone  re- 
mains, the  original  personality  being  for- 
gotten (Leuret's  patient).  This  case  is 
rare.  It  supposes  the  former  ccenassthe- 
sis completely  done  away,  or  at  least  for- 
ever inactive  and  incapable  of  resuscita- 
tion. When  it  is  considered  that  absolute 
transformation  of  personality,  i.e.,  substi- 
tution of  one  personality  for  another — - 
substitution  complete,  unreserved,  with- 
out a  link  to  connect  the  present  with  the 
past — presupposes  a  radical  and  thorough 
transformation  in  the  organism,  one  is 
not  surprised  to  find  that  it  occurs  but 
rarely.  I  am  not  aware  of  any  case 
where  the  second  personality  has  not  in- 
herited at  least  some  small  share  of  the 
effects  of  its  predecessor — at  the  very 
least  certain  acquired  faculties  that  have 
become  automatic,  as  the  power  of  walk- 
ing, talking,  and  the  like. 

2d.  Usually  beneath  the  new  bodily 
sense  (ccenassthesis)  that  has  become  or- 
ganized and  has  become  the  groundwork 
of  the  exsiting  Me,  the  old  organic 
memory  persists.  From  time  to  time  it 
returns  to  consciousness,  weak  and  faint 
like  some  memory  of  childhood  that  repe- 
tition has  not  reawakened.  Probably 
this  reviviscence  is  caused  by  some  re- 
mainder of  the  old  organic  memory  that 
is  common  to  the  two :  the  individual 
then  seems  another.  The  existing  state 
of  consciousness  evokes  a  like  one,  but 
this  has  another  accompaniment.  The 
two  seem  mine  though  contradictory  of 
each  other.  Such  is  the  case  with  patients 
who  find  that  everything  is  as  it  ever  was, 
and  yet  that  all  is  changed. 

3d.  Finally,  there  are  cases  of  alterna- 
tion.    Here  the  two  subjective  memories 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


39 


— the  organized  expression  of  the  two 
ccenaestheses — persist,  both  in  turn  be- 
coming predominant.  Each  is  attended 
by,  and  sets  in  action  a  group  of  feelings 
and  of  physical  and  intellectual  aptitudes 
that  do  not  exist  in  the  other.  Each  forms 
part  of  a  separate  complexus.  The  case 
reported  by  Azam  is  a  good  illustration 
of  two  memories  alternating. 

We  can  add  nothing  more  without  re- 
peating what  we  have  already  said,  or 
without  heaping  up  hypotheses.  Our  ig- 
norance of  the  causes  stops  us  short. 
The  psychologist  is  here  like  the  physi- 
cian who  has  to  deal  with  a  disease  of 
which  he  can  make  out  only  the  symp- 
toms. What  physiological  influences  are 
they  which  thus  alter  the  general  tone  of 
the  organism,  consequently  of  the  ccenses- 
thesis,  consequently  too  of  the  memory  ? 
Is  it  some  condition  of  the  vascular  sys-« 
tern  ?  Or  some  inhibitory  action,  some 
arrest  of  function  ?  We  cannot  say.  So 
long  as  this  question  remains  undecided 
we  are  still  only  at  the  surface  of  the 
matter.  Our  purpose  has  simply  been  to 
shoAr  that  memory  though  in  some  re- 
spects it  may  be  confounded  with  person- 
ality, is  not  its  ultimate  basis. 

Even  in  the  normal  state  the  same 
physical  situation  has  a  tendency  to  re- 
call the  same  mental  situation.  I  have 
often  observed  how,  on  falling  asleep,  a 
dream  of  the  preceding  night  till  then 
forgotten  comes  back  to  memory  in  great 
detail  and  very  distinct.  In  traveling, 
when  I  leave  one  town  to  sleep  in  an- 
other, this  recurrence  of  the  previous 
night's  dream  sometimes  takes  place,  but 
then  the  dream  comes  back  piecemeal, 
disjointed,  and  hard  to  reconstruct.  Is 
thus  the  effect  of  the  physical  conditions, 
in  one  case  alike,  in  the  other  slightly  dif- 
ferent? Though  I  have  not  seen  this 
fact  mentioned  in  any  work  upon  dreams, 
I  do  not  suppose  it  to  be  peculiar  to  me. 

But  there  are  certain  familiar  facts 
that  are  more  conclusive.  In  somnam- 
bulism, whether  natural  or  induced,  the 
occurrences  of  preceding  states  of  the 
same  kind  that  are  forgotten  during 
wakefulness  come  back  in  the  hypnotic 
state.  Of  this  we  have  an  illustration  in 
the  well  known  case  of  the  porter  who 
while  intoxicated  mislaid  a  parcel :  on 
becoming  sober  he  was  unable  to  discover 
it,  but  he  found  it  on  getting  drunk  again. 
Do  we  not  here  see  a  tendency  to  the 
formation  of  two  memories,  one  normal, 
the  other  pathological,  the  two  pertaining 
to  two  distinct  states  of  the  organism, 
and  constituting  as  it  were  the  embry- 


onic forms  of  the  extreme  cases  already 
mentioned  ? 


We  have  already  shown  in  a  general 
way  the  role  of  ideas  in  the  transforma- 
tion of  personality.  It  remains  to  ob- 
serve this  new  factor  in  operation  and  to 
ascertain  what  results  it  produces  per  se 
and  distinctively.  Of  the  many  elements 
whose  consensus  constitutes  the  Me,  none 
perhaps  can  be  so  easily  isolated  and 
studied  apart.  But  we  must  guard 
against  an  ambiguity  in  terms.  For  the 
conscious  individual  the  idea  of  his  per- 
sonality may  be  an  effect  or  a  cause ;  a 
result  or  a  prime  factor,  a  point  of  arrival 
or  a  point  of  departure.  In  the  normal 
state  it  is  always  an  effect,  a  result,  a 
point  of  arrival.  In  the  morbid  state 
it  is  both  an  effect  and  a  cause.  In 
many  of  the  instances  already  cited  we 
have  seen  organic  perturbations,  whether 
affective  or  sensorial,  produce  such  a  feel- 
ing of  exaltation  or  of  depression,  that 
the  individual  believes  himself  to  be  a 
god,  a  giant,  a  great  man,  or  on  the  other 
hand  a  mere  automaton,  a  phantom,  a 
dead  man.  Clearly  these  erroneous  ideas 
are  a  fairly  logical  conclusion  from  the 
inner  transformation  of  the  individual — 
the  ultimate  formula  expressing  it.  There 
are  other  cases  of  a  contrary  nature, 
where  the  transformation  of  personality 
comes  not  from  below  but  from  above; 
where  it  is  not  completed  in  the  brain 
but  where  it  begins  in  the  brain  ;  and 
where  accordingly  the  idea  is,  not  a  con- 
clusion, but  a  premise.  No  doubt  it 
were  rash  to  assert  that  in  many  in- 
stances where  an  erroneous  idea  becomes 
the  starting-point  for  a  change  in  the 
Me,  this  has  not  underlying  it  and  be- 
fore it  in  time  an  organic  or  an  affective 
perturbation.  Indeed  it  .must  be  affirmed 
that  such  is  the  case  always  ;  even  in  the 
hypnotized  subject,  in  whom  the  person- 
ality is  changed  by  suggestion.  Between 
the  two  forms  of  metamorphosis  indi- 
cated above  there  exists  no  clear  line  of 
demarkation  :  the  term  "  ideal  metamor- 
phosis of  personality  "  is  only  an  a  priori 
denomination.  Having  made  this  reser- 
vation, we  will  now  examine  this  new  as- 
pect of  our  subject,  starting  as  usual 
from  the  normal  state. 

A  very  common  occurrence  is  the  en- 
grossment of  the  personality  by  an  in- 
tense fixed  idea.  So  long  as  this  idea 
occupies  the  consciousness  it  is  hardly 
an  exaggeration  to  say  that  it  is  the  in- 
dividual.    When  a  man  is  wrestlincr  con- 


40 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


tinually  with  a  problem,  or  intent  on 
working  out  an  invention,  or  bending  his 
energies  toward  the  production  of  some 
original  work  in  any  held,  his  entire  men- 
tal^resources,  his  whole  personality,  are 
drawn  upon  for  the  benefit  of  one  idea. 
In  such  cases,  a  man  is  overmastered 
by  his  dominant  idea,  that  is,  he  is  an 
automaton  :  he  is  in  an  abnormal  state ; 
there  is  a  disturbance  of  equilibrium.  Of 
this  we  have  proof  in  the  innumerable 
anecdotes  that  are  current  the  world  over 
about  inventors,  whether  well  balanced  or 
half-crazed.  And  it  may  be  remarked  in 
passing  that  a  fixed  idea  is  a  fixed  senti- 
ment, or  a  fixed  passion.  The  fixed  idea 
gets  its  intensity,  its  stability,  its  tenacity 
from  some  longing,  some  emotion  of  love 
or  hatred,  some  consideration  of  gain. 
Ideas  are  ever  servitors  of  the  passions, 
but  they  are  like  those  masters  who  al- 
ways obey  the  while  they  think  they 
command. 

So  far  we  have  no  change  of  personal- 
ity, but   only  simple  deviation    from    the 
normal  type,  or  better,  the  schematic  type, 
where  ex  hypothesi   the  organic,  the   af- 
fective, and,  the  intellective  elements  pro- 
duce a  perfect  consensus.     There  is  hy- 
pertrophy at  one  point,  atrophy  at  other 
points,  conformably   to  the  law  of  com- 
pensation.    Let  us  consider  morbid  cases. 
Outside  of   the  artificial  alterations  pro- 
duced during  hypnotism  it  is  difficult  to 
find  any  great  number  of  cases  in  which 
the  starting-point  is  indisputably  an  idea. 
But  I    think    I    am   justified   in   classing 
among    changes   of    personality   having 
their  source  in  the  intellect  the   phenom- 
ena of    lycanthropy   and   of  zoanthropy ; 
once    so'  common,     now   rare.       At  all 
events,  in   every   instance   of  which   we 
have  authentic  record  *  the  mental  debil- 
ity in   the  lycantkrope  is  so  great,  and  so 
near  akin   to  stupidity,    that  one  is  dis- 
posed to  see  here  a  case  of  reversion,  of 
return  to  the  purely  animal  individuality. 
We  may  add  that  as  these  cases  are  com- 
plicated with  disorders  of  the  viscera,  and 
with   hallucinations  of    touch  (cutane'es) 
and  of   sight,   it   is   not    easy   to    decide 
whether  they  are  the  effects  of  a  precon- 
ceived idea,  or  whether  they  themselves 
produce  it.     Still  it  must  be  remembered 
that    lycanthropy   has    sometimes   been 
epidemic,  that  is,  it  must  have  begun,  at 
least  among   the  ■  imitators,  with  a   fixed 


idea.  Finally,  this  particular  malady  dis- 
appeared when  men  had  ceased  to  be- 
lieve in  it — when  the  thought  that  he  was 
a  wolf  could  no  longer  find  a  lodgment 
in  a  man's  brain. 

The  only  perfect  instances  of  trans- 
formation of  the  personality  by  ideas 
(transformation  ideale)  are  those  already 
mentioned,  where  men  believe  them- 
selves to  be  women,  and  vice  versa, 
without  presenting  any  sexual  anomaly 
that  could  account  for  this  metamor- 
phosis. The  influence  of  an  idea  ap- 
pears also  to  be  initiative  or  preponder- 
ant with  the  possessed,  demoniacs.  It 
often  acts  upon  the  exorcist  by  contagion. 
To  cite  one  instance  of  this,  Father 
Sunn,  so  long  mixed  up  with  the  well- 
known  doings  at  the  Loudun  Ursuline 
nunnery,  was  convinced  that  he  had  two 
souls,  and  sometimes,  as  it  would  appear, 
even  three.! 

In  short,  transformation  of  personality 
through  the  dominance  of  an  idea  are 
not  very  frequent,  and  this  affords  new 
proof  of  what  we  have  again  and  again 
repeated :  that  personality  comes  from 
the  more  fundamental  psychic  elements. 
In  the  higher  nerve  centers  it  attains  its 
unity  and  there  does  it  come  to  full  con- 
sciousness of  itself,  there  it  reaches  per- 
fection. If  by  a  mechanism  acting  in  the 
reverse  direction  it  proceeds  from  above 
downward,  the  result  is  superficial,  pre- 
carious, momentary. 

Of  this  we  have  a  demonstration  when 
artificial  personalities  are  produced  in 
hypnotized  subjects.  The  observations 
of  Ch.  Richet  on  this  subject  are  full  and 
conclusive.}:     I  will  sum  them  up  briefly. 


*  See  Calmeil,  De  la  Folie  Considered  sous  le 
Point  de  Vue  Pathologiquc,  Philosophique,  His- 
torique.  et  Judiciaire,  vol.  i,  book  3,  chap.  2, 
and  book  4,  chap.  2. 


t  He  has  left  us  a  detailed  account  of  his  mental 
state  in  his  Ilistorie  des  Diablcs  de  Loudun,  p. 
297  et  seq.:  "  I  cannot  describe  to  you  what  passes 
within  me  during  this  time  [/.  e.,  when  the  demon 
passes  from  the  body  of  the  possessed  nun  into  his 
body]  and  how  this  spirit  unites  with  mine,  with- 
out depriving  me  either  of  the  cognition  or  of  the 
liberty  of  my  soul,  nevertheless  making  himself 
like  another  me,  and  as  though  I  had  two  souls 
whereof  one  is  dispossessed  of  its  body  and  of  the 
use  of  its  organs  and  stands  aside,  looking  on  while 
the  intruder  makes  herself  at  home.  The  two 
spirits  fight  on  one  field,  which  is  the  body,  and 
the  soul  is  as  it  were  divided  in  twain  :  in  one  part 
of  her,  she  is  the  subject  of  the  diabolic  impres- 
sions: in  the  other,  she  is  the  subject  of  the  mo- 
tions that  are  proper  to  her  or  that  God  gives  her. 
When  I  would,  by  the  motion  of  one  of  these  two 
souls,  make  the  sign  of  the  cross  upon  my  lips, 
the  other  turns  my  hand  away  very  rapidly,  and 
seizes  my  finger  with  the  teeth  to  bite  it  in  its  rage. 
*  *  When  I  would  speak  my  speech  is  checked  ; 
at  the  mass  I  am  stopped  quite  short ;  at  the  table 
I  cannot  raise  a  morsei  to  my  mouth  ;  at  confession, 
I  suddenly  forget  my  sins,  and  I  feel  the  devil  go- 
ing and  coming  within  me,  as  in  his  own  house.  ' 

X  Revue  Philosophique,  March,  1883.  He  gives 
some  later  observations  in  his  work,  IS  Homme  et 
I  Intelligence.  See  also  Carpenter,  Mental  Phys- 
iology. 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


41 


The  hypnotized  subject  (usually  a 
woman)  is  made  to  believe  herself  to  be, 
now  a  peasant,  again  an  actress,  or  a 
general,  an  archbishop,  a  nun,  a  sailor,  a 
little  girl,  and  so  forth ;  and  she  acts  her 
part  without  any  misgiving.  Here  the 
psychological  data  are  perfectly  clear. 
In  this  state  of  artificially  produced  som- 
nambulism the  real  personality  is  intact ; 
the  organic,  affective,  and  intellectual 
elements  have  undergone  no  considerable 
alteration,  but  they  all  remain  in  posse. 
A  certain  not  well  understood  state  of 
the  nerve  centers,  an  arrest  of  function, 
prevents  them  from  passing  into  act. 
By  suggestion  an  idea  is  evoked :  in- 
stantly by  the  mechanism  of  association, 
this  awakens  analogous  states  of  con- 
sciousness, and  no  others  ,  and  in  con- 
nection with  them — always  by  associa- 
tion— the  appropriate  gestures,  acts, 
speech  and  sentiments.  In  this  way  is 
constituted  a  personality  external  to  the 
real  personality,  made  up  of  borrowed 
elements  and  depending  on  automatism. 
This  experiment  shows  what  an  idea  may 
do  when  freed  from  control  by  other 
ideas,  but  at  the  same  time  reduced  to 
its  own  sole  forces,  and  no  longer  sup- 
ported and  aided  by  the  totality  of  the 
individual. 

In  some  cases  of  imperfect  hypnotism 
dualism  is  produced.  Dr.  North,  pro- 
fessor of  physiology  in  the  Westminster 
Hospital,  says,  in  speaking  of  the  period 
of  hypnotization  when  he  was  being  in- 
fluenced by  the  fixing  of  the  gaze  . — "  I 
was  not  unconscious,  but  it  seemed  as  if 
I  lived  as  two  beings.  I  fancied  that  an 
inner  Me  was  alive  to  all  that  was  pass- 
ing, but  that  it  took  no  part  in  the  acts  of 
the  outer  Me,  nor  had  any  care  to  control 
them.  The  repugnance  or  the  inability 
of  the  inner  Me  to  direct  the  outer  Me 
seemed  to  increase  as  the  situation  was 
continued."* 


*  Hack  Tufce,  On  the  Mental  Condition  in  Hyp- 
notism, published  in  the  Journal  of  Mental  Sci- 
ence, April.  i33t.  We  have  also  in  this  article  the 
case  of  a  physician  who,  during  a  troubled  slumber 
after  some  twenty  hours  of  climbing'  among  the 
Alps,  dreamt  that  he  was  twain  •  one  Me  had 
died,  the  other  was  making  the  autopsy.  In  some 
cases  of  intoxication  and  of  delirium,  the  psychic 
coordination  disappears,  and  there  is  a  kind  of 
scission  of  the  personality  in  two.  See  the  articles 
by  Dr.  Azam  on  changes  of  personality  {Rez'ue 
Scientifigue,  Nov.  17,  1883)  and  of  Dr.  Galicier 
[Revue  Pliilosi'phique.  July,  1887").  Taine  gives  a 
curious  case  of  semi-pathological  incoordination  : — 
'•  I  have  seen  a  person  who,  while  singing  or  talking 
writes,  without  looking  at  the  paper,  consecutive 
phrases,  even  whole  pages,  quite  unconscious 
of  what  she  is  writing.  In  my  opinion  she  is  per- 
fectly sincere,  yet  she  declares  that  when  she 
comes  to  the  end  of  the  page  she  has  no  idea  what 


Can  this  inner  personality — the  true 
personality — ever  be  entirely  suppressed  ? 
Can  the  individual's  proper  character  be 
reduced  to  nought,  so  as  to  be  trans- 
formed into  its  opposite  ?  No  doubt  it 
can  :  the  operator,  by  persistent  enforce- 
ment of  his  authority,  succeeds  in  doing 
this,  after  more  or  less  resistance. 
Richet  impressed  upon  a  woman  who 
was  a  very  strong  Bonapartist  strict  re- 
publican convictions.  Braid  having  hyp- 
notized a  "  teetotaler,"  whose  sobriety 
was  without  reproach,  assured  the  man 
again  and  again  that  he  was  drunk. 
•'This  assertion  was  strengthened  by  a 
feeling  of  staggering  (produced  by  mus- 
cular suggestion)  and  it  was  amusing  to 
see  the  man  wavering  between  this  im- 
posed idea  and  the  conviction  resulting 
from  his  habits."  This  momentary  met- 
amorphosis however  is  perfectly  innocu- 
ous. As  Richet  justly  remarks: — ''In 
these  curious  modifications  what  changes 
is  simply  the  outer  form,  the  habits  and 
general  demeanor,  and  not  the  individu- 
ality proper."  As  for  the  question 
whether  by  repeated  suggestions  to  sus- 
ceptible subjects,  we  might  be  able  at 
length  to  produce  a  modification  of  the 
character  .  that  is  a  problem  to  be  solved - 
:  oeriment  alone,  and  that  is  beyond 
our  present  purpose. 

Here  perhaps  is  the  place  to  note  the 
fact  of  the  disappearance  of  personality, 
a.  phenomenon  that  has  been  described 
by  the  mystics  of  ever)'  age,  according  to 
their  own  experience,  and  often  in  ele- 
gant language.!     The  pantheistic  meta- 


she  has  set  down  on  the  paper.  On  reading'  it  she 
is  amazed,  sometimes  alarmed.  The  handwriting 
differs  from  her  ordinary  style.  The  movement  of 
the  fingers  and  of  the  pencil  is  stiff  and  seems 
automatic.  The  wntir.g  always  ends  with  a  signa- 
ture, the  name  of  one  who  is  dead  and  it  bears  the 
impress  of  a  mental  background  [arrtere-  : 
mental]  that  the  author  would  be  unwf.'.  _ 
divulge. "  (De  V Intelligence,  3d  edition,  prefaces. 
t  I  will  quote  only  one  of  these  descriptions,  and 
that  one  because  by  its  style  of  language  and  its 
date  it  comes  nearest  to  our  own  time.  "  I  seem 
to  have  become  a  statue  on  the  banks  of  the  stream 
of  time,  and  to  be  assisting  at  some  mystery, 
whence  I  shall  go  forth  aged  or  ageless.  I  feel  my- 
self to  be  without  name,  impersonal,  with  the  star- 
ing eyes  of  a  corpse,  with  aiind  vague  and  universal 
like  nothingness  or  the  absolute :  I  am  in  suspense, 
I  am  as  if  non-existent.  In  such  moments  it  seems 
to  me  that  my  consciousness  withdraws  into  its 
eternity  *  *  *  it  sees  itself  in  its  very  essence,  su- 
perior to  every  form  containing  its  past,  its  present, 
and  its  future  [sees  itself  as  the]  void  which  en- 
compasses all,  an  atmosphere  {mzlie-u  invisible  and 
fecund,  the  virtuality  of  a  world  which  detaches 
itself  from  its  own  existence  to  regain  itself  {se 
ressaisir)  in  its  pure  inwardness  yiniimite  pure). 
In  those  sublime  moments  the  soul  re-enters  her- 
self, goes  back  again  to  indeterrnination  ;  she  be- 
comes retro-i'oluted  (Sit  venza  verba.  The  original 
has  s  est  reitnpliquee.  Transla'or '•■  beyond  her  own 
life,  she  becomes  again  a  divine  embryo.     All  is  ef- 


42 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


physicians,  too,  without  attaining  to  ec- 
stasy, speak  of  a  state  in  which  the  mind 
thinks  of  itself  "  under  the  form  of  eter- 
nity," appears  to  itself  as  outside  of  time 
and  space,  as  free  from  all  contingent 
modality  and  forming  one  with  the  infi- 
nite. This  psychological  situation,  though 
infrequent,  must  not  be  forgotten.  To 
me  it  seems  as  an  absolute  engrossment 
of  the  mental  activity  by  a  single  idea  (in 
the  mystics  a  positive  one,  negative  in 
the  empirics)  which  idea,  from  its  high 
degree  of  abstractness,  and  from  its  be- 
ing exempt  from  all  determination  and 
limitation,  contradicts  and  excludes  all 
feeling  of  individuality.  Let  but  one  sen- 
sation, however  commonplace,  intervene, 
and  the  illusion  disappears.  This  state  is 
neither  above  the  personality  nor  below  it, 
but  without  and  beyond. 

To  sum  up,  the  states  of  consciousness 
called  ideas  are  only  a  secondary  factor 
in  constituting  personality  and  in  chang- 
ing it.  Ideas  play  their  part,  but  it  is  not 
a  predominant  one.  These  results  do  not 
agree  with  the  time-honored  teachings  of 
psychology.  Ideas  have  an  objective 
character :  hence  they  cannot  express  the 
individual  as  do  his  desires,  his  feelings, 
his  passions. 


CHAPTER  V. 

DISSOLUTION    OF   PERSONALITY. 

To  complete  our  review  of  the  facts, 
we  have  yet  to  treat  of  alterations  of  per- 
sonality in  progressive  dementia  caused 
by  old  age,  general  paralysis,  and  all 
other  morbid  causes.  If  in  the  normal 
state  personality  is  a  psycho-physiological 
coordination  of  the  highest  degree  possi- 
ble, which  endures  amid  perpetual  changes 
and  partial  and  transitory  incoordinations 
(such  as  sudden  impulses,  eccentric  ideas, 
etc.),  then  dementia,  which  is  a  progres- 
sive movement  toward  physical  and  men- 
tal dissolution,  must  manifest  itself  by  an 
ever  increasing  incoordination  till  at  last 
the  Me  disappears  in  absolute  incoher- 
ence, and  there  remain  in  the  individual 
only  the  purely  vital  coordinations — those 
best  organized,  the  lowest,  the  simplest, 


faced,  dissolved,  dissipated,  resumes  the  primor- 
dial state,  is  immersed  again  in  the  original  fluidity 
without  form,  or  angles,-  or  fixed  contours.  This 
state  is  contemplation,  not  stupor:  it  is  neither 
painful,  nor  joyous,  nor  sad  ;  it  is  beyond  all  special 
feeling  and  sentiment,  as  it  is  beyond  all  finite 
thought.  It  is  the  consciousness  of  Being  (/'  etre) 
and  the  consciousness  of  the  omnipossibility  latent 
in  the  depths  of  that  Being.  It  is  the  sense  of 
spiritual  infinitude."     Amiel,  Journal  Intime^  1856. 


and  consequently  the  most  stable,  but 
these  in  turn  disappear  also.  And  it  is 
perhaps  in  these  states  of  progressive  and 
inevitable  dissolution  alone  that  we  find 
instances  of  double  personality  in  the 
strict  sense,  that  is,  of  co-existent  person- 
alities. In  the  course  of  this  work  we 
have  seen  cases  of  successive  personali- 
ties (cases  mentioned  by  Azam,  Dufay, 
Camuset)  ;  of  a  new  personality  supplant- 
ing another  that  is  forgotten  or  thrust  out 
and  held  to  be  extraneous  and  foreign 
(the  case  cited  by  Leuret,  and  that  of  the 
soldier  of  Austerlitz)  ;  of  an  invasion  of 
the  normal  personality  by  unwonted  sen- 
sations which  it  resists  with  more  or  less 
success,  and  which  at  times,  and  momen- 
tarily lead  the  patient  to  think  himself 
twain  (cases  noted  by  Krishaber,  etc.) 
But  in  the  subjects  of  dementia  disorgan- 
ization becomes  organized  :  the  demented 
are  double  in  personality,  think  them- 
selves double,  act  as  double  personalities. 
This  admits  of  no  doubt.  They  retain 
no  trace  of  that  indecision  which,  in  the 
numerous  cases  we  have  cited,  shows  that 
the  normal  personality  (or  what  remains 
of  it)  possesses  some  remainder  of 
strength  which,  weeks  or  months  later, 
will  insure  its  return.  To  the  demented 
it  seems  as  natural  to  be  double  as  to  us 
to  be  of  one  personality.  Such  individu- 
als have  no  skepticism  as  to  their  own 
state  and  do  not  regard  the  opinions  of 
others.  Their  mode  of  being,  given  to 
them  by  their  consciousness,  seems  so 
clear  to  them,  so  evident,  as  to  be  above 
all  question.  This  point  is  worthy  of 
notice  because  it  shows  in  these  morbid 
forms  of  personality,  that  spontaneous- 
ness  of  affirmation  and  of  action  which 
is  characteristic  of  every  natural  state. 
Here  are  two  cases  of  this  kind  : 

A  retired  soldier,  D ,who  afterward 

was  a  police  sergeant,  having  been  sev- 
eral times  struck  on  the  head,  lost  his 
memory  by  degrees,  and  at  last  was  sent 
to  an  asylum.  His  mind  becoming  more 
and  more  affected,  at  last  he  came  to 
think  himself  double. 


"  In  talking  he  always  uses  the  pronoun 
we:  we  will  go,  we  have  made  a  long  march, 
etc.  He  uses  this  form  of  speech,  he  says, 
because  there  is  another  with  him.  At  the 
table  he  says,  '  I  have  had  enough,  but  the 
other  is  still  hungry.'  Sometimes  you  see 
him  running,  and  if  you  ask  why,  the  answer 
is  that  he  would  rather  sit  still,  but  'the 
other'  makes  him  run.  One  day  he  at- 
tempted to  choke  a  child  to  death,  saying  it 
was  not  himself  but  '  the  other  '  that  was  to 
blame.     At  last  he  attempted  his  own  life  to 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


43 


slay  '  the  other,'  whom  he  supposes  to  lie  hid 
in  the  left  side  of  his  body.     Hence  he  calls 

'  the  other '  the  left  D while  he  himself 

is  the  right  D .     This   patient  soon  fell 

into  dementia."* 

A  case  reported  by  Langlois  exhibits  a 
still  lower  grade. 

"  The  man  G is  imbecile,  loquacious, 

with  no  hesitation  in  utterance,  no  paralysis 
of  the  limbs,  and  no  disturbance  of  the 
cutaneous  sensibility.  Though  he  talks 
continually  he  does  but  repeat  the  same 
stereotyped  phrases.  He  always  speaks  of 
himself  in  the  third  person,  and  almost  every 

morning  greets   us   with  '  G is  sick,  he 

must  go  to  the  infirmary.'  Often  he  goes 
upon  his  knees,  and  gives  himself  a  sound 
pummeling ;  then  bursts  out  laughing,  and 

rubbing  his  hands  exclaims, '  G has  been 

bad,  he  has  had  to  do  penance.'  Often  he 
will  take  up  his  wooden  shoe,  and  beat  him- 
self violently  on  the  head,  or  he  will  bury 
his  nails  in  his  flesh,  or  will  scratch  his  face. 
These  fits  of  rage  come  on  suddenly,  and 
while  he  is  disfiguring  himself  his  counte- 
nance is  expressive  of  anger,  but  it  wears 
a  look  of  satisfaction,  as  soon  as  he  has  done 
correcting  the  other.  At  times  when  he  is 
not  overwrought  by  these  imaginary  resent- 
ments,   we    ask    him    '  Where   is    G ? ' 

'  Here  he  is.'  he  answers,  striking  his  breast. 
We  touch  his  head,  asking  whose  that  is. 
'  That,'  he  answers,  '  is  the  pig's  head.' 
'  Why  do  you  beat  it  so  ? '  '  Because  I  must 
punish  the  pig's   head.'     '  But  you  just  now 

struck    G .'     'No.  G is  not  a  bad 

boy  to-day  :  it  is  the  pig's  head  that  has  to  be 
beaten.'  For  many  months  we  asked  him 
the    same  questions,  and  the    answers   were 

ever  the  same.     Generally  it  is  G that  is 

displeased,  but  sometimes  it  is  the  other,  and 
then  it  is  not  the  head  that  is  punished."  t 

A  certain  subject  of  general  paralysis, 
in  a  condition  bordering  on  dementia, 
used  to  be  continually  giving  himself 
advice,  or    reproaching    himself.     "  Mr. 

G ,"  he  would  say,  "you   are   aware 

that  you  have  been  placed  in  this  institu- 
tion, and  here  you  are.  We  tell  you  that 
we  have  no  hope  whatever  of  you,"  etc. 
As  the  general  paralysis  progressed  his 
words  became  less  intelligible,  but  in  his 
raving  this  conversation  with  himself  could 
always  be  made  out.  Sometimes  he  both 
asked  the  questions  and  answered  them. 
When  dementia  had  reached  almost  the 
last  degree,  he  kept  up  the  same  practice. 
He  would  cry  out,  and  show  signs  of  agi- 
tation, but  immediately  growing  calm 
would  say  in  a  low  voice,  and  with  a  sig- 


*  Jaffe,  Archiv  fiir  Psychiatric,  1870. 

+  Annates    Medica-Psychologigues,  vol.    VI.,  p. 


nificant  gesture,  "Won't  you  be  still; 
speak  low."  Then  he  would  answer, 
"  Yes,  I  am  going  to  speak  low."  "  Once 
we  found  him  very  busy,  making  all  the 
motions  of  tasting  [wines,  etc.],  and 
spitting  out.      We  asked   him,  '  You   are 

amusing  yourself,  Mr.  G ?  '    '  Which  ?  ' 

was  his  reply,  and  then  he  relapsed  into 
incoherence.  This  reply,  repeated  here 
literally,  may  seem  to  be  the  result  of 
chance,  but  it  accords  so  well  with  the 
duality  so  long  observed  in  this  patient, 
that  we  have  deemed  it  worthy  of  men- 
tion." \ 

In  the  following  case  the  dissolution  of 
personality  is  presented  in  a  new  aspect : 
the  individual  has  no  consciousness  of  a 
portion  of  himself,  which  is  become  for- 
eign to  him,  or  hostile.  We  have  already, 
while  speaking  of  hallucinations,  seen  the 
patient  coming  by  degrees  to  embody  his 
hallucinations,  and  finally  giving  them 
objective  existence.  In  the  demented  the 
case  is  more  serious.  The  acts  and 
states  that  are  perfectly  normal  for  a  per- 
son of  sound  mind  and  that  have  none  of 
the  morbid  or  imaginative  characters  of 
hallucination,  are  for  the  subject  of  de- 
mentia something  external  to  himself,  nor 
is  he  conscious  that  he  is  himself  their 
cause.  How  may  we  account  for  this 
curious  situation  without  supposing  a 
profound  change  in  the  cceneesthesis,  and 
that  certain  portions  of  the  body  are  no 
longer  represented — or  sensed — in  the 
ruined  brain.  The  sense  of  sight  remains, 
as  experience  proves,  but  the  patient  sees 
his  own  movements  as  an  external,  an 
antagonistic  phenomenon  which  he  at- 
tributes neither  to  himself  nor  to  others  ; 
which  he  notices  passively  without  more 
ado,  because  his  internal  sensations  being 
effaced  and  his  reasoning  power  reduced 
to  impotence,  there  is  no  means  of  cor- 
recting this  incoordination. 

Then  we  have  the  case  of  a  general 
paralytic  in  the  period  of  dementia,  whose 
speech  was  almost  unintelligible,  and  of 


+  Descourtis,  D71  Fonctionnement  des  Operations 
Cerebrales.  et  en  particulier  de  leur  Dedoublement 
dans  les  Psychopathies,  Paris,  1883,  p.  33.  Possibly 
this  second  personality  which  advises  and  admon- 
ishes the  other  is  only  the  purely  passive  reproduc- 
tion of  the  phrases  addressed  to  the  patient  by  his 
physician  or  his  attendants.  It  may  be  remarked 
that  not  seldom  the  demented  speak  of  themselves 
in  the  third  person.  The  same  is  seen  in  young' 
children,  and  it  has  been  accounted  for  by  the  fact 
that  their  personality  is  not  yet  formed.  In  my 
opinion  we  have  here  simply  imitation.  The  in- 
fant is  used  to  hearing  such  remarks  as  these : 
"  Paul  has  been  bad,  he  must  get  a  whipping,"  etc 
He  thus  learns  to  speak  of  himself  in  the  same 
way.  Is  the  use  of  the  third  person  by  some  sub- 
jects of  dementia  a  sign  of  reversion  ? 


44 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


whose  notions  of  the  external  world  but 
little  remained. 

"  One  day  he  was  employed  in  picking 
peas.  Though  inexpert,  and  naturally  right- 
handed,  he  employed  only  the  left  hand. 
Once  the  right  hand  came  forward  as  though 
to  take  its  share  of  the  work,  but  hardly  had 
it  touched  the  peas  when  the  other  hand 
came  down  upon  it,  seized  it  and  gave  it  a 
hard  squeeze.  The  patient's  countenance  j 
meanwhile  bore  an  expression  of  anger  and 
he  repeated  in  a  tone  of  authority,  'No,  no.' 
His  body  trembled  and  shook  with  passion 
and  it  was  plain  that  a  violent  struggle  was 
going  on  within  him.  On  another  occasion 
he  had  to  be  tied  down  in  an  armchair.  His 
countenance  grew  clouded,  and  seizing  his 
right  hand  in  his  left,  he  exclaimed  :  '  There  ! 
It  is  all  your  fault;  on  your  account  they 
have  tied  me  here,'  and  he  struck  the  offend- 
ing hand  again  and  again.  Nor  were  such 
occurrences  exceptional.  Many  times  it  was 
observed  that  on  the  right  nand  quitting  its 
habitual  state  of  inactivity  the  patient 
checked  it  with  the  left.  He  would  become  j 
angry  and  excited,  and  would  beat  it  with  all  1 
the  strength  he  had."  * 

Some  demented  patients  blame  their  j 
fellow  patients  for  the  noise  they  them- 
selves make,  and  complain  of  being  dis- 
turbed by  their  cries.  Finally,  we  will 
quote  the  case,  observed  by  Hunter,  of  an 
old  man,  whose  faculties  were  very  much 
impaired.  He  always  referred  to  the 
present  time  the  occurrences  of  his  early 
life.  Though  he  was  capable  of  acting 
correctly  upon  certain  impressions,  and 
of  referring  them  to  the  portions  of  the 
body  affected  by  them,  he  habitually  at- 
tributed his  own  sensations  to  those 
around  him.  Thus  he  would  tell  his 
keeper  and  the  attendants  that  he  was 
sure  they  were  hungry  or  thirsty.  But 
when  food  or  drink  was  offered  him,  it 
became  apparent  that  this  absurd  idea 
had  been  suggested  to  him  by  his-  -own 
feeling  of  hunger  and  thirst,  and  that  the 
word  they  referred  to  himself,  not  to 
others.  He  had  frequent  violent  fits  of 
coughing,  after  each  of  which  he  would 
resume  the  thread  of  his  conversation, 
first  expressing  in  appropriate  and  sym- 
pathetic terms  his  concern  on  account  of 
his  friend's  complaint.  "  It  grieves  me," 
he  would  say,  "  to  see  you  suffering  from 
so  troublesome  and  so  distressing  a 
cough."  f 

Little  by  little  all  these  cases  steadily 
advance  toward  absolute  incoordination 
and  complete   incoherence.     They  come 


*  Descouftis.  Op.  cit.,  p.  37. 

t  Hunter,  quoted  by  Winslow,  Obscure  Diseases 
0/ the  Brain,  p.  278. 


to  resemble  congenital  imbecility  that  has 
never  been  able  to  reach  the  mean  level 
of  human  personality.  In  the  gradual 
and  progressive  coordination  which  con- 
stitutes normal  man,  the  idiot  has  met 
with  arrest  of  development.  In  him  the 
evolution  has  not  preceded  beyond  the 
early  stages  :  it  has  made  provision  for 
the  physical  life  and  some  few  elementary 
manifestations  of  the  psychic  life ;  but 
the  conditions  of  an  ulterior  development 
are  lacking.  We  have  now  in  conclusion 
to  consider  this  fact  of  coordination  as 
the  groundwork  of  personality. 


But  we  must  first  attempt  a  rapid 
classification  of  the  perturbations  of  per- 
sonality of  which  we  have  given  so  many 
illustrations,  all  so  different  from  one  an- 
other that  it  might  seem  impossible  to 
refer  them  to  a  few  fundamental  types. 

Though  in  the  normal  state  the  bodily 
sense  (ccenassthesis)  undergoes  different 
changes  in  the  course  of  one's  life — in  the 
evolution  which  goes  on  from  birth  to 
death — this  change  is  usually  so  slow,  so 
continuous,  that  the  assimilation  of  new 
sensations  proceeds  little  by  little,  and 
the  transformation  is  brought  about  in- 
sensibly, so  producing  what  we  call  iden- 
tity, i.e.,  apparent  permanence  amid  inces- 
sant variations.  Nevertheless  all  serious 
maladies,  as  well  as  all  profound  changes 
(puberty,  change  of  life)  import  more  or 
less  of  indecision :  between  the  new  state 
and  the  old  there  is  not  immediate  fu- 
sion and  as  it  has  been  well  expressed, 
"  at  first  these  new  sensations  present 
themselves  to  the  old  Me  as  an  extrane- 
ous Thee."  But  should  the  general  bod- 
ily sense  (ccena-sthesisj  be  modified  sud- 
denly; should  there  be  a  large  instanta- 
neous influx  of  unwonted  states,  then  the 
fundamental  element  of  the  Me  is  com- 
pletely transformed  :  the  individual  is 
parted  from  his  prior  personality,  and  he 
appears  to  himself  like  another.  More 
usually  there  is  a  period  of  disturbance 
and  incertitude,  and  the  break  is  not  in- 
stantaneous. When  the  morbid  state 
has  become  fixed,  one  or  other  of  these 
three  principal  types  of  diseases  of  per- 
sonality will  be  presented : 

1.  The  general  bodily  sense  is  changed 
completely.  The  new  state  serves  as 
basis  for  a  new  psychic  life  (new  ways  of 
sensing,  perceiving,  thinking,  hence  a 
new  memory).  Of  the  former  Me  there 
remain  only  the  completely  organized 
processes  (language,  manual  dexterity, 
power  of  walking,  etc.),  activities  that  are 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


45 


purely  automatic  and  almost  unconscious, 
faculties  that  are  like  slaves  ready  to 
serve  any  master.  But  it  must  be  re- 
marked that  in  reality  this  type  is  subject 
to  exceptions.  Sometimes  a  portion  of 
the  automatic  acquisitions  are  not  trans- 
ferred to  the  new  Me.  Again,  at  long 
intervals,  some  few  traces  of  the  old  per- 
sonality reappear,  and  produce  momen- 
tary indecision  in  the  new.  Looking  at 
the  matter  as  a  whole,  and  disregarding 
slight  deviations,  we  may  say  that  here 
we  have  an  alienation  of  personality,  the 
old  personality  having  become  alien  to 
the  new,  so  that  the  individual  has  no 
knowledge  of  his  former  life,  or,  when  he 
is  reminded  of  it,  regards  it  objectively, 
as  something  apart  from  him.  Of  this 
we  see  an  excellent  example  in  the  woman 
inmate  of  La  Salpetriere  who  ever  after  her 
forty-eighth  vear  spoke  of  herself  as  "  the 
person  of  myself"  (la  persomie  de  moi- 
meme).  She  gave  a  fairly  correct  account 
of  her  former  personality,  always,  how- 
ever, identifying  it  with  another.  "  La 
personne  de  moi-meme  does  not  know 
the  one  that  was  born  in  1779" — her 
former  personality.  *  The  case  of 
Father  Lambert  belongs  also  to  this  type. 
Hack  Tuke  tells  of  a  patient  at  the  Bed- 
lam hospital  who  had  lost  his  Me,  that  is, 
the  Me  that  was  familiar  to  him,  and 
would  often  go  looking  for  himself  under 
his  bad.  t 

2.  The  second  type  has  for  its  funda- 
mental character  alternation  of  two  per- 
sonalities, and  to  this  type  in  particular 
properly  belongs  the  current  designation 
of  double  consciousness.  As  we  have 
said,  there  are  transition  forms  intermedi- 
ate between  the  first  type  and  this  one, 
but  at  present  we  are  concerned  only  with 
what  is  clear  and  well  defined.  The 
physical  cause  of  this  alternation  is  very 
obscure,  unknown  we  may  say.  At  the 
point  where  the  new  personality  first  ap- 
pears, this  case  differs  in  nothing  from 
those  of  the  preceding  class :  the  differ- 
ence begins  when  the  first  personality 
reappears.  The  hypothesis  seems  inevi- 
table, that  in  these  subjects  (who  as  a  rule 
are  hysterical,  that  is  to  say  instable  in  a 
high  degree)  there  exist,  with  secondary 
variations,  two  distinct  habits  in  the  phys- 
ical life,  each  serving  as  groundwork  for 
a  psychic  organization.  The  hypothesis 
appears  all  the  more  probable  when  it  is 
remarked  that  the  alternation  bears  upon 


*  See  the  full  details  in  Leuret,  Frag.  Psychoid 
pp.  121-124. 

t  Journal  of Mental  Science,  April,  1883. 


character,  the  thing  that  in  personality  is 
inmost,  and  which  most  fully  expresses 
the  individual  nature.  (Cases  observed 
by  Azam,  Dufay,  Camuset.) 

Of  this  alternation  type  too,  we  have 
different  forms.  Sometimes  the  two  per- 
sonalities know  nothing  of  each  other 
( Macnish).  Again,  one  touches  the  whole 
life,  while  the  other  is  but  partial :  such  is 
the  case  observed  by  Azam.  In  this 
case,  the  most  instructive  of  all  because 
it  now  covers  a  period  of  twenty-eight 
years,  we  see  the  second  personality  con- 
tinually encroaching  upon  the  first.  In 
the  beginning,  the  duration  of  the  first 
personality  was  very  protracted,  but  by 
degrees  it  has  come  to  be  shorter  and 
shorter,  so  that  in  time  it  promises  to 
disappear  entirely,  leaving  the  second  to 
stand  alone.  It  would  hence  appear  that 
this  state  of  alternation,  when  prolonged, 
tends  necessarily  to  be  converted  into  the 
first  type  :  thus  it  holds  a  place  interme- 
diate between  the  normal  state  and  com- 
plete alienation  of  personality. 

3.  The  third  type  is  more  superficial : 
I  will  call  it  substitution  of  personality. 
To  this  type  I  refer  the  rather  frequent 
case  oflndividuals  imagining  themselves 
to  have  changed  from  one  sex  to  the  other 
— from  man  to  woman,  and  vice  versa, 
or  from  ragman  to  king,  etc.  The  state 
of  certain  hypnotized  subjects  already 
mentioned  may  serve  as  an  example  of 
this  whole  class.  The  alteration  is  rather 
psychical,  in  the  narrower  sense  of  the 
term,  than  organic.  I  do  not  for  a  mo- 
ment suppose  that  it  arises,  or  that  it  per- 
sists, without  material  conditions.  I  mean 
only  to  say  that  it  is  not  caused  and  main- 
tained, like  the  other  two  groups,  by  any 
profound  modification  of  the  ccenaesthesis, 
involving  a  complete  transformation  of 
the  personality.  It  arises  from  the  brain, 
and  not  from  the  inner  recesses  of  the 
organism.  It  is  a  local  rather  than  a  gen- 
eral disorder — the  hypertrophy  of  a  fixed 
idea,  which  makes  impossible  that  co- 
ordination which  is  necessary  for  the 
normal  psychic  life.  Hence,  while  in 
alienation  and  alternation  of  personality 
all  conspires  and  co-operates,  exhibiting 
the  inner  unity  and  logic  of  the  organic 
processes,  here,  oftentimes,  the  one  who 
says  he  is  a  king  admits  that  he  has  been 
a  laborer,  and  the  imaginary  millionaire 
that  once  he  earned  only  a  couple  of  francs 
a  day.  Even  outside  of  cases  where  the 
incoordination  is  manifest,  we  see  that  a 
fixed  idea  is  a  weak  excrescence  which 
does  not  at  all  imply  total  transformation 
of  the  individual. 


46 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


This  classification,  proceeding  from  the 
gravest  forms  to  the  slightest,  does  not 
pretend  to  be  rigorously  exact.  It  may 
serve  to  array  the  facts  in  something  like 
order,  and  to  show  how  they  differ,  and 
especially  to  show  once  again  that  per- 
sonality has  its  roots  in  the  organism,  un- 
dergoing like  it  change  and  transforma- 
tion. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

CONCLUSION. 

It  follows  necessarily  from  the  doctrine 
of  evolution  that  the  higher  forms  of  in- 
dividuality must  have  arisen  out  of  the 
lower  by  aggregation  and  coalescence. 
It  follows,  also,  that  individuality  in  its 
highest  degree,  in  man,  must  be  the  ac- 
cumulation and  condensation  in  the  corti- 
cal layer  of  the  brain,  of  elemental  con- 
sciousnesses that  originally  were  auton- 
omous and  dispersed  through  the  organ- 
ism. 

The  different  types  of  psychic  individ- 
uality in  the  animal  scale,  from  lowest  to 
highest,  cannot  be  described  and  defined 
save  by  a  zoo-psychologist  who  makes 
his  way  cautiously  through  the  tangle  of 
facts,  often  trusting  to  conjecture.  Hence 
we  cannot  do  any  more  here  than  to  note 
a  few  forms,  in  view  of  the  principal  aim 
of  this  work,  which  is  to  show  that  the 
ascending  progress  toward  higher  indi- 
viduality is  ever  toward  greater  complex- 
ity and  coordination. 

There  is  no  plainer  term  than  "indi- 
vidual," when  there  is  question  of  a  man, 
a  vertebrate  animal,  even  an  insect  :  but 
no  term  is  more  obscure  as  you  descend 
the  scale :  on  this  point  all  zoologists  are 
agreed.  *  According  to  its  etymology, 
that  is  individual  \individuuiri)  which  is 
not  divided.  The  individual,  in  this  sense, 
must  be  sought  far  down  in  the  scale. 
While  there  are  no  limits  to  the  dimen- 
sions of  inorganic  compounds  (crystals), 
"  every  protoplasmic  mass  having  a  max- 
imum diameter  of  a  few  tenths  of  a  milli- 
meter splits  up  spontaneously  into  two 
or  more  distinct  masses  equivalent  to  the 
mass  from  which  they  come,  and  which 
in  them  is  reproduced.  Hence,  proto- 
plasm does  not  exist  save  in  the  individ- 
ual  state,  having  a  .limited    magnitude, 

*  See  in  particular  Hackel.  General  Morphology, 
I.,  p.  241  (French  trans.)  ;  Gesrenbaur,  Comparative 
A  natomy,  p.  24  et  seq.  (French  trans.) ;  Espinas, 
Socie'te's  A  nil/tales,  2d  ed..  Appendix  II.;  Pouchet, 
Revue  Scientijique,  10  Feb.,  1883. 


and  hence  it  is  that  all  living  things  are 
necessarily  made  up  of  cells."  f  Life  never 
attains  any  considerable  augmentation 
except  through  the  indefinite  repetition  of 
this  fundamental  theme,  by  the  aggrega- 
tion of  an  infinite  number  of  these  minute 
elements,  true  types  of  individuality. 

The  living,  homogeneous  matter  which 
constitutes  these  elemental,  primordial 
individualities,  expands,  contracts,  draws 
itself  out  in  slender  filaments,  creeps  up 
to  substances  capable  of  affording  it  nour- 
ishment, involves  them  in  its  own  sub- 
stance, decomposes  them,  and  assimilates 
their  debris.  We  hear  of  "  rudiments  of 
consciousness  "  in  this  connection — of  a 
sort  of  will  reaching  its  determinations 
through  external  stimulations,  and  of 
vague  wants.  One  may  employ  the  term 
for  want  of  a  better,  but  let  him  not 
forget  that  it  has  for  us  no  precise  signif- 
ication. In  an  homogeneous  mass  pre- 
senting not  the  slightest  trace  of  differ- 
entiation, and  in  which  the  essential  vital 
properties  (nutrition,  generation)  are  in  a 
diffused,  indistinct  state,  the  sole  repre- 
sentative (and  it  is  a  lowly  one  indeed) 
of  psychic  activity  is  the  irritability  com- 
mon to  all  living  things,  and  which  will 
later,  in  the  course  of  evolution,  become 
general  sensibility,  special  sensibility,  and 
so  on.  May  we  call  it  a  consciousness  ? 
The  first  step  toward  a  higher  individ- 
uality consists  of  an  association  of  indi- 
viduals almost  completely  independent  of 
one  another.  "  The  forced  contiguity, 
the  continuity  of  tissues,  the  nearly  con- 
stant unity  of  the  digestive  apparatus,  es- 
tablish between  them  a  number  of  rela- 
tions, and  these  prevent  the  several  indi- 
viduals from  remaining  altogether  stran- 
gers to  what  is  taking  place  among  their 
next  neighbors  :  such  is  the  case  with 
sponges,  colonies  of  Hydra  polypes,  co- 
rolla polypes,  bryozoa,  and  some  colonies 
of  ascidia."  \  But  this  is,  properly  speak- 
ing, only  a  juxtaposition  of  a  number 
of  contiguous,  homogeneous  conscious- 
nesses, having  between  them  nothing  in 
common  save  the  limitation  of  their  ag- 
gregate in  space. 

The  rise  of  the  colony  individuality,  and 
of  the  colony  consciousness  marks  a  great 
step  toward  coordination.  The  colony, 
made  up  of  elemental  individuals,  has  a 
tendency  toward  transformation  into    an 


+  Perrier,  Les  Colonies  A  nimales  et  la  Formatinn 
drs  Organismes.  Paris,  1881,  p.  41.  According  to 
Cattaneo,  Le  Colonic  Lineari  e  la  Morfologia  del 
Molluschi,  the  division  is  carried  farther  still. 

\  Perrier,  Op.  cit.,  p.  774  ;  Espinas,  Societes  An- 
imates, section  2. 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


47 


individuality  of  a  higher  order,  in  which 
there  shall  be  division  of  labor.  In  colo- 
nies of  Hydractmia  we  find  seven  differ- 
ent kinds  of  individuals — the  nurses,  the 
sexed  individuals  (male,  female),  those 
which  capture  prey,  etc.  In  the  Siphon- 
ophora  and  allied  types,  the  faculty  of  lo- 
comotion is  perfectly  centralized  :  the  in- 
dividuals seem  independent  as  long  as  the 
animal  lets  the  common  axis  float  about, 
on  which  they  are  implanted  :  but  when 
any  danger  impends,  or  if  the  animal  is 
to  perform  any  complex  movement,  then 
the  axis  contracts,  carrying  with  it  all  the 
polypes.  The  Prysalia  knows  how  to 
quicken  or  to  slacken  its  movement,  can 
at  will  rise  above  the  surface,  or  descend 
below  it,  can  move  straight  ahead,  or  turn 
about,  all  its  organ-individuals  concurring 
to  perform  these  complicated  acts.  The 
wandering  life  of  these  creatures,  as  Per- 
rier  remarks,  favors  the  development  of 
individuality. 

"  From  it  necessarily  results  greater  inter- 
dependence of  the  individuals ;  closer  ties 
are  formed  between  them  ;  impressions  pro- 
duced upon  any  part  of  the  whole  must  nec- 
essarily be  transmitted  to  the  locomotive  air- 
bladders  ;  and  the  movements  of  these  must 
needs  be  coordinated,  else  all  is  disorder. 
Hence  arises  a  sort  of  '  colony  conscious- 
ness,' and  this  tends  to  pro  luce  a  new  unity, 
to  form  what  we  call  an  individual."  * 

In  other  colonies  the  common  con- 
sciousness has  its  rise  in  a  different  way. 
In  Botrylus,  a  genus  of  Tunicata,  there 
is  a  common  orifice,  which  is  the  cloaca 
around  which  all  the  individuals  are  ar- 
ranged. Each  of  these  sends  out  in  the 
direction  of  the  cloaca  a  tongue -shaped 
process  provided  with  nerves,  whereby 
communication  can  be  established  per- 
manently between  all  the  members  of  a 
group,  t 

"  But  it  by  no  means  follows  that  because  a 
colony  gains  the  notion  of  its  existence  as  a 
colony,  therefore  each  of  the  individuals  com- 
posing it  loses  its  particular  consciousness. 
On  the  contrary,  each  of  these  continues  to 
act  as  if  it  stood  alone.  In  some  star-fishes, 
each  severed  branch  keeps  moving  on,  or 
turns  aside,  as  the  occasion  may  require  :  in 
short,  appears  to  be  conscious.  Neverthe- 
less, the  consciousness  of  each  of  the  rays  is 
subordina:e  to  the  consciousness  of  the  star- 
fish, as  is  proved  by  the  harmony  between 
the  movements  of  the  several  parts  when  the 
creature  changes  position."  J 


*  Perner,  Op   cit.,  p.  232. 
+  Id.  ibid.,  p.  771. 
$  Ibid.,  pp.  772,  773. 


It  is  difficult  for  man,  in  whom  central- 
ization is  carried  to  so  high  a  degree,  to 
have  anything  like  a  clear  idea  of  a  mode 
of  psychic  existence  in  which  partial  indi- 
vidualities co-exist  with  a  collective  indi- 
viduality. We  might  find  some  analogon 
in  certain  morbid  states.  So  too  it  might 
be  said  that  the  human  individual  has 
consciousness  of  himself  both  as  a  person 
and  as  a  member  of  the  body  social. 
But  1  do  not  wish  to  make  comparisons 
that  might  be  contested.  But  looking  at 
the  question  objectively  and  from  with- 
out, we  see  that-  this  "  colony  conscious- 
ness," however  imperfectly  coordinated, 
however  intermittent  it  may  be  in  the  be- 
ginning, has  profound  significance  as  re- 
gards evolution.  It  is  the  germ  of  the 
higher  individualities,  of  personality.  It 
will,  little  by  little,  rise  to  the  highest 
grade,  turning  to  its  own  advantage  all 
these  special  individualities.  In  the  po- 
litical order  we  see  a  like  evolution  in 
thoroughly  centralized  governments. 
There  the  central  power,  at  first  very 
weak  and  hardly  recognized,  oftentimes 
inferior  to  that  of  the  constituent  parts, 
or  provinces,  gains  strength  at  their  ex- 
pense, and  by  degrees  absorbs  them. 

The  development  of  the  nervous  svs- 
tem,  which  is  the  coordinating  agency 
par  excelleiice,  is  the  visible  sign  of  an 
advance  toward  a  more  complex  and  a 
more  harmonious  individuality.  But  this 
centralization  is  not  brought  about  in  a 
moment.  In  the  Annelida  the  brain-like 
ganglia  which  send  out  nerves  to  the  or- 
gans of  sense  seem  to  perform  the  same 
functions  as  the  brain  in  vertebrates  .  but 
these  ganglia  are  by  no  means  fully  or- 
ganized. The  psychological  independ- 
ence of  the  several  rings  is  very  evident. 
"  Consciousness,  while  pretty  distinct  in 
the  brain,  seems  to  grow  fainter  in  pro- 
portion as  the  number  of  rings  is  greater. 
Some  species  of  Eunice,  which  often  at- 
tain a  length  of  five  or  six  feet,  bite  the 
posterior  part  of  their  own  bodies  with- 
out appearing  to  notice  it.  To  this  dim- 
inution of  consciousness  no  doubt  we 
must  attribute  the  fact  that  Annelids 
kept  in  captivity,  under  unfavorable  con- 
ditions, readily  prey  upon  themselves." 
In  linear  colonies,  the  individual  that 
holds  the  front  position,  since  it  has  to 
give  the  initiative,  to  advance  or  to  re- 
treat, to  modify  the  gait  of  the  colony 
which  it  draws  after  itself,  becomes  a 
head ;  but  the  term  head  is  here  em- 
ployed by  zoologists  analogically  only, 
and  we  must  not  suppose  it  to  have  the 
same  meaning  as  when  we  speak  of  the 


48 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


head  of  an  insect  or  of  any  articulate  an- 
imal. The  individuality  it  represents  is 
so  indefinite  that  in  certain  annulates, 
made  up  of  forty  rings  or  more,  we  may 
see  the  head  of  a  sexed  individual  ap- 
pearing at  the  level  of  the  third  ring,  ac- 
quiring tentacles  and  antennas,  then  sepa- 
rating itself  from  the  original  individual, 
and  setting  up  for  itself.* 

For  details  the  reader  is  referred  to 
special  treatises.  As  regards  the  higher 
animals,  there  is  no  need  to  dwellupon 
the  subject :  in  them  individuality,  in  the 
received  meaning  of  the  term,  is  estab- 
lished, being  represented  by  the  brain, 
which  becomes  more  and  more  predom- 
inant. This  excursus  over  the  domain 
of  zoology  will  not  have  been  in  vain  if  it 
shall  have  taught  us  that  this  coordina- 
tion, of  which  we  have  had  so  much  to 
say,  is  not  a  mere  subjective  view,  but  on 
the  contrary  an  objective  fact,  visible  and 
tangible ;  and  that,  in  the  words  of  Es- 
pinas,  the  psychic  individuality  and  the 
physiological  individuality  are  parallel — 
that  consciousness  becomes  unified  or 
diffused  with  the  organism.  Neverthe- 
less the  term  "  consciousness,"  or  "psy- 
chic individuality  "  is  highly  ambiguous. 
If  the  psychic  individuality  is,  as  we 
maintain,  simply  the  subjective  expression 
of  the  organism,  then  the  farther  we  go 
from  the  human  type,  the  greater  is  the 
obscurity  that  surrounds  us.  Conscious- 
ness is  a  function  that  may  be  compared 
to  generation,  inasmuch  as  they  both  ex- 
press the  whole  individual.  Grant  that 
the  most  elementary  organisms  possess  a 
consciousness,  and  that  like  all  their  vital 
properties,  and  generation,  in  particular, 
it  is  diffused  throughout  their  physical 
structure:  now  as  regards  g*.eration, 
we  see  that  this  function,  as  the  animal 
grade  rises,  becomes  localized,  and  ap- 
propriates a  part  of  the  organism,  and 
that  this  part,  after  countless  modifica- 
tions, becomes,  with  respect  to  that  func- 
tion and  that  alone,  the  representative  of 
the  whole  organism.  The  psychic  func- 
tion takes  a  like  course.  In  its  highest 
grade  it  is  strictly  localized,  and  has  ap- 
propriated to  itself  a  part  of  the  organ- 
ism which  becomes,  for  that  function  and 
f  ir  it  only,  the  representative  of  the 
whole  organism.  In  virtue  of  a  long  se- 
ries of  successive  transfers  of  function, 
the  brain  of  the  higher  animals  now  con 
centrates  in  itself  most  of  the  psychic  ac- 
tivity of  the  colony  .  it  has  been  entrusted, 
so  to  speak,  with  one  function  after  an- 


other, till  at  last  its  associates  have  made 
complete  abdication  in  its  favor.f  But 
take  at  random  any  species  of  animal, 
and  who  shall  say  to  just  what  degree 
this  delegation  of  psychic  functions  has 
in  it  proceeded.  Physiologists  have  made 
many  experiments  upon  the  spinal  cord 
in  frogs  is  its  psychic  value  relatively 
the  same  in  man  ?  We  may  well  doubt 
it. 


Return  we  to  man,  and  let  us  consider 
first  his  purely  physical  personality.  We 
will  for  the  nonce  eliminate  all  states  of 
consciousness,  and  will  consider  only  the 
material  groundwork  of  personality. 

i.  There  is  no  need  to  show  at  length 
the  very  close  relations  subsisting  be- 
tween all  the  organs  of  the  so-called  veg- 
etative life — the  heart,  Vessels,  lungs,  in- 
testinal canal,  liver,  kidneys,  etc. — how- 
ever foreign  they  may  appear  to  be  one 
to  another,  and  however  much  engrossed 
with  their  several  tasks.  The  multitudi- 
nous agents  in  this  coordination  are  cen- 
tripetal and  centrifugal  nerves  of  the 
great  sympathetic  and  of  the  cerebrospi- 
nal system  (the  difference  between  these 
two  tends  to  disappear)  together  with 
their  ganglia.  Is  their  activity  restricted 
to  the  simple  molecular  disturbance 
which  constitutes  the  nervous  influx,  or 
has  it  also  a  psychic,  conscious  effect  ? 
No  doubt  it  has  such  an  effect,  in  morbid 
cases:  it  is  then  felt.  In  the  normal 
state  it  simply  calls  forth  that  vague  con- 
sciousness of  life  of  which  we  have  so 
often  spoken.  But  vague  or  not,  that  is 
of  no  importance.  May  we  maintain  that 
these  nerve  actions,  which  represent  the 
totality  of  life,  are  the  fundamental  facts 
of  personality,  and  that,  as  such,  their 
value  is,  so  to  speak,  in  inverse  ratio  to 
their  psychological  intensity  ?  They  do 
far  more  than  just  to  call  forth  a  few 
transitory,  superficial  states  of  conscious- 
ness ;  they  shape  the  nerve  centers,  give 
them  tone,  give  them  a  habit.  Consider 
for  a  moment  the  enormous  power  of 
these  actions  (feeble  though  they  appear) 
going  on  unceasingly,  untiringly,  repeat- 
ing forever  the  self-same  theme  with  few 
variations.  Why  should  they  not  result 
in  forming  organic  states,  that  is  (as  im- 
plied in  the  definition  of  "  organic  ")  sta- 
ble and  continuous  states  which  shall 
represent,  anatomically  and  physiologi- 
cally, the  inward  life  ?  Of  course  all  this 
does  not  depend  on  the  viscera  alone,  for 


*Perricr,  Op.  cit.,  pp.  448,  491,  501. 


t  Espinas,  Les  Societes  Animates,  p.  520. 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


49 


the  nerve  centers  too  have  their  own 
proper  constitution,  in  virtue  of  which 
they  react.  They  are  not  merely  recep- 
tive but  incitative  also,  and  they  are  not 
to  be  separated  from  the  organs  they 
represent,  and  with  which  they  form  one 
whole  :  between  both  there  is  reciprocity 
of  action. 

Where  do  all  these  nerve  actions  come 
together  and  meet  ?  where  do  we  find 
the  resume  of  the  organic  life  ?  We 
know  not.  Ferrier  thinks  that  the  occipi- 
tal lobes  have  a  special  relation  to  the 
sensibility  of  the  viscera,  constituting  the 
anatomical  substratum  of  their  sensa- 
tions. Taking  this  view  simply  as  a 
working  hypothesis,  it  follows  that  by 
successive  stages,  by  one  transfer  after 
another,  the  visceral  life  has  at  last  found 
here  its  ultimate  representation  ;  that  it 
is  writ  here  in  a  language  unknown  to 
us  indeed  but  which  expresses  the  in- 
ward individuality  and  that  only,  to  the 
exclusion  of  all  other  individuality.  But 
in  truth  whether  this  anatomic  represen- 
tation exists  in  the  occipital  'lobes  or 
elsewhere,  and  whether  it  be  localized  or 
diffused,  does  not  affect  our  conclusion, 
provided  only  it  exists.  I  have  the  less 
hesitation  in  dwelling  on  this  subject, 
because  this  coordination  of  the  multi- 
tudinous nervous  actions  of  organic  life 
is  the  groundwork  of  the  physical  and 
psychical  personality,  since  all  the  other 
coordinations  are  based  upon  this ;  be- 
cause this  coordination  is  the  inner  man, 
the  material  form  of  his  subjectivity,  the 
ultimate  reason  of  his  feeling  and  action, 
the  source  of  his  instincts,  sentiments 
and  passions,  and  in  the  language  of  the 
mediaeval  schoolmen,  his  principle  of  in- 
dividuation. 

To  pass  now  from  the  inward  to  the 
outward,  the  periphery  of  the  body  forms 
a  surface  over  which  the  nerve  terminals 
are  unequally  distributed.  Whether  few 
or  many,  the  nerve  filaments  receive  and 
transmit  from  the  different  parts  of  the 
body  impressions  (that  is  to  say,  molecu- 
lar disturbances)  ;  are  centralized  in  the 
spinal  cord,  and  thence  pass  to  the  me- 
dulla oblongata  and  the  pons  Varolii. 
There  a  new  contingent  is  added — that 
from  the  cranial  nerves:  and  now  the 
transmission  of  sensorial  impressions  is 
complete.  We  must  not  overlook  the 
centrifugal  nerves,  which  act  in  a  simi- 
lar way,  but  in  the  direction  of  an  in- 
creasing decentralization.  In  short,  the 
spinal  cord,  which  is  a  string  of  super- 
posed ganglia,  and  more  particularly  the 
medulla  oblongata  with  its  special  centers 


(of  respiration,  phonation,  deglutition, 
etc.),  while  they  are  all  organs  of  trans- 
mission, represent  the  reduction  to  unity 
of  a  vast  multitude  of  nervous  actions 
diffused  throughout  the  organism. 

At  the  point  we  have  reached  the 
question  becomes  full  of  obscurity.  The 
mesencephalon  seems  to  possess  a  more 
complex  function  than  the  medulla  ob- 
longata, and  that  a  more  complex  func- 
tion than  the  spinal  cord.  The  corpora 
striata  would  seem  to  be  the  center  in 
which  are  organized  the  habitual  or  au- 
tomatic 'actions,  and  the  optic  thalami 
to  be  the  point  where  the  sense  impres- 
sions are  reflexed  in  movements. 

However  this  may  be,  we  know  that  the 
fasciculated  portion  of  the  crus  cerebri, 
a  bundle  of  white  brain  substance  con- 
tinuous with  the  peduncle,  traverses  the 
opto-striate  bodies,  penetrating  into  the 
strait  between  the  optic  thalami  and  the 
lenticular  nucleus,  and  that  it  branches 
out  in  the  hemisphere,  forming  the  cor- 
ona radiata  of  Reil.  It  is  a  pathway  over 
which  pass  all  the  sensorial  and  motor 
fibers  running  to  or  from  the  opposite 
side  of  the  body.  The  anterior  portion 
contains  only  motor  fibers.  The  pos- 
terior portion  contains  all  the  sensorial 
fibers,  a  certain  number  of  motor  fibers, 
and  all  the  fibers  coming  from  the  sense 
organs.  The  bundle  of  sensorial  fibers 
having  received  its  full  complement, 
divides  into  two  :  one  portion  ascends  to 
the  fronto-parietal  convolution  ;  the  other 
is  turned  back  to  the  occipital  lobe,  and 
the  bundle  of  motor  fibers  is  distributed 
through  the  gray  cortex  of  the  motor 
zones. 

These  details,  tiresome  as  they  will  be 
to  the  reader  despite  their  brevity,  show 
the  close  interdependence  of  the  different 
parts  of  the  body  and  the  cerebral  hem- 
ispheres. Here  the  study  of  the  localiza- 
tion of  functions,  though  not  yet  carried 
very  far,  has  settled  a  few  points,  as  that 
there  is  a  motor  zone  (formed  of  the  as- 
cending frontal  and  ascending  parietal 
convolutions,  the  paracentral  lobe,  and 
the  base  of  the  frontal  convolutions)  in 
which  are  represented  the  movements  of 
the  different  parts  of  the  body ;  and  that 
there  is  a  sensitive  zone  far  less  clearly 
defined  (embracing  the  occipital  lobes 
and  the  temporo-parietal  region).  As 
for  the  frontal  lobes,  we  have  no  definite 
knowledge  with  regard  to  them,  but  we 
may  in  passing  notice  the  hypothesis  re- 
cently offered  by  Dr.  Hughlings  Jackson 
that  they  represent,  with  respect  to  the 
other  centers,  combinations  and  coordi-. 


50 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


nations  of  a  more   complex   kind,  being- 
thus  a  representation  of  representations.  * 

We  cannot  notice  past  and  present  dis- 
cussions upon  the  physiological  and  psy- 
chological role  of  these  centers :  to  do  so 
would  require  a  volume.  But  we  may 
say  that  the  cortical  substance  represents 
all  the  forms  of  nerve  activity — visceral 
muscular,  tactile,  visual,  auditory,  olfac- 
tory, gustatory,  motor,  signincatory. 
This  representation  is  not  direct.  An 
impression  does  not  go  from  the  pe- 
riphery of  the  brain  as  a  telegram  goes 
from  one  office  to  another  near  by.  In 
one  case,  where  the  spinal  cord  was  re- 
duced to  the  size  of  a  goosequill  and  the 
gray  substance  was  extremely  small,  the 
subject    possessed  sensation. 

But  though  indirect  or  even  doubly 
indirect,  this  representation  is,  or  may  be, 
a  total  representation.  Between  the 
equivalents  of  these  nervous  actions  dis- 
tributed throughout  the  body  there  exist 
innumerable  connections — commissures 
between  the  two  hemispheres  and  between 
the  several  centers  of  each  hemisphere — 
some  of  them  innate,  the  others  estab- 
lished by  experience,  having  all  possible 
degrees,  from  highly  stable  to  highly 
instable.  The  physical  personality,  or  in 
more  precise  language,  its  ultimate  rep- 
resentation, thus  appears  to  us  not  as 
a  ^central  point  whence  all  radiates  and 
where  all  converges — Descartes's  pineal 
gland — but  as  a  wonderfully  complex 
net-work  where  histology,  anatomy  and 
physiology   are    baffled     every  moment. 

From  this  very  imperfect  sketch  the 
reader  may  see  that  the  terms  consen- 
sus, coordination,  are  not  mere  flatus 
voczs,  abstractions,  but  that  they  truly 
express  facts. 


Let  us  reinstate  now  the  psychic  ele- 
ment hitherto  eliminated,  and  note  the  re- 
sult. It  must  be  remembered  that  ac- 
cording to  our  view  consciousness  is  not 
an  entity,  but  a  sum  of  states  each  of 
which  is  a  specific  phenomenon  depend- 
ent on  certain  conditions  of  the  brain's 
activity  ;  that  it  is  present  when  these  are, 
is  lacking  when  they  are  absent,  disap- 
pears when  they  disappear.  It  follows 
-  that  the  sum  of  a  man's  states  of  con- 
sciousness is  far  inferior  to  the  sum  of  his 
.nerve-actions  (that  is,  his  reflex  actions 
,  of  .every  kind,  from  the  simplest  to  the 
most  composite).     A  period  of  five  min- 

.  *  Lectures  on  the  Evolution  and  Dissolut  ion  of  the 
Nfrpp.tfS  -System,   1884. 


utes  may  embrace  a  multitude  of  sensa- 
tions, feelings,  images,  ideas,  acts,  and  it 
is  possible  to  determine    the  number  of 
these   with   some    degree    of    exactness. 
During  the  same  lapse  of  time  there  will 
be  a  much  larger  number  of  nerve-ac-  . 
tions.      Hence  the  conscious  personality 
cannot  represent  all  that  is  going  on  in 
the  nerve  centers  :  it  is  only  an  abstract, 
an  epitome  of  them.     This  follows  nec- 
essarily from  the  nature   of   our  mental 
constitution  :  our  states  of  consciousness 
range  themselves  in  time,  not  in  space, 
2nd  according  to  one  dimension,  not  all 
dimensions.     By  a  fusion  and  an  integra- 
tion of  simple  states  are  formed  highly 
complex  states,  and  these  enter  into  the 
series  as  if  they  were  simple  :  they  may 
in  some  measure  co-exist  for  a  little  time  ; 
but  after  all  the  compass  (or  extension) 
of  consciousness  [Umfang  des  Bewusst- 
seinsj,  and  particularly  the  compass    of 
clear  consciousness,  is  always  very  lim- 
ited.    Hence  we  cannot  regard  the  con- 
scious personality,  in  its  relation  to  the 
objective,  cerebral  personality,  as  a  trac- 
ing which  corresponds  exactly  with  the 
drawing    from   which    it    is    copied :  it 
rather  resembles  a  topographical  sketch 
as  related  to  the   face  of  the  country  it 
represents. 

Why  do  some  nerve-actions  (and 
which  ones?)  become  conscious?  To 
answer  this  question  would  be  to  solve 
the  problem  of  the  conditions  of  con- 
sciousness :  but  these,  as  we  have  said,  are 
in  great  part  unknown.  There  has  also 
been  much  discussion  as  to  the  part 
played  in  the  genesis  of  consciousness  oy 
the  five  layers  of  the  cortical  cells,  but  on 
this  point  we  have  nothing  save  pure 
hypotheses.  These  we  need  not  con- 
sider here,  for  it  cannot  be  of  any  advan- 
tage to  psychology  to  rest  its  conclusions 
upon  an  insecure  physiological  founda- 
tion. We  know  that  states  of  conscious- 
ness, always  unstable,  evoke  and  sup- 
plant one  another.  This  is  the  result  of 
a  transmission  of  force,  and  of  a  con- 
flict among  forces ;  and,  for  us,  it  is  not 
a  conflict  between  states  of  consciousness, 
as  commonly  supposed,  but  between  the 
nervous  elements  which  underlie  and 
produce  them.  These  associations  and 
these  antagonisms,  which  have  been  the 
object  of  deep  study  in  our  day,  do  not 
however  belong  to  the  present  inquiry : 
we  must  go  further  back  and  consider  the 
conditions  of  their  organic  unity.  For 
states  of  consciousness  are  no  ignes 
fatui,  now  flaring,  anon  extinguished  : 
there  is   something   which  unites    them. 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


51 


and  which  is  the  subjective  expression  of 
their  objective  coordination  :  in  this  we 
find  the  ultimate  ground  of  their  continu- 
ity. Though  we  have  already  studied 
this  point,  it  is  so  important  that  I  have 
no  hesitation  about  returning  to  it  and 
viewing  it  under  another  aspect. 

Be  it  remarked  that  we  are  not  speak- 
ing just  now  of  self-conscious  personality, 
but  of  that  spontaneous,  natural  sense  of 
our  own  being  which  exists  in  every  nor- 
mal individual.  Every  one  of  my  states 
of  consciousness  possesses  the  twofold 
character  of  being  such  or  such  a  state, 
and  of  being  7iiine  ;  pain  is  not  simply 
pain,  but  my  pain ;  seeing  a  tree  is  not 
simply  seeing  it  but  my  seeing  it.  Each 
one  has  a  mark  whereby  it  is  known  to 
me  as  mine  only,  and  without  which  it 
seems  foreign  to  me,  as  in  some  morbid 
cases  already  referred  to.  This  mark 
common  to  all  my  states  of  consciousness 
is  a  sign  of  their  common  origin,  and 
whence  can  it  come  if  not  from  the  organ- 
ism ?  Suppose  we  were  able  to  obliterate 
in  a  man  the  five  special  senses  and  with 
them  their  entire  psychological  product, 
such  as  perceptions,  images,  ideas,  asso- 
ciations of  ideas  with  one  another  and  of 
emotions  with  ideas.  In  that  case  there 
would  still  remain  the  inward,  organic  life 
with  its  proper  sensibility  to  the  state  and 
functionment  of  each  organ,  to  the  gen- 
eral or  local  variations  of  the  organs,  and 
to  the  elevation  or  the  depression  of  the 
vital  tone.  The  state  of  a  man  who  is 
sound  asleep  pretty  fully  realizes  these 
conditions.  If  now  we  try  the  opposite 
hypothesis,  we  find  it  absurd,  contradic- 
tory. We  cannot  imagine  to  ourselves 
the  special  senses,  together  with  the  psy- 
chic life  which  they  sustain,  isolated  from 
the  general  sensibility  and  suspended  in 
vacuo.  None  of  our  sense-apparatus  is 
an  abstraction  :  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
a  visual  or  an  auditive  apparatus  in  gen- 
eral, as  they  are  described  in  physiologi- 
cal treatises,  but  only  a  concrete,  invidid- 
ual  apparatus,  and  never,  save  perhaps 
sometimes  in  twins,  are  these  apparatus 
alike  in  two  individuals.  Nor  is  this  all, 
for  not  only  is  the  sense  apparatus  of 
'  each  individual  peculiarly  constituted — a 
peculiarity  directly  and  necessarily  com- 
municated to  all  its  products — but  it  is  at 
all  times  and  in  every  respect  dependent 
on  the  organic  life — on  the  circulation, 
digestion,  respiration,  secretion  and  so 
forth.  These  several  expressions  of  the 
individuality  attach  to  every  perception, 
emotion,    idea,   and   become    one    with 


them,  like  the  harmonics  with-  the  fun- 
damental tone  in  music.  The  personal 
and  possessive  character  of  our  states  of 
consciousness  therefore  is  not,  as  some 
authors  have  held,  the  result  of  a  more  or 
less  explicit  judgment  affirming  them  to 
be  mine  at  the  instant  they  arise.  The 
personal  character  is  not  superadded, 
but  inherent :  it  is  an  integral  part  of 
the  fact,  and  results  from  its  physiologi- 
gal  conditions.  We  do  not  find  out  the 
origin  of  a  state  of  consciousness  by  ob- 
serving itself  alone,  for  it  cannot  be  at 
once  effect  and  cause,  subjective  state 
and  nerve-action. 

The  pathological  facts  confirm  this 
conclusion.  As  we  have  seen,  the  con- 
sciousness of  selfhood  rises  or  falls  ac- 
cording to  the  state  of  the  organism,  and 
hence  some  patients  declare  that  their 
"  sensations  are  changed  " — the  explana- 
tion being  that  in  their  case  the  fundamen- 
tal tone  has  no  longer  the  same  harmon- 
ics. 'So  too  we  have  seen  states  of  con- 
sciousness lose  by  degrees  their  personal 
character,  becoming  for  the  individual  ob- 
jective and  extraneous.  Can  such  facts 
be  accounted    for  on  any  other  theory? 

John    Stuart    Mill,    in   an    oft-quoted 
passage,  asks  what  is  the  bond,  what  the 
"  organic    union "   between   one  state  of 
consciousness  and  another — the  common 
and  lasting  element ;  and  his  conclusion 
is  that  we  can  affirm  nothing  definitively 
of    mind    but    states   of    consciousness.; 
That  is  doubtless   so  if  we  confine  our-  i 
selves  to    pure    ideology.     But   a   group': 
of   effects    is  not  a  cause,  and    however  I 
minutely  we   study   these,  unless  we  go' 
deeper  our  labor  is   incomplete — that  is, ! 
unless  we  descend  into  that  obscure  region 
where,  as  Taine  says,  "innumerable  cur- 
rents   are   ever   circulating  quite  beyond 
our  consciousness."     The  organic  nexus 
desiderated  by  Mill  exists   by   definition, 
so  to  speak,  in  the  organism. 

The  organism  and  the  brain,  its 
supreme  representation,  is  the  real  per- 
sonality, containing  in  itself  the  remi- 
niscence of  what  we  have  been  and  the 
possibilities  of  what  we  shall  be.  On  it  is 
inscribed  the  entire  individual  character 
with  all  its  aptitudes,  active  or  passive,  its 
sympathies  and  antipathies,  its  genius 
and  talent  or  its  stupidity,  its  virtues  and 
its  vices,  its  sloth  or  its  activity.  What 
comes  forth  in  the  consciousness  is  little 
compared  with  what  lies  hid  though  still 
active.  The  conscious  personality  is  only 
a  small  part  of  the  physical  personality. 

Hence  the  unity  of  the  Me  is  not,  as 


52 


THE   DISEASES   OF   PERSONALITY. 


taught  by  the  spiritualists,*  the  unity  of  one 
entity  manifested  in  multiple  phenomena, 
but  the  coordination  of  a  number  of 
states  that  are  continually  arising,  and  its 
one  basis  is  the  vague  sense  of  our  own 
bodies — ccenaesthesis.  This  unity  does 
not  proceed  from  above  downward,  but 
from  beneath  upward  :  it  is  not  an  initial 
but  a  terminal  point. 

Does  such  perfect  unity  exist  ?  In  the 
strict  sense,  clearly  not.  In  the  relative 
|  sense  it  is  seen,  but  rarely  and  momen- 
tarily. In  the  skilled  marksman  as  he 
takes  aim,  or  in  the  surgeon  as  he  is  per- 
forming an  operation,  there  is  a  converg- 
ence of  all  the  faculties  mental  and  physi- 
cal. But  observe  the  result :  in  such  cir- 
cumstances the  sense  of  the  real  person- 
ality disappears,  and  thus  we  see  that 
perfect  unity  of  consciousness  and  the 
sense  of  the  personality  are  mutually  ex- 
clusive. And  we  may  reach  the  same 
conclusion  by  another  route.  The  Me  is 
a  coordination.  It  oscillates  between 
two  extreme  points — perfect  unity  and 
absolute  incoordination — else  it  ceases 
to  be ;  and  we  find  all  the  intermediate 
degrees  exemplified  without  any  line  of 


*  Opposed  to  Materialists. 


demarkation  between  normal  and  abnor- 
mal, health  and  disease,  the  one  trench- 
ing upon  the  other.+ 

The  unity  of  the  Me  then,  in  the  psy- 
chological sense,  is  the  cohesion,  for  a 
given  time,  of  a  certain  number  of  clear 
states  of  consciousness,  accompanied  by 
others  less  clear  and  by  a  multitude  of 
physiological  states,  which,  though  unac- 
companied by  consciousness,  are  not  less 
effective  than  the  conscious  states,  and 
even  more  effective.  Unity  means  co- 
ordination. The  gist  of  the  whole  matter 
is  that  the  co7isensus  of  the  consciousness, 
being  subordinate  to  the  consensus  of 
the  organism,  the  problem  of  the  unity  of 
the  Me  is,  in  the  last  resort,  a  biological 
problem,  and  it  is  for  biology  to  explain, 
if  it  can,  the  genesis  of  organisms  and 
the  solidarity  of  their  parts  :  the  psycho- 
logical explanation  can  come  only  then. 
This  we  endeavored  to  show  in  detail  by 
analyzing  and  discussing  morbid  cases. 
Here  then  our  task  ends. 


t  Even  in  the  normal  state  the  coordination  is 
often  so  lax  that  several  series  co-exist  separately. 
One  may  walk  about,  or  perform  manual  work  with 
a  vague,  intermittent  consciousness  of  his  move- 
ments, at  the  same  time  singing  and  musing  ;  but 
as  he  begins  to  think  more  intently,  he  stops  sing- 
ing. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGB 

Chap.  I.  Introduction i 

Chap.  II.  Organic  Disturbance 7 

Chap.  III.  Affective  Disturbance 18 

Chap.  IV.  Intellective  Disturbance 30 

Chap.  V.  Dissolution  of  Personality 42 

Chap.  VI.  Conclusion , 46 


CATALOGUE  OF  TH 


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No.    1.     Light     Science     for     Leisure 
Hours  S  A  series  of  Familiar  Essays  on  Scien- 
tific Subjects.    By  Richard  A.  Proctor,  F.R.A.S. 
Contents  (in  part")  :  —The  Earth  a   Magnet  ;  the 
Secret  of   the  North   Pole  ;  Our  Chief  Timepiece 
Losing  Time  ;  Tornadoes  ;  Influence  of  Marriage 
on  the  Death  Rate  ;  Squaring  the  Circle  ;  the  Use- 
fulness of    Earthquakes  ;   the  Forcing  Power   of 
Rain,  etc.,  etc. 

No.  2.  The  Forms  of  Water  in  Clouds  and 
Rivers,  Ice  and  Glaciers.  By  John  Tyndall, 
LL.D.,  F.R.S.  (illustrated;. 

Contents  (in  part)  : — Oceanic  Distillation  ;  Archi- 
tecture of  Snow  ;.The  Motion  of  Glaciers  ;  Icicles  ; 
Erratic   Blocks  ;  Tropical   Rains  ;   Atomic   Poles  ; 
Birth  of  a  Crevasse  ;  Moraine  Ridges,  etc.,  etc.,  etc. 
No.  3.  Physics  and  Politics:— An  Appli- 
cation of  the  Principles  of  Natural  Selection  and 
Heredity  to  Political  Society.     By  Walter  Bage- 
hot,   Author  of   "The    English   Constitution," 
etc. 

Contents  . — The  Preliminary  Age ;  the  Use  of 
Conflict ;  Nation  Making  ;  the  Age  of  Discussion  ; 
Verifiable  Progress  Politically  Considered. 

No,  4.  Evidence  as  to  Man's  Place  in 

Nature.     By  Thomas   Huxley,  F.R.S.  (illus- 
trated). 

Contents:— The  Natural  History  of  the  Manlike 
Apes ;  The   Relations  of  Man  to  the   Lower  Ani- 
mals; Fossil  Remains  of  Man. 
No.  5.  Education  s  Intellectual,  Mou*all 

and  Physical.     By  Herbert  Spencer. 

Contents  :—  What  Knowledge  is  of  Most  Worth  ? 
Intellectual  Education  ;  Moral  Education  ;  Physi- 
cal Education. 
No.    6.     Town    Geology.      By    the    Rev. 

Charles  Kingsley,  F.R.S.,  Canon  of  Chester. 

Contents : — The   Soil  of  the  Field  ;  the  Pebbles 
in  the  Street;  the  Stones  in  the  Wall  ;  the  Coal  in 
the  Fire  ;  the  Lime  in  the  Mortar  ;  the  Slates  on 
the  Roof. 
No.  7.    The  Conservation  of  Energy. 

By  Balfour  Stewart,  F.R.S.  (illustrated). 

Contents  : — What  is  Energy  ?  Mechanical  En- 
ergy and  its  Change  into  Heat ;  The  Forces  and 
Energies  of  Nature  ;  Transmutations  of  Energy  ; 
the  Dissipation  of  Energy  ;  the  Position  of  Life  ; 
Correlation  of  Nervous  and  Mental  Forces. 
No.  8.  ffhe  Study  of  Languages  brought 

back  to  its  true  Principles.     By  C.  Marcel. 

Contents: — Subdivision    and    Order  of    Study; 
the  Art  of  Reading;  the  Art  of  Hearing  ;  the  Art 
of  Speaking  ;  the  Art  of  Writing  ;  Mental  Culture  ; 
Routine. 
No.  9.  The  Data  of  Ethics.    By  Herbert 

Spencer. 

Contents  : — Conduct  in  General ;  Evolution  of 
Conduct ;  Good  and  Bad  Conduct ;  Ways  of  Judg- 


ing Conduct;  The  Physical  View  ;  The  Biological 
View  ;  the  Psychological  View  ;  the  Sociological 
View;  Criticisms  and  Explanations;  Relativity  of 
Pains  and  Pleasures  ;  Egoism  vs.  Altruism  ;  Al- 
truism vs.  Egoism;  Trial  and  Compromise;  Con- 
ciliation ;  Absolute  Ethics  and  Relative  Ethics; 
the  Scope  of  Ethics. 

No.  10.  The  Theory  of  Sound  in  its  Rela- 
tion to  Music.     By  Prof.  Pietro  Blaserna,  of 
the  Royal  University  of  Rome  (illustrated). 
Contents  (in  part)  ; — Periodic  Movements,  vibra- 
tion ;  Transmission   of  Sound  ;  Characteristics  of 
Sound,  and  difference  between  musical  sound  and 
noise ;   Discords  ;  Quality  or    timbre  of    musical 
sounds;  Italian  and  German  music,  etc.,  etc. 

Nos.  11  and  12.  The  Naturalist  on  th« 
1&iver  Ainazons  :— A  Record  of  Adventures. 
Habits  of  Animals,  Sketches  of  Brazilian  and 
Indian  Life,  and  Aspects  of  Nature  under  th& 
Equator,  during  eleven  j'ears  of  Travel.  By 
Henry  Walter  Bates,  F.R.S. 
***  One  of  the  most  charming  books  of  travel  ii? 
our  language. 

No.  13.  Mind  and  tto<&yz  The  Theories  of 
their  Relation.  By  Alexander  Bain,  LL.D., 
Professor  of  Logic  in  the  University  of  Aber-* 
deen. 

Contents: — The  Question  Stated;  Connection  of 
Mind  and  Body  ;  the  Connection  viewed  as  corre- 
spondence or  concomitant  variation  ;  General  Laws 
of  Alliance  of  Mind  and  Body:  the  Feelings  and 
will  ;  the  Intellect  ;  How  are  Mind  and  Body 
United  ?     History  of  the  Theories  of  the  Soul. 

No.  14.  The  Wonders  of  the  Heavems. 

By  Camille  Flammarion  (illustrated). 

Contents  (in  part) : — The  Heavens  ;  the  Milky 
Way ;  Double,  Multiple  and  Colored  Suns ;  the 
Planets  ;  the  Earth  ;  Plurality  of  Inhabited  Worlds ; 
Infinite  Space  ;  Constellations;  The  Sun  ;  Comets; 
the  Moon,  etc.,  etc. 

No.  15.  Longevity  :  the  Means  of  Prolong, 
ing  Life  after  the  Middle  Age.     By  John  Gard- 
ner, M.  D. 
Contents  (in  part) : — Is  the  Duration  of  Life  ia 

any   way  within  our  power  ?     Physiology  of  Ad. 

vanced  Age  ;  Heredity  ;  Established  Facts  regard, 

ing  Longevity,  etc.,  etc. 

No.  16.  On  the  ©rigin  of  Species;  or  the 

Causes  of  the  Phenomena  of  Organic  Nature:  A 
Course  of  Six  Lectures.  By  Thomas  H.  Hux- 
ley, F.R.S. 

Contents  :— Present  Condition  of  Organic  Nature , 
Past  Condition  of  Organic  Nature;  Origination  of 
Organic  Beings  ;  Perpetuation  of  Living  Beings  5 
Conditions  of  Existence  ;  A  Critical  Examination 
of  Mr.  Darwin's  Great  Work, 
No.  17.  Progress  :  its  Law  and  Cause; 
with  other  disquisitions.    By  Herbert  Spencer. 


Contents :— Progress  ;  the  Physiology  of  Laugh- 
ter- Origin  an:I  Functions  of  Music  ;  the  Develop- 
ment Hypothesis;  the  Social  Organism;  the  Use 
of  Anthropomorphism. 
So.    IS.    £,essoas    in    Electricity.     By 

John  Tvndall,  F.R.S.  (illustrated.). 

Contents  (in  part):— The  Art  of  Experiment; 
■Electric  Induction  ;  Lichtenberg's  Figures  ;  Elec- 
trics and  Kon-Eiectrics  ;  the  Leyden  Jar  ;  Physio- 
logical Effect  of  the  Electric  Discharge  ;  Atmos- 
pheric Electricity,  etc.,  etc. 
Wo.  19.  Familiar  Essays  on  Scientific 

Subjects,     by  Richard  A.  Pkoctgr,  F.R.A.S. 

Contents  :— Oxygen  in  the  Sun  ;  Sun-spot,  Storm 
and   Famine  ;  New  ways  of  Measuring  the  Sun's 
Distance  ;  Drifting  Light-waves  ;  The   new   Star 
which  faded  into  Star-mist  ;  Star-grouping. 
No.  20.  The  ISoasianee  of  Astronomy. 

By  R.  Kalley  Miller,  M.A. 

Contents :— The  Planets  ;  Astrology  ;  The  Moon  ; 
the  Sun  ;  the  Comets  ;  Laplace's  Nebular  Hypoth- 
esis ;  the  Stars  ;  the  Nebulae  ;  Appendix. 
No,  21.  On  the  Physical  SSasis  of  Life. 

With     other    Essays.       By    Thomas    H.    Hux- 
ley, F.R.S. 

Contents :— Physical    Basis    of    Life ;  Scientific 
Aspects  of  Positivism  ;  A  Piece  of  Chalk  ;  Geolog- 
ical Contemporaneity  ;  A   Liberal  Education  and 
where  to  find  it. 
No.  22.  Seeing  and  SMnMng.    By  Prof. 

William  Kingdon  Clifford,  F.R.S.  (.illustrated). 

Contents :— The  Eye  and  the  Brain  ;  the  Eye  and 
Seeing  ;  the  Brain  and  Thinking ;  On  Boundaries 
in  General. 
No.  23.  Scientific  Sophisms  s— A  Review 

of   Current    Theories  concerning   Atoms,   Apes 

and  Men.     By  Samuel  Wainright,  D.D. 

Contents  .-—The  Right  of  Search  ;  Evolution  :  A 
Puerile  Hypothesis  ;  Scientific  Levity  ;  a  House  of 
Cards  ;  Sophisms  ;  Protoplasm  ;  the  Three  Begin- 
nings; the  Three  Barriers;  Atoms;  Apes;  Men; 
Anima  Mundi. 

No.  24.  Popular  Scientific  Lectures. 
.iBy  Prof.  H.  Helmkoltz  (illustrated). 
Contents  :— The  Relation  of  Optics  to  Painting. 
i.  Form.  2.  Shade.  3.  Color.  4.  Harmony  of 
Color  ;  the  Origin  of  the  Planetary  System  ; 
Thought  in  Medicine  ;  Academic  Freedom  in  Ger- 
man Universities. 

No.  25.  The  ©rigin  of  Nations  J— Com- 
prising   two    divisions,   viz.: — "Early   Civiliza- 
tions,     and   "  Ethnic    Affinities."     By   George 
Rawlinson,  M.A.,  Camden  Professor  of  Ancient 
History  in  Oxford  University,  England. 
Contents  : — Early   Civilizations  : — Introduction  ; 
Antiquity  of  Civilization  in  England  ;  Antiquity  of 
Civilization  at  Babylon  :  Phoenician  Civilization  ; 
Civilizations  of  Phrygia;  Lydia,  the  Troas,  Assyria, 
Media,  India,  etc.;  Civilization  of 'the  British  Celts  ; 
Civilization  of  the  Etruscans  ;  Results  of„the  In- 
quiry.    Ethnic  Affinities  :— Chief  Japhetic  Races  ; 
Subdivisions  of  the  Japhetic  Races  ;  Chief  Hametic 
Races:  Subdivisions  of  Cush  ;  Subdivisions  of  Miz- 
raim  and   Canaan  :  the  Semitic  Races  ;  Subdivis- 
ions of  the  Semitic  Races. 

No,  26.  The  Evolutionist  at  Large.    By 

Grant  Allen. 

Contents  (in  part)  : — Microscopic  Brains  ;  Slugs 
and     Snails  ;  Butterfly    Psychology  ;  In    Summer 
Fields;  Speckled  Trout ;  Origin  of  Walnuts  ;  Dogs 
and  Masters,  etc.,  etc. 
No.  27.  The  History  of  Landholding 

in  England.    By  Joseph  Fisher,  F.R.H.S. 

Contents  (in  part) : — The  Aborigines  ;  the  Scan- 
dinavians; the  Plan tagenets  ;  the  Stuarts  ;  the  Ro- 
mans ;  the  Normans  ;  the  Tudors  ;  the  House  of 
Brunswick;  Land  and  Labor,  etc.,  etc. 

No.  28,  Fashion  in  ©eforinity,  as  Illus- 
trated in  the  Customs  of  Barbarous  and  Civil- 
ized Races.     By  William  Henry  Flower,  F.R.S. 
(illustrated").    To  which   is  added; — Manners 
and  Fashion..    By  Herbert  Spencer. 
Contents  (in  part)  : — Fashions  in  Coiffure ;  Tat- 
tooing;  Deforming    the    Teeth;   Deforming    the 
Feet;  Eradicating  the  Eyebrows;  Ornaments  for 
th.e    Nose,    Ears,    Lips  ;   Compressing   the   Skull ; 
Effects  of  Tight  Lacing,  etc.,  etc. 


No.  29.  Facts  aad  Fictions  of  Zoology, 
By  AndrevV  Wilson,  Ph.D.  (illustrated). 

Contents  : — Zoological  Myths  ;  the  Sea  Serpents 
of   Science  ;  Some    Animal    Architects  ;  Parasites 
and  Their  Development  ;  What  I  saw  in  an  Ant's 
Nest. 
Nos.    30    and     31.    On    the    Study    of 

Words.     By  Richard  Chenevix  Trench,  D.D. 

Contents  : — Introduction  ;  the  Poetry  in  Words  ; 
the  Morality  in  Words;  the  History  in  Words; 
the  Rise  of  New  Words  ;  the  Distinction  of  Words  ; 
the  Schoolmaster's  use  of  Words. 

No.    32.    Hereditary    Traits,    and    other 
Essays.     By  R-chard  A.  Proctor,  F.R.A.S. 
Contents  : — Hereditary   Traits' ;   Artificial   Som- 
nambulism ;  Bodily  Illness  as  a  Mental  Stimulant ; 
Dual  Consciousness. 

No.    33,  Vignettes    from    Nature.     By 

Grant  Allen. 

Contents  (in  part) : — Fallow   Deer  ;  the  Heron's 
Haunt ;  Wild   Thyme  ;  the  Fall  of  the  Leaf  ;  the 
Hedgehog's  Hole  ;  Seaside  Weeds ;  the  Donkey's 
Ancestors. 
No.  34.  The  Philosophy  of  Style.     By 

Herbert  Spencer.     To  which  is  added  : — The 

Mother    Tongue.     By    Alexander    Bain, 

LL.D. 

Contents: — The  Principle  of  Economy  applied 
to  words ;  Effect  of  Figurative  Language  Ex- 
plained ;  Arrangement  of  Minor  Images  in  build- 
ing up  a  thought ;  The  Superiority  of  Poetry  ta 
Prose  explained ;  Causes  of  Force  in  Language 
which  depend  upon  Economy  of  the  Mental  Sensi- 
bilities ;  the  Mother  Tongue. 
No.   35.   Oriental    iSeligions.    Edited  by 

Rev.  John  Caird,  D.D.,  President  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  Glasgow. 

Contents  :  —  Brahmanism  ;     Buddhism  ;     Confu- 
cianism ;  Zoroaster  and  the  Zend  Avesta. 
No.  36.  Lectures  on  Evolution,  with  a^ 

Appendix  on  the   Study   of  Biology.    By 

Thomas  H.  Huxley,  F.R  S.  (illustrated). 

Contents  : — The  Three_  Hypotheses  respecting 
the  History  of  Nature ;  the  Hypothesis  of  Evolu- 
tion— the  Neutral  and  Favorable  Evidence  ;  the 
Demonstrative  Evidence  of  Evolution  ;  the  Study 
of  Biology. 
No.  31.  Sim  Lectures  on  Light.    By  John 

Tyndall,  F.R.S.  (illustrated). 

Contents  :  —  Introductory  ;  Origin  of  Physical 
Theories ;  Relation  of  Theories  to  Experience  •, 
Chromatic  Phenomena  produced  by  Crystals ; 
Range  of  Vision  and  Range  of  Radiation  ;  Spec- 
trum Analysis. 

Nos.  3S  and  39.  Geological  Sltetches 
at  Mome  and  Abroad  5  in  two  Parts,  each 
complete  in  itself.  By  Archibald  Geikie, 
F.R.S. 

Contents  :  Part  I : — My  first  Geological  Excur- 
sion ;  "  The  Old  Man  of-  Hoy  "  ;  the  Baron's  Stone 
of  Killochan  ;  the  Colliers  of  Carrick  ;  Among  the 
Volcanoes  of  Central  France  ;  the  Old  Glaciers  of 
Norway  and  Scotland ;  Rock-Weathering  meas- 
ured by  Decay  of  Tombstones.  Part  II :  A  Frag- 
ment of  Primeval  Europe  ;  In  Wyoming ;  The 
Geysers  of  the  Yellowstone  ;  the  Lava  fields  -  of 
Northwestern  Europe ;  the  Scottish  School  of 
Geology  ;  Geographical  Evolution  ;  the  Geologi- 
cal influences  which  have  affected  the  course  of 
British  History. 

No.  40.  The  Scientific  Evidence  of  Or- 
ganic Evolution.  By  George  J.  Romanes, 
F.R.S. 

Contents  (in  part) : — The  Argument  from  Classi- 
fication— from  Morphology  or  Structure — from 
Geology — from  Geographical  Distribution — from 
Embr3'ology,  etc.,  etc. 

No.  41.  Current  XHseussions  in  Sci- 
ence. By  W.  M.  Williams,  F.C.S. 
Contents  (in  part):  The  Fuel  of  the  Sun;  Ori- 
gin of  Lunar  Volcanoes ;  Aerial  Exploration  of 
the  Arctic  Regions ;  The  Air  of  Stove-heated 
Rooms,  etc.,  etc. 

No.  42.  History  of  the  Science  of  Poli- 
tics.    By  Frederick  Pollock. 
Contents:    The    Place    of    Politics    in    Human 
Knowledge  ;    The  Classic  Period — Pericles — Soc- 
rates—Plato— Aristotle,  etc.;  the  Medieval  Period 


—the   Papacy  and  the  Empire  ;  Beginning  of  the 
Modern   Period — Maohiavelli — Hobbes  ;  the  Mod- 
era  Period — Locke— Hooker— Blackst  ine— Hume— 
Montesquieu— Burke  ;  the  Present  Cfcritury — Ben- 
thaui— Austin— Kant — Savigny — Herbert  Spencer. 
No.  43.  DariTin  and  EumboMt,  tneir 
iiives  and  Woriis  s — contains  a  series  of 
notices  of  Darwin,  by  Huxley,  Romanes,  Geikie, 
Thisciton  Dyer ;    also    the   laie   Prof.  Agassiz's 
Centennial  Address  on  the   Life  and    Work  of 
Alexander  von  Humboldt.    - 

Nos.  44  and.  45.  Ilie  Bawa  of  History : 
an  introduction  to  Pre-Historic  Study.     .Edited 
fay  C.  K   Keary,   M.A.,  of  the  British  Museum. 
In  two  Par;.,. 
Contents  of  Part  I :  Earliest  Traces  of  Man  ;  the 

Second   Stone   Age;    the   Growth   of  Languages: 

Families  of   Languages  ;  the   Nations  of   the  Old 

World  ;  Early  Social  Life  ;  the  Village  Community. 

Contents  of  Part  II :    Religion  ;   Aryan   Religion  ; 

the   Other  World:   Mythologies  and    Folk  Tales ; 

Pieture  Writing  ;  Phonetic  Writing  ;  Conclusion. 

Wo.  46.  IFlze  ISiseases  of  Memory.    By 

Th.  Ribot.      (Translated    from  the   French   by 

J.  Fitzgerald.) 

Contents: — Memory  as  a  Biological  Fact  ;  Gen- 
eral Amnesia ;  Partial  Amnesia ;  Exaltation  of 
Memory,  or  Hyperi-.nesia  ;  Conclusion. 

No.  47.  Tlie  Cliildiaood  of  Keligions. 

By  Edward  Clodd,  F.R.A.S. 

Contents  (in  part) :— Legends  of  the  Past  about 
Creation  ;  Creation  as  told  by  Science  ;  Legends 
of  the  Past  about  Mankind  ;  Ancient  and  Modern 
Hindu  Religions,  etc.,  etc. 

No.  4S.  It  lie  In  Nature.    By  James  Hinton, 

Author    of  "  Man  and  his  Dwelling  Place." 
Contents  (in    part) . — Function  ,•  Living  Forms  ; 

Is  Life  Universal?     Nutrition;  Nature  and  Man; 

the  Life  of  Man,  etc.,  etc. 

No.  49.  TCIie  Sua: — its  Constitution;  its  Phe- 
nomena; its  Condition.  By  Nathan  T.  Carr, 
LL.D.,  Judge  of  the  Ninth  Judicial  Circuit  of 
Indiana. 

Contents  (in  part)  : — The  Sun's  Atmosphere  ;  the 
Chromosphere ;  the  Photosphere ;  Production  of 
the  Sun's"  Spots  ;  the  Question  of  the  Extinction  of 
the  Sun,  etc.,  etc. 

Nos.  .50  asid  51.  Money  and  tfee  Meeli- 
anissn  of  Ezsceliange.  By  Prof.  W.  Stan- 
ley Jevons,  F.R.S. 

Contents  (in  part): — The  Functions  of  Money; 
Early  History  of  Money  ;  the  Metals  as  Money  ; 
Principles  of  Circulation  ;  Promissory  Notes  ;  the 
Banking  System;  the  Clearing  House;  Quantity 
of  Money  needed  by  a  Nation,  etc.,  etc. 
No.  52.  Tlae "diseases  of  tSie  Will.  By 
Th.  Ribot.  (^ i ransiated  from  the  French  b)rJ. 
Fitzgerald.) 

Contents  : — The    Question   Stated  ;    Impairment 
of  the  Will — Lack  of  Impulsion — Excess  of  Impul- 
sion ;  Impairment  of  Voluntary  attention  ;  Caprice  ; 
Extinction  of  the  Will  ;  Conclusion. 
No.  53.  Aj-iEaal  Automatism,  and  Other 
Essays.     By  Prof.  T.  H.  Huxley,  F.R.S. 
Contents  : — Animal    Automatism  ;    Science    and 
Culture  ;   elementary  Instruction  in  Physiology ; 
the  Border  Territory  between  Animals  and  Plants  ; 
Universities,  Actual  and  Ideal. 
No.    54.    Tlte   Birtu    and    Growtli   of 
Mytll.     By  Edward  Clodd,  F.R.A.S. 
Contents  (in  parO  : — Nature  as  viewed  by  Primi- 
';       !  ian  ;  Sun  and  Moon  in  Mythology  ;  the  Hindu 
Sun  and  Cloud  Myth  ;  Demonology  ;  Beast  Fables  ; 
Totemism,  etc.,  etc. 

Mo.  55.  TJie  Scientific  Blasts  of  Morals, 
'and  Other  Essays.  By  William  Kingdom 
Clifford,  F.R.S. 

Contents  ■ — Scientific  Basis  of  Morals  ;  Right  and 
Wrong ;  the  Ethics  of  Belief ;  the  Ethics  of  Re- 
gion. 


Nos.   58    and    57.    Illusions:    A   Psy« 
eliological  Study.    By  James  Sully. 
Contents  : — The  Study  of  Illusion  ;  Classification 

of    Illusions ;    Illusions  of    Perception ;    Dreams ; 

Illusions  of  Introspection  ;  Other  Quasi-Presenta- 

tive  illusions  ;  Illusions  of   Memory  ;   Illusions  of 

Belief. 

Nos.  58  and.  59  (two  double  aumbers,  30  cents 

eaca).  Tlie  Origin  of  Species.    By  Charles 

Darwin. 

*:>*  This    is    Darwin's  famous  work  complete, 
with  index  and  glossary. 
No.  60.  IMie  Claildliood  of  tlie  WorlcL 

By  Edward  Clodd,  f  .k..a.s. 

Contents  (in  part) : — Man's  First  Wants,  Man's 
First  Tools.  Fire,  Dwellings,  Use  of  Metals ;  Lan- 
guage, 7  iti  (  unting,  Myths  about  Sun  and 
Moon,  Stars.  Eclipses  ;  Ideas  about  the  Soul,  Be- 
lief in  Witchcraft,  Fetichism,  Idolatry,  etc.,  etc. 
No.  61.  Miscellaneous  Essays.  By  Rich- 
ard A.  Proctor. 

Contents: — Strange  Coincidences;  Coincidences 
and      Superstitions ;       Gambling      Superstitions ; 
Learning  Languages  ;  Strange  Sea-Creatures ;  the 
Origin  of  Whales  ;  Prayer  and  Weather. 
No.   62  (Double    number,  30  cents").  Tlie  Be' 

ligions  of  tlse  Ancient  World. 

Contents: — Religions  of  the  Ancient  Egyptians, 
ancient  Iranians,  Assyrians,  Babylonians,  ancien/ 
Sanskritic     Indians.     Phoenicians.    Carthaginians, 
Etruscans,  ancient  Greeks  and  ancient  Romans. 
No.     63.     Progressive     Morality.      By 

Thomas  Fowler,    F.S.A.,  President  of   Corpus 

Christi  College,  Oxford. 

Contents:  —  The  Sanctions  of  Conduct;  the 
Moral  Sanction,  or  Moral  Sentiment  ;  Analysis 
and  Formation  of  the  Moral  Sentiment ;  the  Moral 
Test ;  Examples  of  the  practical  applications  o{ 
the  Moral  Test. 
No.  64.  The  Distribution  of  ILSfe.    By 

Alferd  Russel  Wallace  and  W.  T.  Thiseltos 

Dyer. 

Contents  (in  part)  : — Geographical  Distribution 
of  Land  Animals  ;  Distribution  of  Marine  Anu 
mals  ;  Relations  of  Marine  with  Terrestrial  Zoolog- 
ical Regions ;  Distribution  of  Vegetable  Life  \ 
Northern,  Southern,  Tropical  Flora,  etc.,  etc. 
No.  65.   Conditions  of  Mental  Bevel*> 

opment,    and     Other    Essays.     By    William 

Kingdon  Clifford,  F.R.S. 

Contents  :— Conditions  of  Mental  Development; 
Aims    and    Instruments    of    Scientific    Thought ; 
Atoms  ;  The  First  and  the  Last  Catastrophe. 
No.  66.  Teclinical^  Education,  rud  other 

Essays.     By  Thomas  H.  Huxley,  F.R.S. 

Contents  : — Technical  Education  ;  The  Connec- 
tion of  the  Biological  Sciences  with  Medicine; 
Joseph  Priestley ;  On  Sensation  and  the  Unity  of 
Structure  of  the  Sensiferous  Organs;  On  Certain 
Errors  respecting  the  Structure  of  the  Heart  at- 
tributed to  Aristotle. 
No.  67.  The  Blacl£  Death;  An  account  of 

the  Great   Pestilence  of  the  14th   Century.     By 

J.  F.  C.  Hecker,  M.D. 

Contents : — General  Observations  ;  the  Disease ; 
Causes — Spread,  Mortality  ;  Moral  Effects  ;  Physi- 
cians ;  Appendix. 
No.    68   (Special   Number,    10   cents).    Three 

Essays,   viz.:  Laws,   and   the   Order  of  their 

Discovery  ;  Origin  of  Animal  Worship  ;  Politi- 
cal Fetichism.    By  Herbert  Spencer. 
No.    69   (Double  Number,   30  cents).   Fetich^ 

Ism  :  A  Contribution  to  Anthropology  and  the 

History  of  Religion.     By  Fritz  Schultze,  Ph.D. 

Translated  from  the  German  by  J.  Fitzgerald, 

M.A. 

Contents :— The  Mind  of  the_  Savage  ;  Relation 
between  the  Savage  Mind  and  its  Object ;  Fetich- 
ism as  a  Religion  ;  Various  Objects  of  Fetich  Wor- 
ship;—The  Highest  Grade  of  Fetichism;  Aim  of 
Fetichism. 


No.  70.    Essays,  Speculative  and  Prac- 
tical.    By  Herbert  spencer. 
Contents:— Specialized    Administration;     "The 
Collective   Wisdom;"    Morals  and    Moral   Senti- 
ments ;    Reasons  for  Dissenting  from   the  Philos- 
ophy of  Cornte  ;  What  is  Electricity? 
No.  71.    Anthropology.    By  Daniel  Wil- 
son, LL.D. 

Contents  : — Scope  of  the  Science  ;  Man's  Place  in 
Nature  ;  Origin  of  Man  ;  Races  of  Mankind  ;  An- 
tiquity of  Man  Language  ;  Development  of  Civ- 
ilization. 

No.   72.     The  Dancing    Mania  of  the 
Middle  Ages.    By  J.  F.  C.  Hecker,  M.D. 
Contents  (in  part)  :— The  Dancing  Mania  in  Ger- 
many and  the  Netherlands;  The  Dancing  Mania  in 
Italy  ;  The  Dancing  Mania  in  Abyssinia. 
No.    73.    Evolution   iu  History,   Lan- 
guage, and  Science.     Lectures  delivered  at 
tne  London  Crystal  Palace  School   of   Art,  Sci- 
ence, and  Literature. 

Contents: — The  Principle  of  Causal  Evolution; 
Scientific  Study  of   Geography  ;   Hereditary  Ten- 
dencies ;  Vicissitudes  of  the  English  Language. 
Nos.   74,   75,   76,   77.    The  Descent  of 
Man,  and  Selection  in    delation  to 
Sex.     By  Charles  Darwin. 
***  Price,  Parts   74,  75,  76,   fifteen  cents  each  ; 
No.  77  (double  number),  thirty  cents  ;    the   entire 
work,  seventy-five  cents. 

No.  78.  Historical  Sketch  of  the  Dis- 
tribution of  ILand  in  England.  By- 
Prof.  Wh.  Lloyd  Birkbeck,  Cambridge  Uni- 
versity. 

Contents :— Anglo-Saxon  Agriculture  ;  Origin  of 
Land  Properties ;  Saxon  Law  of  Succession  to 
Land  ;  Norman  Law  of  Succession  ;  Inclosure  of 
Waste  Lands,  etc. 

No.  79.    Scientific  Aspects  of  Some  Fa- 
miliar   Things.      By     W.     M.     Williams, 
■    F.R.S.,  F.C.S. 

Contents  :— Social  Benefits  of  Paraffin;  Forma- 
tion of  Coal ;  Chemistry  of  Bog  Reclamation  ;  The 
Coloring  of  Green  Tea  ;  "  Iron  Filings  "■  in  Tea  ; 
Origin  of  Soap  ;  Action  of  Frost  on  Building  Ma- 
terials, etc.  ;  Fire-Clay  and  Anthracite  ;  Rumford's 
Cooking-Stoves;  Stove -heated  Rooms;  Domestic 
Ventilation. 

No.  80.  Charles  Darwin  s  His  JBJife  and 
Work.  By  Grant  Allen.  (Double  Numoer, 
30  cents.) 
No.  81.  The  Mystery  of  Matter.  Also 
The  Philosophy  of  Ignorance.  By  J. 
Allanson   Picton. 

No.  82.   .  Illusions  of  the    Senses  and 
Other  Essays.    By  Richard  A.  Proctor. 
Contents: — Illusions  of  the  Senses;   Animals  of 

the  Present  and  the  Past ;  Life  in  Other  Worlds  ; 

Earthquakes;  Our  Dual  Brain;  A  New  Star  in  a 

Star    Cloud  ;    Monster    Sea-Serpents ;     Origin    of 

Comets. 

No.  83.  Profit-Sharing  Between  La- 
bor and  Capital.  By  Sedley  Taylor. 
Contents: — Profit-Sharing  in  the  Maison  Le- 
claire  ;  Profit-Sharing  in  Industry  ;  Profit-Sharing 
in  the  Paris-Orleans'  R.R.  Co.  ;  Profit-Sharing  in 
Agriculture  ;  An  Irish  Experiment  ;  Profit-Shar- 
ing in  Distributive  Enterprise. 


No.    84.  Studies  of  Animated  Nature. 

Uy  W.  S.  Dallas. 

Contents:  —  Bats;     Dragon-Flies;    The     Glow- 
Worm  and  other  Phosphorescent  Animals;  Minute 
Organisms. 
No.  85.    The  Essential  Nature  of  Be- 

ligion.     By  J.  Allanson  Picton. 

Contents:  Religion  and  Freedom  of  Thought; 
Evolution  of  Religion;  Fetichism;  Nature-Wor- 
ship; Prophetic  Religions;  Religious  Dogma;  The 
Future  of  Religion. 

No.  86,  The  Unseen  Universe.  Also, 
The  Philosophy  of  the  irure  Science ; 
By  Wh.  Kingdom  Clifford,  F.R.S. 

Contents; — The  Unseen  LTniverse;  Philosophy  of 
the  Pure  Sciences  ;  Statement  of  the  Question  ; 
Knowledge  and  Feeling;  Postulates  of  the  Science 
of  Space;  The  Universal  Statements  of  Arithmetic. 
No.  87.    The   Morphine    Habit   iMor- 

phinoinauia.)       With      Four     oilier 

lectures.    By  Prof  B.  Ball,  M.D. 

Contents  : — General  Description  of  Morphino- 
mania;  Effects  of  the  Abuse  of  Morphine;  Effects 
of  Abstinence;  The  Borderland  of  Insanity,  Pro- 
longed Dreams  ;  Cerebral  Dualism  ;  Insanity  in 
Twins. 

No.  88.    Science  and  Crime,  and  other 

Essays.     By  Andrew  Wilson,  b  .R.S.E. 

Contents: — Science  and   Crime;  Earliest  known 
Life-Relic;    About   Kangaroos;    On  Giants;    The 
Polity  of  a  Pond;  Skates  and  Rays;  Leaves. 
No.   89.     The  Genesis  of  Science.     By 

Herbert  Spencer. 

To  which  is  added  :  The  Coming  of  Age  of  "  The 
Origin  of  Species  "  By  T.  H.  Huxley. 

No.  90.  Notes  on  Earthquakes  :  with 
other  Essays.  By  Richard  A.  Proctor. 
Contents  : — Notes  on  Earthquakes  ;  Photograph- 
ing Fifteen  Million  Stars;  Story  of  the  Moon; 
The  Earth's  Past  ;  Story  of  the  Earth  ;  Falls  of 
Niagara ;  The  Unknowable  ;  Sun- Worship  ;  Her- 
bert Spencer  on  Priesthoods  -  Star  of  Bethlehem 
and  a  Bible  Comet ;  An  Historical  Puzzle  ;  Galileo, 
Darwin,  and  the  Pope ;  Science  and  Politics  ; 
Parents  and  Children. 

No.    91.    The  Rise  off  Universities.    By 

S.  S.  Laurie,  LL.D     (Double  number,  30  cents.) 

Contents  : — Romano-Hellenic  Schools;  Influence 
of  Christianity  on  Education;  Charlemagne  and 
the  Ninth  Century;  The  First  Universities;  Saler 
num  School;  University  of  Naples;  of  Bologna; 
of  Paris,  Constitution  of  Universities;  Graduation; 
Oxford  and  Cambridge;  University  of  Prague, 
etc. 

No.  92.  Formation  of  Vegetable 
Mould  Through  the  Action  of  Earth- 
Worms,  with  "Observations  on  their 
Habits.  By  Charles  Darwin.  (Double  Num- 
ber, 30  cents.) 

No.  93.  Scientific  Methods  of  Capital 
Punishment.  By  J  Mount  Bleyer,  M.D. 
(Price  ten  cents.) 

Contents  •  General  Review  of  the  Subject; 
Death  by  Hanging;  by  Electricity;  by  Subcuta- 
neous Injection  of  Morphine;  by  Chloroform;  by 
Prussic  Acid;  Objections.  Appendix;  Inflictioa 
of  the  Death  Penalty,  By  Park  Benjamin. 


Sent  post-free  on  receipt  of  price. 

J.  FITZGERALD,  PUBLISHER, 

24  East  4th  St.,  NEW  YORK. 


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